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Abstract

This dissertation finds its exigency in “The 9/11 Commission Report,” and
specifically its claim that “a failure of imagination” that dismisses possibilities
relates to the work currently in focus within rhetoric and composition studies as
it relates to writing (with) new media. My argument relies on the underdeveloped
concept of ‘imagination’ in composition as a way to argue for an alternate
theoretical framework for addressing what writing (with) new media entails as
a growing form of art. As such, I take up Geoff Sirc’s invitation to ‘remake’ his
English Composition as a Happening with all of its references to avant-garde art
as conceptualized in Allan Kaprow’s figure of the unartist and Dick Higgins calls
for intermedia practices. Both of these concepts appear in the unart of comics – an
‘art’ for artists who have left their ‘homes’ in disciplinary iterations of art (unart)
and for artists who are more concerned with working between media than they are
within a specific medium (intermedia). Comics, as I use the term, does not refer
to a specific medium, but works as a form of thought in the Deleuzian sense: a
sort of intuition exercised by imagination engaged in the continuous discovery of
possibilities.
Building on ‘post-pedagogical’ theories of invention—Italo Calvino, Byron
Hawk, Cynthia Haynes, Gregory Ulmer—avant-garde writing and art practices (as
it relates to new media)—Maurice Blanchot, Andre Breton, Friedrich Kittler, Jeanii

Francois Lyotard—and institutional rhetorics—Giorgio Agamben, Jacques Derrida,
Bill Readings, Thomas Rickert—I propose a ‘strange’ manner of writing that
foregoes the demands of argumentative writing in favor of a playful writing that
attunes itself to imaginative possibilities of discovery. To write strangely connotes
an unconventional approach to composition that would offer us the opportunities to
think about ‘the coming composition’ as we invent new forms and ways of thinking
according to methods invented for the occasion. In inventing new forms by thinking
in terms of intermedia, we can realize the goal of Lyotard’s postmodern writer:
to present (allusions to) the unpresentable. If we are to address the ‘failure of
imagination’ in institutional practice and in ‘the scene of teaching,’ we need to be
willing to be nomadic as both artists AND writers. Comics ‘artists,’ or those who
I refere to as unartists, are adept at demonstrating ways in which this work can
proceed, especially if we think of comics in terms of Haynes’ slash-technology that
cuts through the divisions between media. In this dissertation, comics function as
a form of thought that extends ‘multimodal composition’ and ‘art’ to their limits in
order to suggest a strangely imaginative composition capable of attending to the
disast(e)rous ‘failure of imagination.’
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Imagining the Coming Composition

Imagining the Coming Composition
“Give ‘em the boot, the roots, the radicals/
Give ‘em the boot, you know I’m a radical…”
~ Rancid, “Roots Radicals”
“At a time when wise men peered/through glass tubes
toward the sky/the heavens changed in predictable
ways/and one man was able to find/that he had
thought he found the answer/and he was quick to
write his revelation/but as they were scrutinized/in his
colleagues eyes/he soon became a mockery/don’t tell
me about the answer/’cause then another one will come
along soon/I don’t believe you have the answer/I’ve got
ideas too/but if you’ve got enough naïveté/and you’ve
got conviction/then the answer is perfect for you…”
~ Bad Religion, “The Answer”

I

would prefer not to write ‘purely.’1 The predictability of such writing holds
little interest and even less activity by providing (revelatory) answers with

conviction, coded as acceptable. As Maurice Blanchot points out in a reading of
Herman Melville’s “Bartleby the Scrivener,” ‘pure’ writing “can only be that of
the copyist (rewriting)” (Writing 145). And yet, it is Bartleby’s refusal to write
purely that disrupts the unnamed narrator’s refusal to write at all, contented to
direct other scriveners to write and correct their errors. It is this refusal that I
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look to affirm – a passive, passionate, patient writing that precedes, and therefore
reproduction of essays (pure writing) that we have seen so often. And Bartleby’s
refusal prompts the unnamed narrator to take up a quill and write for the first
time, waiving “the biographies of all other scriveners, for a few passages in the life
of Bartleby, who was a scrivener, the strangest one I ever saw, or heard of. While,
of other law-copyists, I might write the complete life, of Bartleby nothing of that
sort can be done” – ‘a few passages’ (aphorisms) that jeopardize his conviction that
the “easiest way of life is the best” (Melville 39-40). For the unnamed narrator,
the easiest way of life is to maintain the letter of the law, to write full biographies
word-for-word, to maintain his conviction toward the ‘easiest way of life is best’
and remain a convict of ‘pure writing.’ Even in writing Bartleby’s “little narrative,”
the narrator continues writing purely, copying what he observes, describing it in
detail, attempting to give a clear picture of his former scrivener. In concluding,
the narrator explains his purpose for writing: “if this little narrative has
sufficiently interested him, to awaken curiosity as to who Bartleby was, making his
acquaintance, I can only reply, that in such curiosity I fully share, but am wholly
unable to gratify” (Melville 73). Unable to gratify his curiosity, he writes, in an
attempt to make sense of Bartleby’s (excessive) refusal.
David Bartholomae tells us of a similar project in “The Tidy House: Basic
Writing in the American Curriculum” when he discusses Quentin Pierce’s essay
for an assignment about Jean-Paul Sartre. As Bartholomae reports, “I knew from
the first week that I was going to fail them; in fact, I knew I was going to preside
over a curriculum that spent 14 weeks slowly and inevitably demonstrating their
failures” (Writing 313). He was not prepared to receive Quentin’s essay, he did
not know how to respond to it, he could only ignore it even though it was the “only
memorable paper [he] received from that class” (Writing 314). Like Bartleby’s

3

exceeds, any criterion of acceptable writing, anything that falls outside of the
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what was acceptable (“normal”) writing had been exceeded. Quentin preferred
not to write purely, and wrote according this preference, producing an essay
that left Bartholomae curious and unsure about what he was doing teaching
basic writing. This is not to say that Bartholomae did not sense that Quentin’s
essay demonstrated a level of “skillful performance in words” (Writing 314);
indeed, Bartholomae recognized that the “paper was a written document of some
considerable skill and force – more skill and force, for example, than I saw in many
of the ‘normal’ and acceptable papers I read” (Writing 314). While Bartholomae
deals specifically with ‘basic writing,’ his perspectives apply to general education
writing courses that attempt to produce writers who can make effective arguments
and, in effect, normalize students with pedagogical methods that emphasize skills,
courses that postpone “‘real’ reading and writing” that enforce “the very cultural
divisions that [stand] as the defining markers of the problem with education
and its teachers” (Writing 315). And despite current trends toward avant-garde
writing pedagogies, institutional and disciplinary demands remain focused on
offering students a set of skills that they will need when they begin ‘real’ reading
and writing – reading and writing that will begin only after they learn how to
perpetuate what they learn in university writing courses.2 In other words, a skillsbased pedagogical approach – such as the one detailed by the current Council of
Writing Program Administrator’s (CWPA), which includes writing multiple drafts,
focusing on a purpose, and developing effective arguments – churns out copyists
(scriveners) by seeking to “to regularize what can be expected to be taught in firstyear composition” since helping “students demonstrate these outcomes requires

Fail
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unnamed narrator (henceforth, Bartleby), Bartholomae’s initial criterion of

expert understanding of how students actually learn to write” (CWPA). Thinking
that “experts” understand how students “actually learn to write” better than
students themselves is (actually) to keep students from learning to write in their
own ways. Its as if teaching these writers to write to the letter of the law could the
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answer to a disaster that has no (single) answer (e.g., an answer to the question
September 11, 2001).3 Pedagogically, regularizing the outcomes for student writing
implicates pedagogues in the regulation of thought as manifested through writing.
Commenting on Bartholomae’s essay, Thomas Rickert explains some the
implications for traditional writing pedagogy: “It is not so much that pedagogy
fails as that pedagogy is implicated at every turn in the structures that contribute
to Pierce’s nihilism and daily humiliation. Pierce knows all too well that ‘effective
communication’ is a trap for him” (Acts 192). But it would be a mistake to see
Quentin’s work – and Bartleby’s refusal – as something to replace the accepted
writing (practices) lest the excessive displaces and replaces current assessment
standards and procedures. Instead, Rickert chooses to see Quentin’s essay as a
performative (singular) act (moment) that reflects “his ability to cut through [his
servitude to the institution], to refuse to believe in a fantasy of writing for the
university as being somehow liberating, empowering, or even meaningful” (Acts
194). This, however, does not mean that Rickert’s pedagogical manner is devoid
of meaning; rather, he sees the act of writing as meaning in itself, as an inventive
moment; or, to stretch Bartholomae’s “Inventing the University,” Quentin invents
the university by writing strangely with his refusal to write in service to/for the
university, and “to learn to speak our language” (Writing 60). He doesn’t believe
that Bartholomae (or the university) has the answers because he has ideas too; he’s
not naïve, but he asserts his failure by performing in such an excessive manner
that Bartholomae is left to his own devices to find meaning in Quentin’s essay, as
if he were looking at an avant-garde artwork. Quentin’s refusal, like Bartleby’s,
appears in ‘a few passages,’ as aphoristic performances (as in the styles of
Nietzsche and Benjamin), which Bartholomae then applies to his own pedagogical
perspective(s). And Rickert also looks at the essay to provide an alternate
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concerning how to avoid another terrorist attack the likes of which we saw on
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perspective, one that he recognizes may be misread: “[H]e sets out the possibility
for a writing that would be otherwise, that would not display in each grammatically
correct line, in each thesis proved and supported, in each ending skillfully reached
and concluded, the utter slavishness and impoverishment of what counts as ‘good’
writing in the academy” (Acts 195). Bartholomae and Rickert share a common
perspective on what Quentin’s essay presents: that institutional and disciplinary
demands have become so fixed that the dominant pedagogical methods currently in
play have turned writing into basic writing, demanding that students write purely
(re/produce writing) according institutionally defined standards.4
Unlike Bartholomae, Rickert suggests a pedagogy imbued with risk, one
that he finds within Geoffrey Sirc’s DIY (do-it-yourself) ‘punk pedagogy. Punk, as a
state of mind, does not merely refuse the answer(s) that a writing discipline offers
its disciples, but thrusts off any answers that have been proceduralized. Instead,
like Quentin, a punk pedagogy pays no heed to the authorized forms of writing
– in favor of standard or against those standards – proposed by institutionalized
or academic standards, but attempts to exceed those demands to present the
unpresentable (Lyotard). Sirc recognizes this element of Quentin’s essay when he
writes: “Quentin, then, is the excess that our pedagogy cannot process, the poison
in our human machine. But Quentin is also the flower in our dustbin, one whose
seed lay not-so-dormant (the only memorable paper) for eighteen years until it
blossomed in ‘The Tidy House’” (English 261). And Rickert notes “Sirc’s pun on
‘process’ as a statement on the limits of process pedagogy” (Acts 192). A pedagogy
that risks would extend the limits of what we can process by allowing students to
develop ever-changing processes in their writing. What Quentin produced was more
than a mere refusal of the institution; it was also a commentary on the limitations
of a Modernist (generalizable) pedagogy, which Sirc describes as being “all about
limits” and suggests that these “may be limits we no longer want to define our
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composition” (English 36). Quentin, in exceeding the limits of institutional
English 260), and he becomes Lyotard’s postmodern writer:
A postmodern artist or writer is in the position of a philosopher: the texts he
writes, the work he produces are not in principle governed by preestablished
rules, and they cannot be judged according to a determining judgment, by
applying familiar categories to the text or to the work. Those rules and
categories are what the work of art itself is looking for. The artist and writer,
then, are working without rules in order to formulate the rules of what will
have been done. Hence the fact that work and text have the characters of
an event: hence also, they always come too late for their author, or, what
amounts to the same thing, their being put into work, their realization (mise
en oeuvre) always begin too soon. Post modern would have to be understood
according to the paradox of the future (post) anterior (modo). (Lyotard,
Postmodern Condition 81)
Indeed, as Bartholomae writes, he was not prepared for Quentin’s essay; it had
come too soon, too soon for not only his ability to manage the essay and too soon
for what pedagogy was prepared to address. By the time that he wrote “The Tidy
House,” Bartholomae was already recognizing some of the faults in disciplinary
perspectives of ‘basic writing’ programs, particularly that “a provisional position
has become fixed, naturalized” (Writing 325) – what Blanchot calls pure writing.
Sirc’s conceptualization of English Composition as a Happening and ‘punk
pedagogy’ provides a way out of the fixed position with his preference not to allow
composition to be defined by those limits. Moreover, Quentin’s essay risks failure
according to a determining judgment, but that risk positions him as a postmodern

7

acceptability, refuses “to enable the ritual” of ‘pure’ writing any “further” (Sirc,
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writer, a risk that Bartholomae, Rickert and Sirc bear witness to as a common
obstruction of English Composition, and one where students serve institutions
and their (ir)respective practices (cf. CWPA). Like Sirc, I would prefer to allow
inhabitants of writing “a sense of the sublime” and “offer compelling environments
in which to inhabit situations of writing instruction” (English 1-2). However, what
follows is not a mere reiteration of Sirc’s work – that would be to write purely.
Instead, I receive4 his “salute” for “the next remake of English Composition as
a Happening” (English 294) and write (of) the disaster6 – simultaneously the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, and composition’s continued focus on skillsbased pedagogy – and write strangely.7 Indeed, this imaginative manner of writing
promotes “writing Acts that shift control of the dominant loci of contention from
teacher to student […] that refuses to mirror the society of control with a pedagogy
of control” (Rickert, Acts 163). Such a radically passive writing (pedagogy) does
not propose “an effort to construct a ‘new’ ethic” or “to produce any ‘new’ values,”
but to allow “another ethic” to “enter our conversations” (Haynes, “The EthicoPolitical Agon” 304). In other words, Rickert suggests a postpedagogy that does not
attempt “a reversal of valuation (as in a binary reversal or negative deconstruction)
achieved through oppositional strategies, but [as] a transvaluation (in the
Nietzschean sense8) achieved through production” (Acts 173).
Versus its mis/re/presentation by folks suspicious of postmodernist critiques,
postpedagogy does not resist meaning per se, but espouses a proliferation of
meanings. In this sense, postpedagogy does not suggest that pedagogy is at its end;
rather, it recognizes recognition that we are always already in a pedagogical state
of being, that we are never finished learning. Postpedagogy, then, aims to exceed
the Modernist limits that Sirc finds have defined institutionally appropriate writing
in order to ‘formulate the rules of what will have been done’ through a productive
imagination.9 Byron Hawk explains that the “problem with excluding this larger
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role of the imagination is that it reduces thinking to generic inventional strategies
and that the appeal of the imagination is that it does not “determine the path of
inquiry,” but “continually sets that inquiry in motion” (Counterhistory 102), similar
to Gregory Ulmer’s concepts of conduction and heuretics.10
Hawk’s view echoes what William A. Covino suggests in Magic Rhetoric, and
Literacy: “What human imagination can maintain, perhaps, is an appreciation for
‘absolute refusal’ that is our only hope” (108). Again, Bartleby’s refusal rears its
head – to refuse to write purely is to refuse, as Quentin does, the answer in favor
of inventing the composition(s) to come. As Lyotard explains in The Postmodern
Condition, the imagination “allows one either to make a new move or to change
the rules of the game” (52) – the same rules that would ‘slowly and inevitably’
work to demonstrate ‘Quentin’s failure.’ Quentin’s refusal to write purely, as well
as Bartleby’s, is perhaps the production of the coming composition11 that invents
new rules for writing as it acts out the practices of writing. If current trends are
any sign, writing will take form as both image and text: comics.12 However, before
continuing with a discussion of comics, I want to focus on what is at stake in this
call for revitalizing the imagination for rhetoric and composition.

“A Failure of Imagination”

T

hese are the words of former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz
to former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, reported by the 9/11

Commission; it was, they write, “a mind-set that dismissed possibilities” (National
Commission 336). This is precisely the sort of mindset that Hawk challenges
in his discussion of Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s secondary imagination, and

9

that are then plugged into a linear and acontextual model of the composing process”
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that postpedagogical manners13 offer. “Such a view of creative invention and
proliferation,” Hawk tells us, “not only opens method to the moment but also
means that method is not something that pre-exists and then mediates subject
and object as a third term [the excessive]” (Counterhistory 109). In part, the
failure that Wolfowitz describes is one that ignores the third (excessive) term
Hawk finds absent in current writing pedagogy, and one that can have disastrous
consequences. Chapter 11 of the Commissions report (“Foresight—And Hindsight”)
explains:
In composing this narrative, we have tried to remember that we write with
the benefit and handicap of hindsight. Hindsight can sometimes see the past
clearly—with 20/20 vision. But the path of what happened is so brightly lit
that it places everything else more deeply into shadow. Commenting on Pearl
Harbor, Roberta Wohlstetter found it “much easier after the event to sort out
the relevant from the irrelevant signals. After the event, of course, a signal is
always crystal clear; we can now see what disaster it was signaling since the
disaster has occurred. But before the event it is obscure and pregnant with
conflicting meanings” (National Commission 339)

The lack of foresight, the (in)ability to imagine possibilities.
What the Commission acknowledges here in the handicap
of hindsight, what ‘this narrative’ indicates, is not the need
to learn from the past, but to bear witness to what the
imagination offers (‘free play’), and to work without (a predetermined) criteria (which is not to say “no criteria”) to
formulate what will have been since “the limits of what
people then could reasonably have known or done” (National Commission 339)
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lacked the sufficient foresight. Even more telling is the Commission’s use of the
11

“reasonable,” for what constitutes reason failed to defer the disaster. Likewise,
reason, and reasonable writing, being able to focus on a purpose in order to
develop effective arguments, contains no risk (and therefore, the utmost risk14) and
dismisses the possibilities of writing otherwise.
Again, Blanchot aphorizes:
Fragmentary writing is risk, it would seem: risk itself. It is not based on
any theory, nor does it introduce a practice one could define as interruption.
Interrupted, it goes on. Interrogating itself, it does not co-opt the question
but suspends it (without maintaining it) as nonresponse. Thus, if it claims
that its time comes only when the whole—at least ideally—is realized, this
is because that time is never sure, but is the absence of time, absence in a
nonnegative sense, time anterior to all past-present, as well as posterior to
every possibility of a present yet to come. (Writing 59-60)
Blanchot performs the risk of aphorism, but a risk with the power of the refusals
that Bartleby and Quentin pose – a ‘nonresponse’ – and in doing so becomes
the postmodern writer (a refugee from reason) that Lyotard adopts. The risk
of refusal to write reasonably, as Covino suggests, may be the hope of an
imaginative approach the 9/11 Commission finds necessary. And yet, even as the
they also propose the paradoxical solution of finding “a way of routinizing, even
bureaucratizing, the exercise of imagination” (National Commission 344), which
would merely position imagination in the service of institutional standards and,
therefore, lose its risk.

Epic Fail

Commission’s report critiques institutional bureaucracy for a lack of imagination,
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The imagination cannot be applied in any tradition/al way – which would
be a form a critique15 – but may be produced without a pre-established valuation
system. In his discussion of the Berlin Wall and of the ‘Gulf situation’ in1990,
Lyotard explains that critique develops “in the empty interior space that the
system maintains and protects within itself”; yet, even within those systems “some
‘blanks’ always remain in the ‘text,’ whatever text it is” (Political Writings 120).
For the 9/11 Commission, these blanks are “the resource[s] of critique” (Lyotard,
Political Writings 120) that they recognize in Wolfowitz’s phrase: “a failure of
imagination.” But the failure was not of imagination, but the lack of imagination,
an approach that focuses more on critique and assessment than on potentialities
of writing (i.e., a capacity for coming into being through writing),16 perhaps as a
method to protect itself. Still, if there is one lesson that can be garnered from the
report and the events of 9/11, it is that the system’s methods do not suffice. The
same ‘blanks’ that institutions use as a “resource of critique” allow for “something
besides critique: imagination” (Lyotard, Political Writings 120), a productive and
provocative imagination. Integrating the imagination into the political, which the
Commission suggests is necessary, only positions it as a part of the letter of the law
that ‘dismissed possibilities.’
Instead, Lyotard’s postmodern writer, in his ability to work without preestablished rules, works beyond the limits of what is acceptable in order to affirm
alternate possibilities. As a “philosopher,” the postmodern writer takes up Friedrich
Nietzsche’s demand to “take his stand beyond good and evil and leave the illusion of
moral judgment beneath himself. This demand follows from an insight which I was
first to formulate: that there are altogether no moral facts” (Portable 501). Even in
its desire to integrate the imagination in the service of institutional practices, the
Commission positions itself against what it recognizes as ‘evil’ – terrorism – but the
imagination occupies no place within this distinction, it takes no-thing for granted.
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Nietzsche explains: “Moral judgments […] belong to a stage of ignorance at which
are still lacking; thus ‘truth,’ at this stage, designates all sorts of things which
we today call ‘imaginings’ (Portable 501).17 At this point, the postmodern writer’s
desire to write what will have been, writing to invent or discover the rules of
additional potentialities of writing, exceeds the values of institutional practices in
order to invent valuations for what functions beyond institutional practices, which
is precisely what the Commission recommends despite their call to appropriate the
imagination as a part of the system:
The men and women of the World War II generation rose to the challenges
of the 1940s and 1950s. They restructured the government so that it could
protect the country. That is now the job of the generation that experienced
9/11. Those attacks showed, emphatically, that ways of doing business rooted
in a different era are not just good enough. Americans should not settle for
incremental, ad hoc adjustments to a system designed generations ago for a
world that no longer exists. (National Commission 399)
This sounds remarkably like a call for a post-modern politics, in the Lyotardian
sense. The presented, the presentable, has not worked to defer the disaster and
the disaster is always approaching, and the fixed letter of the law has not gone far
enough. Adjustments to a system rooted in the rhetorical practices, thinking and
assessment appear to have been stripped of their power, laid bare by Lyotard’s
ephemeral skin – the excessive potential of the figural (image).18 And, “it is
necessary that we strengthen our imagination, our palpative potential [puissance]
until – rather than to think, we are not thinkers – until a producer-body,
determines it; the idea of a passage over nothing, which produces, its passage”
(Lyotard, Libidinal 16). Put simply, the imagination does not think (itself), but cuts

13

the very concept of the real and the distinction between what is real and imaginary,

Imagining the Coming Composition
14

through oppositional forces with “ephemeral explosions or libidinal intensities”
(Lyotard, Libidinal 18) not to record, but to write other/wise.19

Toward a (Post)Pedagogical Writing

S

o, what has this to do with composition (pedagogy)? Everything! The pedagogical
imperative to provide students with what they need to succeed in the university

and postponing the ‘real’ writing that they will be required to complete later
still remains a way of enforcing “the very cultural divisions that [stand] as the
defining markers of the problem with education and its teachers” (Bartholomae,
Writing 315), the same problems that the 9/11 Commission acknowledges as a
‘failure of imagination.’20 As pedagogues, we occupy a political position, one, if
current pedagogical theory is any sign, that remains grounded within institutional
perspectives of being able to provide students with the necessary skills to succeed in
the perpetuation of institutional practices. Diane Davis explains as much when she
writes, “[James] Berlin’s article [“Rhetoric and Ideology in the Writing Class”] exposed
the extent to which politics is always driving any/every rhetoric of composition and
its corresponding pedagogy, the extent to which power/knowledge in the classroom
is ideologically saturated” (Breaking 209; cf. Berlin, Rhetoric 189). Davis continues:
“Even the teaching of composition, as Berlin suggests, is the teaching of a world view:
it assumes and then propagates a particular relationship among the writer, the reader,
language, and ‘reality,’ and from there it peddles assumptions about what is, what
ought to be, and what can be changed. This is a seriously political business” (Breaking
209-10; original emphasis). A post (future) writing would leave these assumptions at
the center of (current) traditional composition pedagogy and move to the wayside, the
gutter21 where thought can open up possibilities of “thinking the unthought” (Davis,
Breaking 208).

Un/Composing (Visual) Rhetorics

the space where Scott McCloud observes that readers and writers insert themselves
to make links between panels. It is no coincidence that comics seem to fit the
postmodern writer so well since they incorporate both word and image (hybrid
works), as I alluded to earlier. As McCloud observes, “in the limbo of the gutter,
human imagination takes two separate images and transforms them into a
single idea” (Understanding 66). ‘Limbo’ seems a fitting word in the current setting,
indicating a state of uncertainty, a third position that Hawk and Davis offer writing.
Moreover, the transformation that McCloud imagines takes place in the excluded
excess (an abyss? perhaps an abysmal space?22), that which has yet to be thought.
Unknowingly, McCloud taps into the necessity to link that Lyotard describes in The
Differend23 (can you see the linkages here?). But the ‘imagination’ that McCloud
points to is not governed by an ‘ought,’ but a necessity – Lyotard cautions us to not
“confuse necessity with obligation. If there is a must (Il faut), it is not a You ought to
(Vous devez)” (Differend 80). These linkages, then, become imaginatively inventive,
exploring potentialities that have yet to be thought or written, through unexpected
arrangements. The preference not to write purely opens up what would otherwise be
dismissed possibilities given that linking “is necessary,” but not “a particular linkage”
(Lyotard, Differend 134; cf. Vitanza, “Three Countertheses”), and to which McCloud
makes no claim. Even an inspectional reading of Understanding Comics suggests
that McCloud sees his analysis of, and the medium of, comics as contingent: “It’s only
through wandering that any of us ever get a solid sense of where we want to go. And
no matter how many worthwhile destinations have been visited by earlier generations
-- there’s always a chance that yours doesn’t exist on any map yet, because it has
yet to be discovered” (Understanding 238; original emphasis). However, what comics
offer rhetoric and composition extends beyond the gutter, an ‘idiom’ that has so often
been addressed; rather, comics engages the available means of production that Lyotard
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associates with postmodern writing: discourse (word) AND figure (image) – each of
which have found their ways into the composition classroom as ‘multimodal’ writing.
Still, approaches to multimodal writing remain focused on critique or
argumentation, which offers a set of possible (worthwhile) directions, but does not
take into account the chances of finding unthought possibilities that fall outside
(between) that set. Sid Jacobson and Ernie Colón provide an example of the former
with their ‘graphic adaptation’ of the 9/11 Commission Report. The adaptation, as
Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton
write in the foreword, affords the 9/11
Commission “the opportunity to bring
the work of the 9/11 Commission to the
attention of a new set of readers. We
commend the talented graphic artists

There is no
art here.

of this edition for their close adherence
to the findings, recommendation, spirit, and tone of the original Commission
Report” (ix). Here, the opportunities that multimodal writing affords writers takes
a back seat to representing a truncated version of the original report, closely
adhering to institutional recommendations even while the report implores readers
to think the unthought, and to allow a free play of the imagination to take alternate
routes.24 For Walter Ong, comics present an avant-garde approach to writing,
one that “is often genuinely avant-garde—representing (with understandable
inaccuracy and exaggeration) the sensibilities everybody is on the way to
developing, only well ahead of the mass of people” (Heer 100). In Ong’s estimation
of comics, the adaptation of the 9/11 Commission report does little to foresee the
possibilities of multimodal writing in its contentment to directly represent the
original. Indeed, Ong sees the potential of comics to write strangely and with
inaccuracy to see what may arise out of the imagination. Ong continues:
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cripples an intelligent approach to the problems of the modern artist, lies the
supposition (in part an heritage from Rousseau, who may be followed in face
where he is disowned in principle) that the common man is always right in
his attitudes and instincts and that it is high time effete “modern” artists and
writers returned to him and his point of view, whatever that is. But there
seems to be signs that the common man, in his own instinctive way, has
perhaps vague symptoms of the disease supposed to be the prerogative of the
decadent intellectual. Popular art—and if there was ever popular art, it is the
comic strip—is like the thing most opposed to. (Heer 101)
If we are to believe Ong, comics present themselves as a way to popularize a
postmodern writing that takes into account that which has led to the ‘decay’ of
dialogue, from “the art of discourse to the art of reason” as he details in Ramus,
Method, and the Decay of Dialogue: From the Art of Discourse to the Art of Reason.
Whether ‘decadent intellectuals’ recognize the current effects of Ramism on how
institutions function, there exists a focus, a rootedness, on what ‘students’ need
as institutionally mandated by the pre-established criteria and curricula that
handicaps the ability of imagination to wander, explore, and experiment at, within,
and across excluded possibilities.
In a reading of Ong’s Ramus, Haynes explains that the problem for composition
lies at the heart of pedagogy where “reason is perfected in pedagogy, for pedagogy, by
pedagogues” (“Writing Offshore” 673), which locates writing in (the service of) institutions.
One suggestion that Haynes proposes is akin to the 9/11 Commission’s desire to be more
imaginative: “We must be (t)reasonous. We must be intensive and hospitable; we must
be without way” (711). However, while the Commission seeks an imaginative method in
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the service of institutional stability, imagination pays no heed to (any single) method or
service, but plays in an ungrounded sliver (perhaps a slash). Moreover, an imaginative
postpedagogy would discard “whys” in favor of intensive performances that may be
productively (t)reasonous, “as a site where strange explorations are appreciated, where
aesthetic criteria still come into play, but criteria not merely cribbed off an endless,
formalist tape-loop” (Sirc, English 32; qtd. in Haynes, “Writing Offshore” 710). Building on
Vitanza’s “Three Counterthesis,” Haynes suggests that we turn to writing nomadically,
an ungrounded (non)position that detaches itself from institutionally accepted practices
as a way to wander through writing, “testing contradictions” instead of “taking a
position” (“Writing Offshore” 715). Such is the “art consciousness to daily life” that Sirc
proposes in “Box Logic,” an approach geared toward “attempts to use technology to infuse
contemporary composition instruction with a spirit of the neo-avant-garde” (146). Such is
Marshall McLuhan’s perspective that “comics provide a useful approach to understanding
the TV image [digital media]” (Understanding 164) that may remind “us of all the life and
faculty that we have omitted from our daily lives” (Understanding 167). Such is Allan
Kaprow’s unartist, “who is engaged in changing jobs” (Understanding 102). Such is the task
of Lyotard’s philosopher – a postmodern writer and artist exceeding pre-established criteria
in order to continually formulate the rules of what will have been. And perhaps, such a
pedagogical manner would have us uncomposition ourselves from institutional demands
to write purely so that we may explore what other possibilities present themselves in Acts
of writing. Comics provide such a way to begin thinking about writing as postmoderns.
McCloud’s six steps – (1) Idea, (2) Form, (3) Idiom, (4) Structure, (5) Craft, (6) Surface –
of creating such work gestures toward such a writing, including the progression of this
dissertation.
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W

hile I use McCloud’s six steps as a framework for this dissertation,
the manifestations of the chapters do not (always) directly correlate to

the descriptions that he provides for each step. The six steps, or chapters, are
subdivided through three parts: knowing, doing, and making. The first three
chapters constitute the ‘knowing,’ while the last two chapters comprise the ‘doing,’
and the ‘making’ consists of the design, writing, and production of this dissertation.
To explain how I use McCloud’s six steps, the following chapter descriptions offer
a brief introduction into how I am using comics in this dissertation. Put simply,
I do not mean to use comics as such to discuss rhetoric and composition’s current
move toward digital technology; instead, comics suggest something else, and what
they suggest is similar to why Duchamp interests Sirc: “showing how alternative
technologies and strategies can change fundamental compositional questions”
(English 35).
In addition, I will also be designing the
dissertation in such a way to perform the work
that I propose. As you’ve probably already noticed,
the ‘tabs’ on the side of each page will indicate a
color associated with each chapter. The rationale
for this color scheme comes from the Department
of Homeland Security’s advisory system: (1) Red
(step 1), (2) Orange (step 2), (3) Yellow (step 3), (4)
Blue (step 4), and (5) Green (steps 5 and 6). For
the purpose of this dissertation, I had to add an
additional color (violet) in order to be able to offer

Homeland Security Advisory System:
Color-coded Threat Level
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a color for each chapter.
In Chapter I – idea (concept behind the idea): “There’s a Stranger in
My Composition” – I work through a survey, a sort of literature review, of
what has already been said in relation to postpedagogies, highlighting ways
in which composition theorists have discussed comics with specific examples
of how these theory-heads have thought of postmodern writing. These current
theoretical approaches to rhetoric and composition have begun to do away with
the prerogatives of what Ong calls ‘decadent intellectuals’ in attempts to affirm
students’ own ways of knowing. The link between how these theorists explain
postpedagogy enters the mix through Italo Calvino’s personal tale of how he began
writing stories through the images in comics. Lyotard emerges as one key figure
in discussing how a postmodern writer addresses the problems posed by the rise of
technologies that enforce a proceduralized system of thinking, and how this strange
writing allows for an imaginative pro-duction that has significant implications for
writing in the 21st century, including the relationship both see between the work of
(another kind of) art (unart) and politics.
Chapter II – form (shape of the work): “In the Shadow of Image/Text” – takes
its task as addressing three of the major conversations addressing comics as a
medium – defining the media, comparing comics to other media – particularly
cinema – and how comics begin to enact the sort of teaching that postpedagogy
proposes we take on. Since McCloud’s Understanding Comics was released, various
critics have attempted to dismantle his project in order to develop a more precise
definition that would account for other iterations. In part, these critics, specifically
Thierry Groensteen, have attempted to solidify a system that would be able to
integrate the various combinations of image and text that they see as the essence
of a comics medium. Art Spiegelman’s In the Shadow of No Towers brings an
alternate perspective to the work of comics that fraternizes with avant-garde ‘art’
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outlooks. His keynote talk at the 2006 Thomas R. Watson Conference in Louisville,
for thinking of the ways in which digital technologies afford us opportunities to
think with the logics of electronic media (Ulmer’s conductive logic) rather than
attempting to directly translate print logics into electronic environments.
Chapter III – idiom (‘school’ of art): “Art Interrupted” – attempts to break
away from what, in current trends toward multimodal composition, has been
generally discussed in terms of ‘mixed media.’ Two major concepts inform this
chapter: (1) intermedia and (2) unart. “Intermedia” shares Lyotard’s view that
image and text are not separate but always already interrelated, superimposed on
one another. The shape of the work, of the elements involved in producing comics,
extends beyond traditional forms of art even though they begin with those forms.
For McCloud, “form” includes a variety of different elements – ink, paint, speech,
etc. – and methods. In this chapter, I begin to tackle the generally unrecognized
significance of comics for rhetoric and composition, and specifically that rhetorical
approaches to art are more akin to comics than to Art proper; that is, to what
Kaprow calls unart. The term unart was coined in order to indicate a move away
from the more generalizable, more easily recognizable forms of Art that have been
situated under specified categories. As Kaprow explains, unart has more to do
with intermedia, combining media in a way that cannot be divided or assessed as
separate, than with ‘mixed media,’ where each medium has been used on its own
terms. To expose how comics provide such an approach, I discuss Spiegelman’s
surrealist project The Narrative Corpse throughout as an example of the different
forms, perspectives, and methods that comics offer.
Chapter IV – structure (nuts-and-bolts): “Uncomposing (Visual) Rhetorics” –
turns to a discussion of what it would mean for us to begin uncomposing ourselves.
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The title of this chapter, simultaneously the title of this dissertation, implies a
variety of meanings taken up as the focus of this chapter. Taking my cue from Allan
Kaprow’s term unart, I suggest that what we find in the figural – what rhetoricians
generally refer to as ‘visual rhetorics’ – exceeds the desire for persuasion. As such,
the figural offers itself as an interruption of Aristotelian rhetoric, of the ‘art(s) of
persuasion.’ This interruption of rhetoric as persuasion would exact a refusal, in
Bartleby’s and Quentin’s senses, to recode, or invert, power relations (Readings,
University 163). Building on Chapter 3, if comics can be thought of as a stranger
surrealist project – which Blanchot sees as the experience of experience of thought
itself – then, we can better recognize comics in terms of Bill Readings’ view of
thought as an in(ter)vention that does “not resolve arguments; it does not provide a
metalanguage that can translate all other idioms into its own so that their dispute
can be settled, their claims arranged and evaluated on a homogenous scale”; rather,
comics would throw “those who participate in pedagogy back into a reflection upon
the ungroundedness of their situation: their obligation to each other and to a name
that hails them as addressees, before they can think about it” (Readings, University
161). If we think of this in terms of criteria – and Lyotard’s desire to work without
criteria – this would mean to allow writing to be thought of in terms of exploration
without intent, without assuming a single standard of evaluation that would hinder
a strangely imaginative writing.
Chapter V – craft (skills of producing the work) and sureface (finishing
touches): “Traitorous Hospitality: An Aphoristic (Composition) Pedagogy” – returns
to Haynes’ concept of ‘hospitality’ in “Writing Offshore” as it relates to comics’
relationship to art, and with how it offers us a way to think about how we might
begin to uncomposition ourselves. As most of the comics ‘artists’ cited in this
dissertation began in art and became disaffected by the inability to produce work
that related more to life than to Art, rhetoric and composition has yet to learn
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the lessons it has seemed to support from the avant-garde: breaking away from
Having left home – the discipline of art – comics ‘artists’ become witnesses to the
disaster (of art); “the witness,” according to Lyotard, “is a traitor” (Inhuman 204).
The traitor to art and composition here becomes open to occasions for writing
and thinking that fall beyond even their own beliefs and values by testing those
contradictions. Put briefly, the traitorous writer is hospitable to even the most
monstorous of thoughts.
This chapter concludes this dissertation with a Nietzschean turn toward
fragmentary writing. In this chapter, I build on Chris Ware’s view of comics
production to suggest we update Nietzsche’s ambition of writing and ‘art.’ In an
interview, as we will see, Ware explains that his ‘drawing’ is more like typography
than ‘real drawing.’ If we take Ware’s approach to writing and compare it to
the fragmentary writing currently taking place in electronic (digital/online)
environments – specifically on Twitter – we find that Nietzsche’s aphorisms provide
us with a way of understanding how art and writing may develop in the 21st
century. To clarify: my ambition is not to “say in ten sentences what everyone else
says in a book – what everyone else does not say in a book” (Nietzsche, Potable
556). No! My ambition is to say in 140-characters what Nietzsche would say in ‘ten
sentences,’ to be a 140-Artist, to be a 140-unartist. The singularity of such writing
offers us the ability to speak of life as the artist speaks of and to Art.
Ah, writing! Ah, humanity!25 I present this dissertation as an act of love (in
the Nietzschean sense).26
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categories of acceptability in favor of new, innovative, and imaginative work.

Chapter 1

There’s a Stranger in My Composition
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There’s a Stranger in My Composition

“The suppliant and the stranger are one; both are cut off
from the whole, being deprived of the right that founds all
others and alone establishes one’s belonging to the home.”
~ Maurice Blanchot, The Infinite Conversation

I

t’s no secret: in the past decade technology and the visual have transformed
the teaching of composition. To understand how and why they have radicalized

composition instruction and moved the figural into the forefront of writing, this
chapter provides a stasis (theory) for today’s composition pedagogy in the avantgarde ambit of transformation. Why and how this move is occurring requires that
I work through a string of examples to mark how ‘new media’ (from video/games
to cinema to music, etc.) has opened the fields of rhetoric and composition to new
modes of thought and creation. In essence, this chapter consolidates what scholars
and practitioners have said on the subjects of new media and postpedagogy in order
to situate how I see the future of composition studies developing in the wake of
these new theories, methods, and instructional practices.
To that end, I use the figure of the ‘Stranger,’ and specifically, the Plato/nic
Stranger, as described in The Sophist. In the course of my research, however, Maurice
Blanchot’s work has become a significant influence in how I have come to think
about why the Stranger appeals to me, and how Blanchot’s writings on the
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stranger have altered and clarified the importance of the Strange(r) in the way I
think of composition pedagogy and rhetorical practice. An endnote in The Infinite
Conversation, more than any other reflection, has brought the Stranger’s (non)
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purpose together for me:
…a stranger to the strangeness of the Castle, a stranger to the strangeness
of the village, and a stranger to himself [Franz Kafka’s ‘foreigner’ in The
Castle] since, in an incomprehensible manner, he decides to break with his
own familiarity, as though pulled ahead toward these sites nonetheless
without allure by an exigency he is unable to account for. (463)
Like this ‘stranger,’ I’m not sure that I can account for the exigency of this project,
but I can say that the ‘Castle’ Blanchot refers to here appears to correlate to the
unbuilt hacienda Geoff Sirc continues working on (Sirc, English 1-32).
There are other references in Blanchot’s passage that relate to other areas of
interest. For example, ‘the strangeness of the village’ relates, at least through an
aleatory (chance) logic, to McLuhan’s ‘global village’ – approaches to ‘new media’
that ‘make[s] the world smaller,’ but that continue to separate us from our own
ways of being in the world. The Stranger, at least in this sense, is meant to indicate
a figure that can put us closer to our own ways of being, including our own ways
of being with language, writing, and ‘art’ in a world that continues – indirectly –
trying to distance us from our own ways of knowing. As we will see, the Stranger
in Plato’s Sophist is not strange enough to address how we may be in the world
according to our own devices. In rhetoric and composition, a good deal of how we
address new media has little, if anything, to do with how we may be in a world
where new media has been working our thinking and writing over in new ways.
That is, if there is any way to provide an exigency for this project, it is to say that
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we have yet to find ways in which writing and art can take place (happen/ings)
with new media. If we remain content to merely translate the ‘literacy,’ or writing
processes, or what have you, from the time of print to the time of new media, we
exclude ways of thinking that offer us (imaginative) in/sights into our own being.
27

As I’ve tried to explain in the introduction, I am drawn toward comics in an
‘incomprehensible manner.’ In part because I have been reading comics for the
better part of a decade now, and I continue to be surprised, I continue to ‘break
with my own familiarity’ with not only the form, but with the ways in which comics
imply another way of writing and creating art. If I must provide a reason, an
exigency, for this project, it would have to be that what I see in comics exceeds how
Scott McCloud and Will Eisner, among other practitioners and scholars that have
discussed Comics, have attempted to describe and define
the form as a medium. In my estimation, comics offer the
a variety of ways that link with current perspectives on
composition pedagogy, and offer us a way to begin thinking
about what ‘the coming composition’ might look like, what
forms our unbuilt haciendas may take with the coming
generation of pedagogues well-versed in using ‘new media’
to write and create art. The exigency for writing (with) new
media would remains ‘incomprehensible,’ ‘unaccountable,’
and strange(ly) imaginative since we have yet to grasp how
the call for writing with/in new media has yet to be fully
realized on their own terms.1 If we don’t begin allowing the
strangers with/in us to teach us how to be imaginative, we
will not only lose our ability to be effective pedagogues, but
we will also remain part of the ‘old guard’ instead of an

The form of comics has nothing to do with the medium of
comics. As Gilles Deleuze when reflecting on form: “Aesthetic
form […] is merged with the reflection of the object in the
imagination” (“The Idea of Genesis…” 61). The form of comics,
then, has to do with a sort of intuition exercised by imagination.

strange(rs) with/in us a way to write and create art in

Deleuze

There’s a Stranger in My Composition
(inventive) avant-garde – the coming composition (postpedagogy).
When I speak of ‘the coming composition,’ what I am referring to is
analogous to Giorgio Agamben’s The Coming Community – a community that
28

we have yet to experience and that we are constantly trying to achieve. This
is not the sort of community that has appeared in composition pedagogy, the
sort that seeks to create an enclosed community within a classroom, and that
hope to create communal knowledge. Rather, ‘the coming composition’ is the
composition of the Stranger(s) with/in us, that which we exclude because we have
no way of communicating our (ways of) thinking. ‘The coming composition,’ like
Agamben’s view of ‘the coming community,’ is a composition of singularities that
“communicate[s] online the empty space of the example, without being tied by
any common property, by any identity” (Agamben, Coming 11). The Stranger does
not work as a ‘model’ for this sort of composition, but like “[t]ricksters or fakes,
assistants or ‘toons” (Agamben, Coming 11), the Stranger is an exemplar of the

So....this dude is Zarathustra?

coming composition.

While Agamben does not directly make this
claim, the Stranger who brings about the
coming community will appear as Nietzsche’s
Zarathustra: “...at last a change came over
his heart, and one morning he rose with the
dawn, stepped before the sun...” (Portable
121). The Stranger teaches us the ubermench-the overman; the “overman,” who would then
occupy an empty space of the coming community,
would be that being for whom Being is of
utmost concern, and would have us move
beyond the criteria of “good” and “bad.”
Wanderer above the Sea of Fog by Caspar David Friedrich
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The Strange(rs) With/In Us
“How did reason come into the world? As is fitting, in an irrational
manner, by accident. One will have to guess at it as at a riddle.”

T

he Stranger in Plato’s Sophist is appointed by Socrates to be a guest lecturer
on the subject of sophistry with a student of his [the Stranger’s] choosing:

Theaetetus. Another colleague, Theodorus, explains that this Stranger “is more
reasonable than those who devote themselves to disputation” (267), which is
emphasized when the Stranger tells Theaetetus to “follow your own devices […]
as the discussion proceeds” (271) on “the art of imitation” (275). Using Socrates’
method of division and definition, the Stranger separates imitation into likenessmaking and appearance-making (also called ‘phantastic art’). According to our
Stranger, likeness-making (the first sophist/ic) “produces the imitation by following
the proportions of the original in length, breadth, and depth, and giving, besides,
the appropriate colours to each part” (333). In a word: copies.2 Institutional
practices geared toward producing students who can succeed in professional
contexts are in the habit of working to produce these sorts of likenesses.
After exploring likeness-making, the Stranger turns to appearance-making,
dividing it in two once again. The first of this new division (the second sophist/
ic) concerns “easily [taking] advantage of our poverty of terms to make a counter
attack, twisting our words to the opposite meaning” (347) in order to deceive – this
“is an art of deception” that attempts to mislead others to “hold a false opinion”
(351). This form of appearance-making correlates to Geoff Sirc’s view of traditional
composition where we
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…erect temples to language, in which we relive the rites of text-production for
the nth time, despite the sad truth that the gods have fled so long ago that no
one is even sure that they were ever there in the first place (in Composition,

30

the gods are called, variously, power, authentic voice, discourse, critical
consciousness, versatility, style, disciplinarity, purpose, etc.). (English 2)
To make the link clear, Sirc’s view of composition does not mean that we are in
the habit of teaching students how to twist words in order to deceive, at least
not explicitly, but that teaching through the defined structures of what it means
to write keeps students at a distance from their own ways of knowing, of writing
with their own devices. When Sirc questions whether the ‘gods’ were ever there
in the first place, the connection becomes clear that we have been teaching in
such a way that we have been deceiving ourselves by thinking that we have the
answers to show students how to write, and that through our teaching we can
provide students with the power to assert their own needs.
The first sophist/ic addresses the possible, while the second sophist/
ic constructs limits by detailing the impossible, creating a “binary of possible/
impossible” (Vitanza, Negation 245). The second form of appearance-making (the
third sophist/ic), however, discards this binary in order to work at slashing through
it, cutting through the divisions that separate writers/artists from their ‘own
devices,’ “by employing [one’s] own person as [an] instrument” (453) – ‘instrument’
does not mean a ‘tool’ in the Heideggerian sense. However, the Stranger was so
exhausted after working through the first two forms of sophistry that he beseeched
Theaetetus to “be so self-indulgent as to let it go and leave it for someone else to
unify and name appropriately” (453).3
It wasn’t until Murray Bundy’s 1922 article “Plato’s View of the Imagination”
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that the second form of appearance-making (the third sophist/ic) was ‘named
appropriately.’ Bundy finds that this second form of appearance-making has to do
with ‘the imagination,’ which traces through Plato’s corpus of writings, including
The Sophist, in order to illustrate Plato’s thinking on art and aesthetics. Bundy
fashion to how the Stranger describes the third sophist/ic as the work made of
an individual’s own body and mind, including public speech and performance.
For Bundy, the second order of appearance-making relates to the abstraction that
arises out of one’s own imaginative capabilities, which suggests “that the highest
human creation involves an act of ‘imagination’” (386). As Bundy explains, the
imagination is concerned with “the connecting link between the real and the ideal,
between the realm of ideas and that of material objects” (386; emphasis added).
Or to use Lyotard’s terms about “the condition of knowledge in the most highly
developed societies” (Postmodern xxiii), abstraction/imagination attempts to
link the presentable and the unpresentable through creative acts that “impart a
stronger sense of the unpresentable” (Postmodern 81). The continued calls for an
avant-garde pedagogy ask that we move beyond likeness-making (the first sophist/
ic) and the first form of appearance-making (the second sophist/ic) in order to
affirm students’ own ways of knowing (read: using their own devices).
Similarly, Cynthia Haynes questions the need for argumentative writing in
“Writing Offshore” before calling for a pedagogy of abstraction encouraging students
to direct their own education in order to “enact the necessary detachment (abstractus)
that would unhinge the link between reason and pedagogy, and dissemble the
assembly line model of education in whose grip we have been since Ramus so cleanly
paired discourse and logic” (“Writing” 673). Rather than asking students to use
previous works as models of acceptable writing, a pedagogy of abstraction would not
require students to take a stance, but would allow students write without purpose or
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associates Plato’s view of art with one’s own (productive) imagination, in similar
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intention and discover their own ways of writing and art-ing. In order to clarify the
need for such a pedagogy, I will briefly survey current concerns about multimodal
composition before examining rhetoric and composition’s move to the figural in the age
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of new media and some ways in which this move has begun to alter pedagogical goals
within the university. In order to frame why there is a need to offer students ways
to address their own needs and knowledge, we turn to Paulo Freire’s Pedagogy of the
Oppressed and its relation to rhetoric and composition.

The (Curiously) Strange Case of (New Media) Pedagogy
“Still, as in those photographs from which the distant but
excessively close face of a stranger stares out at us, something
in this infamy demands [esige] its proper name, testifying to
itself beyond any expression and beyond any memory.”
~ Giorgio Agamben, Profanations

F

reire’s goal in Pedagogy of the Oppressed was not to liberate the “peasant
workers” of Brazil, but to teach them how to write with the most accessible

medium of the time – printed text – so that they could address their own political
and personal needs and concerns – not to teach them what he thought they needed.
It is in this sense that Friere describes a pedagogy of the oppressed, and not a
pedagogy for the oppressed. In Marxist fashion, Freire saw that these workers were
being treated as cogs in the wheels of industry, workers that could be replaced
at will and had no recourse to assert their own human needs; this production,
however, was “a distortion of the vocation of becoming more fully human”
(Pedagogy 44). In attempting to teach them the dominant mode of discourse –
reading and writing – Friere presented them with a way assert their own needs.
He was teaching them how print media worked to convey meaning, but not how to
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use the medium for a specific intent/purpose. He was teaching them the available
means of “striving so that these hands – whether of individuals or entire peoples –
need be extended less and less in supplication, so that more and more they become
human hands which work and, working, transform the world” (Pedagogy 45).4
students, what to think, but to have the ability to engage in the dominant discourse
so that they may transform their world. Indeed, the political struggles that rhetoric
and composition have attempted to address since the late 60s have not yet begun on
“a pedagogy which must be forged with, not for, the oppressed (whether individuals
or peoples) in the incessant struggle to regain their humanity,” especially when
considering that pedagogical practices (or ‘best practices’) remain focused on ‘what
students need’ instead of looking to develop a pedagogy that “will be made and
remade” (Pedagogy 48) – the work of postpedagogies, including the ‘salute’ from Sirc
out of which this project develops.
A decade later, Lyotard took on a similar project directed at highly developed,
industrialized countries – minus Freire’s Marxist perspectives – with his treatise
on scientific/technological thinking in The Postmodern Condition. In this report
to the Conseil of Universitiés in Quebec, Lyotard makes an effort to analyze
and transform education from what he calls ‘grand narratives’ (generalizations)
into ‘little narratives’ (singularities) as “the quintessential form of imaginative
invention,” where writers and artists allude to the unknown/unpresentable
(Postmodern 60; 78). For Lyotard, grand narratives correlate to scientific
knowledge that seeks to define the bounds of accepted/acceptable knowledge (or
argumentation and Reason) that implies a duty to verification.5 However, Lyotard
problematizes the scientific and technological approach to knowledge as reductive
due to its systematized approach that privileges its “own interests and point of
view” (Postmodern 16). With the rise of technology, Lyotard fears that education

33

Freire clearly explains that the desire is not to teach these workers, simultaneously
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and thought would be weakened by technological thinking that reduces the limits
of knowledge to only what is presentable and excludes what does not fit within the
system. One of Lyotard’s contemporaries, Gilles Deleuze, explains that this process
will move us from Michel Foucault’s disciplinary societies to the new societies of
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control whose function is to “keep people employed until the installation of the new
forces knocking at the door” (“Postscript” 4) will inevitably deliver “the school over
to the corporation” (“Postscript” 5) – which is precisely what Freire was attempting
to subvert with a pedagogy of the oppressed.
Put differently, technological – code(d) – thinking/writing/arting restricts

George Orwell would be displeased.

what can be known by discarding what does not have a place in that system – what
can be exchanged within the market structures that corporations perpetuate in
their own interests. This is not to say that technology6 itself restricts the ability
to address the unpresentable, but that systematizing how we go about addressing
knowledge may exclude other ways of knowing,7 and in doing so, contributes
to the perpetuation of ‘societies of control.’ For Lyotard, little narratives – the
writings of the ‘illiterate’ workers in Freire’s Brazil, as well as the knowledge that
students in ‘the most advanced societies’ can bring to institutions and institutional
practices – work to break apart systematized ways of knowing, doing, and making
that (indirectly) support corporate-schools with alternate, excluded practices and
methods.
Lyotard saw how this move would position knowledge in educational
institutions and worldwide:
Knowledge in the form of an informational commodity indispensable to
productive power is already, and will continue to be, a major – perhaps the
major – stake in worldwide competition for power. It is conceivable that the
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nation-states will one day fight for control of information, just as they battled
in the past for control over territory, and afterwards for control of access to
and exploitation of raw materials and cheap labor. (Postmodern 5)
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Lawrence Lessig gives credence to Lyotard’s observation when he explains that
the current state of technology is leading us toward systematized thought and
regulated, owned meaning. In Free Culture, Lessig addresses what he calls our
“information society” and current trends toward a feudal society where such power
is the “power of control [over] the uses of culture” (Free 28), instead of a free culture
that “supports and protects creators […] to guarantee that follow-on creators
One such example is Apple iTunes and its coding model that limits individuals’
ability to distribute and re-purpose (i.e., remix) information by commodifying
and centralizing power over cultural artifacts and their uses. In Remix, Lessig
differentiates this control, which he names Read-Only (RO) culture, with a ReadWrite (RW) culture that allows “citizens” to “create and re-create the culture
around them” by “using the same tools the professional uses” and those “given to
them by nature” (Remix 28), analogous to the second order of appearance-making.
A RW culture might look like Jacques Derrida’s ‘analysis’ of Philippe Sollers’
novels at the end of Dissemination – Derrida uses the Sollers’ Numbers to “critique”
the work itself, using the techniques of collage and montage to re-arrange the
work in a new way.8 Translating such a method into digital culture, including
multimodal composition, has proven much more difficult since the code exercises
much more control over works and the corporation-/institutional friendly laws
that fight for control over information, which, in so doing, restrict the production
of imaginative and transformative works. In this sense, Lessig’s view of remix
correlates to current perspectives of writing across media since it “is just the

Kinda contradicts Apple’s “1984”
Macintosh ad. I’m just sayin’...

and innovators remain as free as possible from the control of the past” (Free xiv).
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same sort of stuff that we’ve always done with words,” which succeed “when they
show others something new; they fail when they are trite or derivative. […] It is
great writing without words. It is creativity supported by a new technology,” at
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least “until the law effectively blocks it” (Remix 82-83) – effectively blocking the
imaginative, transformative work they call “fellow citizens to study, reflect—and
act” upon (National Commission xviii).

A Strange(r’s) Writing
“Still, the postmodern condition is as much a stranger to
disenchantment as it is to the blind positivity of delegitimation.”
~ Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition

A

lexander Galloway traces the development of code in relation to the move
beyond centralized control over meaning in his book Protocol: How Control

Exists After Decentralization, taking his cue from Deleuze’s article on societies
of control – related to the feudal control of writing that Lessig fears will restrict
writers and artists from producing new work. Throughout the book, Galloway
describes the protocological essence of technology: code, which is “the only
executable language” that “does what it says” (Protocol 165-66). Programming code
may be thought of analogously to the art style of “caricature” (see my chapter 2)
in that it is infused with predetermined meaning with little, if any, wiggle room.
Building on Friedrich Kittler’s work on media technologies, Galloway’s project
seeks to explain how the language of computers and computer networks function,
which he claims are at the base of understanding contemporary culture – a
perspective that excludes possibilities in favor of standardization. For our purposes,
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this claim signifies a change in traditional writing and in writing (with) new
media, including how our ways of writing and thinking are altered by code. The
goal of composition pedagogy, if it takes on the political need for a third sophist/
ic imaginative approach, would necessitate a way of working with new media as
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the avant-garde artists we continually refer to (e.g., Duchamp) worked – without
intention or purpose. But this would not be the sort of ‘art practice’ that Galloway
espouses, it would not refer “to any type of artistic practice within the global
Internet, be it the World Wide Web, email, telnet, or any other such protocological
technology” (Protocol 211). To (only) work with the protocols already coded into
these technologies would do nothing to help us better understand our ways of being
with language, writing and art in the age of new media. The “tactical” definition of
the “Internet art” that Galloway proposes serves, in his own words, “an aesthetic
defined by its oppositional position vis-à-vis previous, often inadequate, forms
of cultural production” (212). Being ‘oppositional,’ Galloway’s form of a ‘tactical
Internet art’ positions itself as a part of the second sophist/ic meant to deceive us
of how protocols (codes) keep us at an arms-length from our own ways of imagining
alternate ways of writing/art-ing (with) new media, of conducting (in the Ulmerian
sense of the word conduction9) our/selves as Strangers.

when he coins the term procedural rhetoric to “define the way things work:
the methods, techniques, and logics that drive the operations of systems, from
mechanical systems like engines to organizational systems” (Persuasive 3). In
part, the procedure becomes a method of making arguments with computers and
the coded software, “persuading through processes in general and computational
processes in particular” (Persuasive 3) – the particular, however, remains a
function (in a computational sense) of the generalized process (cf. my earlier
discussion of Lyotard’s ‘grand narratives’). While Bogost perceives this (rhetorical)

Sounds a bit like the Shannon-Weaver
Mathematical (Communication) Model...

Ian Bogost provides further explanation in his book Persuasive Games
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method as productive for “making arguments with computational systems and
for unpacking computational arguments others have created” (Persuasive 3),
Galloway remains skeptical10 about encouraging procedures and protocols, and
calls us to become viral, to infect these systems with unexpected methods, even
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though his “viral” methods remain a part of the protocols he critiques. For example,
when he addresses (video)games in his book Gaming, Galloway defines his goal
as “hinder[ing] gameplay, not advanc[ing] it” (Gaming 125). While it may not
be his intention, such a perspective supports the argumentative structures that
he finds in protocols and games. While they come to technology from different
perspectives, both Bogost’s procedural rhetoric(s) and Galloway’s “going viral” and
countergaming methods do little to offer us a way to give voice to the Strangers
with/in us since they – perhaps unintentionally – maintain binary (both 010101
and 1/2) approaches to writing (with) new media.
Rather than attempting to focus on working to hinder this brand of control,
Martin Heidegger offers us a way to think about technology apart from protocols
and procedures. In an attempt to ascertain the essence of technology in “The
Question Concerning Technology” – written before the digital technology that
we know today – Heidegger explains that this essence “is by no means anything
technological” (Basic Writings 311), but “is a way of revealing” (Basic Writings 318)

Heidegger thinks you’re a tool.

by “unlocking, transforming, storing, distributing, and switching about” (Basic
Writings 322); or, in contemporary cultural terms, remixing. However, Heidegger
shares Lessig’s fear that technological/protocological thinking may become the
mode of understanding and making sense of the world while closing out other
potentialities – capacities for coming into being – of knowing. If writing is only
done mechanically, as Galloway and Bogost suggest, writing unfolds as a restricted
practice, similar to Freire’s critique of the banking method that perpetuates the
exclusion of other ways of knowing and to the programming codes that Lessig
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fears will lead to a feudal culture. For Heidegger, technological thinking becomes
a means to an end – equivalent to students’ pleas for instructors to tell them
how to fix their writing so that they may ‘write to the test’ (here, the test is, dis/
respectfully, the vague criteria of ‘excellence’11). In addition, he also warns of
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seeing technology as a neutral tool. As an alternative, Heidegger suggests that
we approach technology by returning to the Greek word techne from which the
terms “technology” and “art” derive; he claims that “reflection upon technology and
decisive confrontation with it must happen in a realm that is, on the one hand, akin
to the essence of technology and, on the other, fundamentally different from it” –
“such a realm is art” (Basic Writings 340). The kind of art that Heidegger refers to
here, however, is not the kind of art that takes place in ‘the discipline of art,’ but
unfolds through one’s own devices.
This unfolding,12 however, suggests an additional manner exceeding
deduction (conclusion), induction (rule), and abduction (precondition) that comics
artist Chris Ware calls pro-duction13 – this form of production shares Derrida’s
view that “Productive force is also called imagination” (Archeology 76) – which he
finds, in part, in the techniques of collage/montage that avant-garde artists enact in producing experiment-al work.14 Here, pro-duction derives from the Latin
producere, simultaneously meaning to ‘bring forth’ (pro: forth; ducere: to bring,
lead) and ‘bring into being,’ in the sense of performance(s) (such as a theatrical
performance; cf. Artaud). Taking our cue from Antonin Artaud, this unfolding
realizes itself “by a return to the primitive Myths” and “giving them their
immediacy” in such a manner that they are “sensed and experienced directly by
the mind” (Theater and Its Double 123-24). The immediacy of these experiences, as
well as the productions that they give rise to, obscure the distinctions between “the
reality of imagination and dreams” so that they “appear there on equal footing with
life” (Artaud, Theater and Its Double 123). In this manner, a proliferation of mixes

A nation
of the
image,
perhaps?
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would come about since the original mix only presents one mix among a variety of
other possible mixes. While Heidegger’s claim that ‘art’ can provide us a way out
of procedural thinking/writing that has come about in the 21st century, this claim
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rests on seeing art as a form of being rather than as category or discipline.
In contrast to the banking method of instruction that defines an aggregate of
linkages, this pro-ductive, experiment-al manner offers students what Sirc claims is
an easy entré into composition, a compelling medium and genre in which
to re-arrange textual materials – both original and appropriated – in
order to have those materials speak the student’s own voice and concerns,
allowing them to come up with something obscure, perhaps, yet promising
illumination. (“Box-Logic” 113; emphasis added)
Re-arrangement here approaches a manner of invention that unfolds through
alternate mixes – or, to use the colloquial term, to re-mix – which George Kennedy
finds analogous to Aristotle’s approach to invention.15 By focusing on invention,
post-pedagogy does not advocate for any single process, but supports a perpetual
invention of methods appropriate for the ‘scene of writing.’16 Such an approach
would de-center the educational process by keeping “the question of meaning open
as a locus of debate” (Readings, University 165). This does not mean that meaning
has no place in education, but that it lingers, that meaning remains contingent and
singular rather than generalizable.
Similarly, Sirc looks to move beyond the view that students cannot produce
significant work unless given models of ‘good’ writing on which to base their own
work. In English Composition as a Happening, he outlines what a do-it-yourself
(DIY) pedagogy might look like in the composition classroom based in Kaprow’s
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work on Happenings art – a term referring to the avant-garde art movement during
the 1960s where artists and spectators were involved in creating performance
art that could not be duplicated (English 63). For those teachers fearful of what
this means for instructional practices, there’s no need to panic about what your
you is that you take part in what you teach, to practice what you teach. Following
Kaprow’s lead, Sirc proposes an approach to the composition classroom centered
on blurring the divisions between new media, art, composition and life that avoids
seeing instructors as the bearers of knowledge so that we may affirm students’
experiences with writing, art and technology in hopes of making composition
more relevant for them. For Kaprow, as for Sirc, Happenings are performative,
unrehearsed, and require an active engagement with the world, intervening in,
rather than merely reflecting on, ‘reality.’17 Instead of following a strict curriculum,
composition would become a way of producing something new rather than a
reproduction.
In other words, art (practices) have entered composition in order to
intervene in the technological/protocological/procedural thinking that has turned
classrooms into assembly lines that offer students a place to develop their own
forms of knowledge. But, even as ‘Art’ has entered pedagogical discussion of just
education(s), the way in which Art has been discussed leaves much to be desired.
It is here that Kaprow’s unart, as “play without intention” (Essays 113) intersects
with current pedagogical theories of writing that ‘err on the side of life’ rather than
on bureaucratic demands for ‘correctness.’18
Here comes another blank sequel cause words are not working, they are not equal
And baby, isn’t it boring to always talk in the same old clichés
Right now can’t be bothered with thinking cause rational reasons, they keep us sinking
And you know that no syllable will make us feel more real...
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roles will consist of in the classroom; all that a DIY, happenings pedagogy asks of
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We Are the Strange(rs)
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“The artist’s imagination is a world of potentialities that no work
will succeed in realizing. What we experience by living another
world, answering to other forms of order and disorder.”
~ Italo Calvino, Six Memos for the Next Millennium

A

s Sirc tells us, postpedagogy does not require students to become artists,
which would only have us teach another iteration of the ‘banking’ method,

but works to bring an “art consciousness to daily life” (“Box-Logic” 117), to think
apart from the structures that demand we follow protocols and procedures.
Postpedagogy acknowledges the avant-garde as a starting point that invites
students to intervene in accepted models of writing as a way to think of their
own ways of knowing, offering them “what they want: an invitation to become”
(Sirc, English 294; emphasis added). In addition, such a manner would take on
the task of popularizing education19 already under way in the digital technologies
students use every day – the difference would be that we shift from perceiving
these technologies as mere tools for the production of written texts in the service of
the institutions that dictate what students need instead of letting them discover it
through producing their devices. Sirc uses the example of rap to ask students to see
their writing
as strange-d, made curious, something interesting to consider, an object
of intellectual fascination as much as emotional possession. It’s the writer
not only as collector, but as a dissatisfied collector, one impatiently seeking
pleasure […] composition as a craving; teaching students to feel desire and
lack. (“Box-Logic” 117; emphasis added)
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In (un)common parlance, composition becomes the presence of an absence that
we are unequipped to quell for our students, making our work into the playful
collection of art-ifacts that we share with students to “offer them new possibilities
for” writing with an “associational logic of linkages” that “foster a personal
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aesthetic among our students” (Sirc, “Box-Logic” 123).
One of the artists most often cited in the avant-garde movement has been
Marcel Duchamp for his critique of Art at the turn of the 20th century. In “The
Euretics of Alice’s Valise,” Ulmer adopts Duchamp’s method of creating something
new from a set of ‘readymade’ objects that students collect by unpacking items
from a valise and re-arranging them at random (Sirc’s box-logic proposes a
items in unexpected ways produces “results that surprise the instructors as
much as the students” (3), and he calls this moment of surprise an instance of
discovery, a eureka moment “synonymous with thinking as a discovery rather
than as interpretation” (4) – invention rather than critique: “a cognitive practice
coming into formation as an alternative to (not opposed to, but supplementing)
hermeneutics and critique” (4) – as a way to generate new pedagogical and
art practices.20 This method is not meant to indicate that postpedagogy is an

Seriously guys...I was done with
this approach, like, 80 years ago.
You got nothing else? Really?

similar method). As Ulmer describes this process, the method of re-arranging

‘anything goes’ approach to composing, but to begin students on their own paths
to intervening in the world around them, or as Ulmer writes in an earlier essay,
“not to reflect but to change reality” (“Object of Post-Criticism” 86). Approaches like
the one that Sirc and Ulmer suggest are meant to offer us opportunities to drift
like nomads in our writing and art, letting the imaginative linkages that arise at
any given moment direct our ways of composing.21 The invention of these alternate
arrangements – remixes perhaps – are products of bringing an art consciousness
to daily life, of forging new linkages at the time of creation, creating links by
drifting in the scene of writing, and perpetually re-inventing performances with our
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audiences – spectators and students become co-creators of a new style of writing
and producing art.22
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In these post-pedagogical approaches, the preferred outcomes in other
pedagogies – teaching students how to write by copying the style and structure of
established texts – give way to new and unexpected outcomes from the students’
creative practices invented for the moment. Italo Calvino refers to this as “some
possible pedagogy of the imagination […] that we can only exercise upon ourselves,
according to the methods invented for the occasion and with unpredictable results”
that heads off “the danger we run in losing a basic human faculty: the power of
bringing visions into focus with our eyes shut, of bringing forth forms and colors
from the lines of black letters on a white page, and in fact of
thinking in terms of images” (Six Memos 92). Rather than teaching
what he calls the icastic, self-sufficient form, Calvino conceives
of “phantasmic and oneiric transfigurations, the figurative world
as it is transmitted by a culture at its various levels, and a
process of abstraction, condensation, and interiorization of sense

Banksy

experience, a matter of prime importance to both the visualization
and verbalization of thought” (Six Memos 95).23 In this manner of
writing (and teaching), we write to tell our own stories (Lyotard’s

‘little narratives’), beginning with images “that have made an impact” (Six Memos
94) and spurring pro-ductive variants.
Calvino provides an example of this sort of imaginative pro-duction (reading
and writing) through comics. As a child, before he learned to read, he directed his
attention toward comics, spending “hours following the cartoons of each series from
one issue to another, while in [his] mind [he] told [himself] stories, interpreting the
scenes in different ways” (Six Memos 93)24 – making linkages from what he was
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presented with, similar to the concepts of remix, collage, and montage that have
popularized experiment-al approaches to education. Even after he had learned to read,
Calvino explains, “the advantage [he] gained was minimal. […] it was evident that
the rhymster had no idea of what might have been in the balloons of the original,”
daydreaming within the pictures and their sequence” (Six Memos 93-94). For Calvino,
there is no one correct way to reason through the sequences, but a variety of possible
linkages. Beginning his own stories in this way, Calvino treated the comics images
as readymade that could be seen in a way not dictated by the writers. Taken a step
further, Calvino could have cut out the comics panels to reorder them as way to create
further presentations and possible readings. While altering the arrangement of the
panels in those comics he was reading, as he did with his alternate readings, Calvino
would be experimenting with the possibility of additional mini-narratives. We can
see examples of these phantasmic transfigurations in Roland Barthes’ experimental
writings about (and with) photography and film.
Throughout “The Third Meaning” Barthes speaks of Eisenstein’s Battleship
Potemkin and the filmic still image that “forces itself upon me” (Image 56) even
though he does not know why they attract him. The meaning of these images,
the obtuse meaning, occupies a third space between its presentation and its
description, suspended between meanings that do “not copy anything” and exists
outside of articulated language – “what the obtuse meaning disturbs, sterilizes, is
metalanguage (criticism)” (Image 61). In The Rhetoric of Cool, Jeff Rice finds that
the use of images in current composition courses does not allow for the inarticulate
meaning that Barthes describes – an attempt to domesticate images rather than
looking at the unpresentable meanings they open up. Instead, writing means that
“[s]tudents write about images, but not with image. Students ‘see’ images but
don’t use them for generating new experience. Students observe images but are
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preferring “to ignore the written lines and to continue with [his] favorite occupation of
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not asked to find correlations between an image-based experience and their own”
(Rice, Cool 140) despite popular (culture) evidence that this is already underway,
and in “the age of new media” excluding these alternate writing practices would
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mean that pedagogy “remain insular” (Cool 145), ensuring its own irrelevance.
Requiring that students appropriate the dominant discourse provided them in our
classrooms means to validate the ‘metalanguage’ that Barthes speak of, to become
critics rather than producers. However, as Barthes describes it, the obtuse meaning
requires a “diegetic horizon” that allows for alternative combinations – it is not
present in a stand-alone image whether photographic or painted (Image 66).
Throughout Camera Lucida, Barthes begins to sketch out how an additional
third meaning arises out of stand-alone images that are not placed within a
narrative arc, exploring ways in which images can engender thought. In his own
terms, his concern is not with the studium – “a kind of education (knowledge and
civility, ‘politeness’) which allows me to discover the Operator, to experience the
intentions which establish and animate his practices, but to experience them
‘in reverse,’ according to my will as a Spectator” (Camera 28) – but with the
punctum – an “accident which pricks me” (Camera 27), showing “no preference for
morality or good taste: the punctum can be ill-bred” (Camera 43) with “a power
of expansion” (Camera 45). Still, the studium is not separate from the punctum;
where the punctum appears, the studium is also present. The punctum, “whether
or not it is triggered, is an addition: it is what I add to the photograph and what
is nonetheless already there” (Camera 55). A pedagogy of imagination would take
Bathes’ punctum to its productive limit, bringing forth an addition(al) from one’s
own devices.
Adding Lyotard, we can say that Barthes creates little narratives through
the third meanings he finds in both film and photography through a process of
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imaginative linking. What postpedagogy finds in the figural, as Barthes does, is not
a customary one-size-fits-all pedagogical model, but a way to encourage students
to think abstractly and imaginatively. An avant-garde approach of finding new
methods of making art that de-stabilizes fixed meaning provides a way to begin
composition in “Writing Offshore,” explaining it as one that places learning in
students’ hands and one that requires a move from argumentation to abstraction.
Such a pedagogical method would be infused with an element of play that does
not dictate meaning, but allows students to assert their own ways to knowing,
doing and making, and that do not always correspond to established methods. As a
pedagogical method, postpedagogy seeks to avoid the totalization of meaning that
requires one to take a stance in place of finding alternate ways of understanding,
thinking, and writing. Lyotard, like Haynes, Sirc and Ulmer after him, refers to
Duchamp’s readymades as an example of the writing to come, of looking again to
see other possible linkages with a method found in the practice of an imaginative
writing unconcerned with an imposed criterion. The playful methods of avantgarde artists, methods that comics artists adapted to their own work, provide us
with the opportunity to enact the abstract pedagogy that Haynes calls for, one in
which we open up our pedagogical spaces so that we can learn as much, if not more,
from our students as they learn from us.
In “The Creative Act,” Duchamp speaks to this method of creation from
an artist’s perspective, claiming that in creating a work of art, artists go “from
intention to realization through a chain of totally subjective reactions” as a “series
of efforts, pains, satisfactions, refusals, decisions, which also cannot and must not
be fully self-conscious, at least on the esthetic plane” (Duchamp’s Writings 139).
Here, we can see a gap between the artist’s intention and his ability to realize it;
Duchamp’s manner of describing art offers a way of thinking about the task of
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the work of thinking in abstractions. Haynes brings this move to rhetoric and

There’s a Stranger in My Composition
Lyotard’s postmodern artist/writer: to present (allusions to) the unpresentable.
However, this pro-ductive manner only presents a fraction of the creative act that
grows exponentially when a “spectator brings the work in contact with the external
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world by deciphering and interpreting its inner qualifications and thus adds his
contribution to the creative act” (Duchamp’s Writings 140). Lyotard tells us as
much when he discusses the presentable and the unpresentable, where the role
of art is to find that some things cannot be made visible, and the artist presents
this inability to understand.25 To do this, he implies, we need what the avantgardes provide: abstraction – to make us see by making it impossible to see. This
is what Haynes’ asks of us when she calls for a pedagogy of abstraction: not to
create meaning for students, but to break with the logic that holds students apart
from their own creative acts with a refusal “to examine the rules of art” in order to
“pursue successful careers in mass conformism by communicating, by means of the
‘correct rules,’ the endemic desire for reality with objects and situations capable
of gratifying it” (Lyotard, Postmodern Condition 75). For those “who question the
rules of plastic and narrative arts,” Lyotard writes, “they are destined to have little
credibility in the eyes of those concerned with ‘reality’ and ‘identity’: they have no
guarantee of an audience” (Postmodern Condition 75). We, the strange, take this as
our manner, not to argue, but to detach ourselves from the dialogue that requires
us to take a (reason-able) stance.26
The future of composition studies in the wake of post-pedagogical methods
of invention is currently moving toward a role similar to the avant-garde artists
(or better yet, of Kaprow’s unartists) as a way to avoid keeping students separated
from their ways of being active in their own learning. Rickert tells us that
postpedagogy makes an effort to interrupt the accepted methods of writing, just as
avant-garde artists do for Art when a ‘school of art’ begins to stabilize – a problem
that comics artists have tended to avoid since they are constantly looking for new
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ways of writing and art-ing. Comics offer us a way to think about this ‘playfulness’
since they work by way of linkages, enacting a practice that tries to rewrite its
environment, rather than write purely. More importantly, comics artists, like the
avant-garde artists of the 60s and 70s, show us a (singular) way to think about the
“err on the side of life” (“Box-Logic” 113) rather than on the side of the university.
The integration of the figural, as a form of abstraction, infuses a sense of how to
live in a technological age that attempts to proceduralize the available means of
writing (with) new media. Unlike the other ‘arts’ mentioned in this chapter, comics
have a (still continuing) history of being an un-credited ‘art,’ an ‘art’ that remains
beyond the margins of art (history/disciplines/movements) despite all the wellmeaning attempts at normalization – the province of chapter 2.
For rhetoric and composition, the figural fills a similar gap, asking us (and
students) to be cautious of standardized writing practices – composition as a service
course, institutionally defined and institutionalizing students to accepted modes of
writing. But the similar problems exist in writing (with) new media if the methods
used in this process are merely technological and/or protocological. For Kaprow, the
playful use of technology favors continuous inventive practices, experimentations
that can lead to surprising results.
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playful use of art and art techniques for writing across media in such a way that we

Chapter 2

In the Shadow of Image/Text

Un/Composing (Visual) Rhetorics

In the S

h ad o w

(

s

)

of

Image/Text

~ Art Spiegelman, In The Shadow of No Towers

I

t was 					

moment of my 			
college course (composition), 		

the strangest
life, sitting in my first
still adjusting to being away

from home and to college-life, when

the instructor came in and turned

the television on to show the burning

North tower. Looking around the

classroom, the students were in shock,

trying to make sense of what was

happening just a few hours drive away

in New York – some of us had family

living in the surrounding areas. After

a few minutes, the instructor turned

the television off to start us on our own

composition work. As we went over

the syllabus, the assignments and the

grading procedures/criteria, I could

not help but think about the burning

tower. Up to this point, writing was

an exercise I practiced on my own; to

distill my thoughts throughout the

semester I would ask myself how the

material in this course would allow

us to drift through writing to make sense

of the event that would mark my
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“…my mind kept wandering. I found no solace in [poetry or]
music of any kind […] it seemed too obscenely exquisite. The
only cultural artifacts that could get past my defenses to
flood my eyes and brain with something other than images
of burning towers were old comic strips; vital, unpretentious
ephemera from the optimistic dawn of the twentieth century.”

In the Shadow of Image/Text
time as an undergraduate student. As the debris was cleared over the next few
months and the victims of the attacks were tallied, the event would lead to personal
accounts – someone we knew was in one of the towers or in the surrounding
areas, and tales of where we were when it happened. In my own account: no one
I knew was in either tower or in the immediate surrounding areas. However,
throughout the semester, the work we were assigned in this first-year composition
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course did not allow us [students] to explore our own ways of making sense of the
event; rather, it required us to take a stance and write the same stale standard
academic argumentative essays we’ve always been assigned as a part of a standard
curriculum. Something was missing from this sort of writing, something that we
[the students in this FYC course] desperately needed in order to make sense of the
devastation.
					

During the October 2006

					

Thomas R. Watson Conference in

						
wha t w a s

			

Louisville, KY, I f i n a l l y f o u n d				
missing during Art Spiegelman’s keynote

talk on his then-recent publication, In The Shadow of No Towers – a comic
a comic book about the repercussions of the World Trade Center (WTC) attacks.
Spiegelman 			
						
					
					

was living (and still does live) in New York
city when the planes hit the two towers.
He tells readers of his experience –

while not generally good at

coping with high-stress situations he explains that he was very cogent in the
aftermath. As soon as the first tower was hit, Spiegelman and his wife ran into the
streets to find their daughter who was also at her first day of (elementary) school
when they first heard and felt the thundering explosion of the North tower. The
initial explosion brought memories of his father’s stories of Auschwitz1 and the
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advice he received from his father to always keep a bag packed in case such malice
ever happened again: Spiegelman considered leaving the city as quickly as possible
to get away from the mayhem. A narrative analysis of the book might suggest that
Spiegelman’s experience during the attacks represented one generalized example
of what others (may have) experienced, both directly and indirectly affected.
‘Spiegelman lends his voice and art,’ they might say, ‘to the millions of people still
reeling from the aftershocks.’ However, Spiegelman asks that the audience consider
of a stable understanding.
Lately, what has been happening in discussions of comics and the interplay
between image and text tends to ignore alternate readings that take into account
Spiegelman’s use of comics as a form of writing abstractly, thinking through
writing and the figural. Reading and visualizing the work in comics tends to ignore
the thinking that produced the work itself and the thinking that it calls us to
perform as a part of the creative act Marcel Duchamp so effectively uncovers in
“The Creative Act.” That is, what we lose by positioning writing and art as “skills”
used for a given purpose, is the way in which both change the ways in which we
think and see the world around us. The importance of this work correlates to
Spiegelman’s attempt to make sense of his reactions to the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks on the WTC with an imaginative comics approach; I’ll also
be referring to what others have been doing to expand the use of comics as an
abstract form of writing. While the ‘definitional’ and ‘cinematic’ approaches have
revitalized the medium in popular culture and have brought comics into academic
conversations, they have yet to explore the potential of the form for theoretical and
pedagogical thought. In other words, I see in comics a way of reading and writing that
Lyotard describes as postmodern and that Byron Hawk refers to as hyperrhetorical2 –
which sets out to discover a method of invention while inventing it.3
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the book an attempt to make sense of his own (initial) reactions, not an expression

In the Shadow of Image/Text
At first, being able to define the field of study creates a niche, a legitimized
position from which to argue for the integration and use of a specific idea. Thierry
Groensteen’s oft-anthologized essay “Why Are Comics Still in Search of Cultural
Legitimization?” sets up the perceived problem for the medium of comics when he
claims that they “suffer from a considerable lack of legitimacy” and “it is curious
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that the legitimizing authorities (universities, museums, the media) still regularly
charge it with being infantile, vulgar, or insignificant” (“Why” 3). However, while
Groensteen sees this lack of legitimization as a problem, it may be more of a benefit
for comics than he recognizes, and it is one well suited to a postmodern writer/
artist since it works across various media.4 To begin setting out on this project,
three anchors must be retracted:
						

(1)

						

the

						

first

					

attempts

					

to fix comics

					

as a medium,

				

(2) the second attempts

				
			

to legitimize comics through 						
comparisons to film, specifically

			

addressing why comics are

				

primordial to the various

cinematic 		

arts, and (3) the third 		

to make comics
		

into 			

discipline – 		

it is in

attempts
a teachable

this section

			

that I begin to work at finding some of the

			

ways that we might think of
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a comics form (not medium) rhetorically. For example, when a comic book (or
graphic novel) attracts wide public attention, the medium is not always the
primary factor, but its new take on a topic or how it approaches (or remediates)
thinking and writing in unique ways (e.g. Alan Moore’s graphic novel Watchmen).
While Groensteen celebrates this (non)legitimization by challenging the modernist
“ideology of purification that has led contemporary art to a dead end” (“Why” 9), he
does so by developing an alternate system that “defines an ideal” (System 20). In
form of comics offers us an easy entre to say that they are well suited to explore
ideas of other ways of practicing writing/art excluded from institutional ways of
knowing (definition), doing (cinematic), and making (producing).
Groensteen’s larger project – defining the system of comics – has deeper
issues at play that rely on narrative elements of the medium. In The System of
Comics, he goes on to discuss a complex network that compels an associative logic
that can be extended to current work in new media and art criticism scholarship,
such as a post-hermeneutic method that extends beyond interpretation alone.5
Groensteen explains in his introduction that he is setting out to develop “a
conceptual frame in which all of the actualizations of the ‘ninth art’ can find
their place and be thought of in relation to each other, taking into account
their differences and their commonalities within the same medium” in order
to advance “the fundamental concept of solidarity” (System 20). However wellintentioned, this objective begins to exclude those forms of comics that fall outside
of his classifications, a criticism that he has also pinned on Scott McCloud. Such
categorizations that can lead to an us/them relationship of conflict6 centered on
guarding accepted manifestations as if there were some semblance of control over
the development of the medium (and its compositions) – projects like Frank Miller’s
300, Chris Ware’s Jimmy Corrigan: The Smartest Kid on Earth, or Andrei Molotui’s
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a postmodern age weary of notions of ‘purity’ and ‘ideals,’ the absence of an ‘ideal’

In the Shadow of Image/Text
Abstract Comics would continue fall beyond the scope of Groensteen’s system. In
order to sketch out how comics present postmodern writers/artists with an instance
of writing imaginatively, we need to move beyond notions of comics as inherently
sequential and as a dominantly print medium so that we may see how they may
function in ‘the arts’ and in rhetoric/composition; this requires that we first turn to
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the ‘definitional project’ in order to offer a (non)definition of comics as a form.

Slashing Through Image/Text:
The Definitional Project

“One way to perceive the disjunction is to view the slash as a
technology. In other words, the difference between rhetoric and
composition is in how they each define and employ techné.”
~Cynthia Haynes, “Rhetoric/Slash/Composition”

G

roensteen’s definitional project correlates to current concerns in writing
instruction and the various problematics of legitimized knowledge and writing

practices – or what I have called ‘pure’ writing. While well-informed, defining
parameters in terms of formal categories, such as the “spatio-topical” system
Groensteen describes, reduces image/text relationships gives one mediation preference
over the other, creating a hierarchy meant to move toward legitimization. In contrast
to Groensteen’s view of comics as medium – designating the limits of this ‘art’ form
by providing a stance, or what in rhetorical terms is called stasis theory – Kenneth
Burke’s ‘”paradox of substance” offers a better approximation of the comics form. As
Burk writes, “though used to designate something within the thing, intrinsic to it,
[substance] etymologically refers to something outside the thing, extrinsic to it,” it
would be “something that the thing is not” (Grammar 23).7 For comics, this sub-stance
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lies outside formal/systematic conceptualizations and, has a context beyond traditional
form(ulation)s (sequentiality).8
											

As such,

										

most attempts

										

at defining comics

									
								

generally unproductive,

							

perhaps even self-serving

						

to the point of ignoring

					

the larger context of

				

comics – as intermedial

			

form (for more on

			

intermedia, see

				

chapter 3). A more

			

productive approach

			
		
		

unnecessary and

appears in a method
Greg Ulmer and Hawk
call hyperrhetoric –

which inserts ‘art’
directly into rhetoric
and composition.
What I suggest is
that current perspectives on comics (art) would be better achieved through a (non)
category than with a formal/istic classifications. Here I take my cue from Cynthia
Haynes’ “Rhetoric/Slash/Composition,” Lisa Trahair’s reading of Lyotard’s Discours,
figure in The Comedy of Philosophy and James Kochalka’s suggestion that art
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as a medium are

In the Shadow of Image/Text
is a way of understanding and condensing life’s experiences (Cute Manifesto).
To put it briefly, as I hope to show, because comics are a form associated with
both image and text, because they exist at the intersections between media, they
would be better thought of as a technology in the sense that Haynes uses the
term slash between rhetoric and composition. If “the and between computers and
writing [is] already utterly unnecessary” (“Rhetoric/Slash/Composition”; emphasis
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added), per Haynes’ rhetorical question, it isn’t a far stretch to say that writing
in the form of comics – as image and text – would need little discussion to dismiss
another unnecessary and between ‘computers and [comics]. As we’ll see, from both
Groensteen and Lyotard, writing always already involves both image and text.
Groensteen reminds us that the Greeks used “a single word, graphien”
to refer to writing and painting, which, when “our alphabetical culture quickly
became logocentrism,” subordinated “visual forms of expression to language” since
“philosophers continually repeat that the image tricks and troubles us, acting on
our senses and exciting our emotions, and that reason is on the side of the word”
(“Why” 8; emphasis added). Building on Michel Foucault’s
									

		

a Pipe, Groensteen							
expose the opposition 					
text, claiming that the 		

between image and

been long fought
written text over the

visual. T h i s c o n v e r s a t i o n i s n o t h i n g n e w t o
those of us involved in rhetoric and
co m p o s i t i o n ’ s c u r r e n t f o c u s
		
			

on ‘multimedia, but
what I want to

attempts to

opposition between

looking and reading has 		
and continues to value the

This is Not
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point to here has to do with Groensteen’s attempts to position comics as an art
that leans more toward the visual than the textual. The problem with the way
that he frames comics here, and in the way he discusses text, is that he does
not give the written word the (ambiguous) credit it de-serves – “reason is on the
side of the word” – despite a history of postmodern scholarship to the contrary;
here I am specifically thinking of Derrida’s work on language and writing in Of
Grammatology. In other words, Groensteen fails to realize that the interplay of
presented together.
To elucidate this claim more fully, we turn to Trahair’s reading of Lyotard.
Through a reading of Lyotards’ Discourse, figure, Trahair suggests that each mode
(discourse, figure) is not an order of knowing separated from the other, but that
both realms “inhabit [each] other,” that both image and text are always already
given together (Comedy 171). Evaluating these two modes of expression as Trahair
explains provides current multimodal composing processes in popular culture
(remix) with some alternate ways of thinking about what it means to write in an
age of new media. Where remix tends to work with a logic of association in the form
of collage/montage,9 the thought-practices that Lyotard proposes brings us back to
the Greek word graphien, not as a separation, but as the superimposition of image
and text, each occupying the same space, just as stills in a film occupy the space
on a screen. This superimposition blurs the distinction between image and text
by breaking with the perspective that in “some instances of ‘textual production,’
discourse will dominate; in others, the figure takes hold of the text” (Trahair,
Comedy 171).10 Reading and writing in this way presents a logic of invention that
returns “texts” to conceptual starting places (tropes) that exceed methods of reading
and writing categorically (topos).
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image and text lays bare the ambiguities of each and that both are always already

In the Shadow of Image/Text
As it relates to traditional views of comics, topoi (commonplaces) can be misused
if the goal is to illustrate some known idea or represent some preconceived knowledge,
such as caricature(s). In response to one of the most outrageous (‘causing outrage’)
examples of this misuse, the 2005 Danish political cartoons of the Muslim prophet
Mohammed, Spiegelman echoes the problems that rhetoric and composition have
been addressing over the last thirty years – specifically, the desire to control meaning,
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language, writing and the teaching of rhetoric and composition. For Spiegelman,
these caricatures symbolize a symptom, not the cause of a larger problem: the desire
to canonize or curate. “Caricature,” Spiegelman writes, “is by definition a charged or
loaded image: its wit lies in the visual concision of using a few deft strokes to make its
point” by “deploying a handful of visual symbols and clichés” that use “the discredited
pseudo-scientific principles of physiognomy to portray character through a few physical
attributes and facial expressions” (“Drawing Blood” 45). As a representational form
(mimesis) of thought, caricature plays on accepted icons already present in the public
consciousness. When Sirc details how composition builds classrooms as
					

“peculiar

				

sorts of cultural

				

temples in which students

				

are ‘invited’ in to sample

			

the best that has been thought

and expressed in our language and maybe even, like the art students
we see poised in art galleries with their sketchbooks and charcoals,
to learn to produce the master’s craft” (English 2), the issue lies with
caricature – we ‘invite’ 				

students into classrooms in

order that they can 				

create caricatures of our

language with tasks 				

geared toward making

them write purely, to 				

reproduce the models of

‘the best that has been 				

thought and expressed.’
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What comics offer us goes beyond caricature – a form that allows writers and
artists to compose without the requirement of a model or master copies hanging
over their heads.
Scott McCloud’s Understanding Comics offers an alternate perspective that
begins to blur the division between theory and practice – a blurring not too distant
from Haynes’ virgule, the slash (/), between rhetoric and composition (“Rhetoric/
McCloud has been widely criticized for his attempt to define the medium of comics
– either it is too limiting (Meskin) or too broad (Cohn) depending on the critic – his
performative exploration of comics suggests an intersection between Duchamp’s
creative act in art and craft, a place of invention – and “object” that goes beyond
criticism and actually performs the work that it discusses, or what Ulmer would
call an “object of post-criticism.” McCloud’s content aside, the book acts out the sort
of practices that comics offer rhetoric/ composition pedagogy, a field continually
concerned with verbal language and visual inscriptions. That is, comics present a
hesitating intervention, which is precisely what McCloud attempts to accomplish
with Understanding Comics: he hesitates to fix a definition of comics while
examining the current state of the medium, even claiming that the definition is
only a way to set out on the work he does throughout the rest of the book. As far as
the content is concerned, he bookends the entire project with two claims: (1) “[O]ur
attempts to define comics are an on-going process which won’t end anytime soon”
(Understanding 23), and (2) “I’ve learned a lot about comics since beginning this
project and I know I have a lot left to learn. I hope you’ll all consider exploring—or
continuing to explore—comics on your own” (Understanding 215). McCloud has no
illusions of creating a fixed definition, and he welcomes an inventive approach to
comics that falls outside of his own project’s purview.
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Slash/Composition”) or the hesitating comma in Lyotard’s Discours, figure. While

In the Shadow of Image/Text
If we learn to look at comics as McCloud does, we have the terrain to think
of comics as a technology, as techné, that defines and employs images and text
in different ways, ways that welcome experimental arrangements. Here we see
comics’ connection to the current move in multimodal composition pedagogy away
from interpretation and toward stimulating thought to create something new
through generative practices that alters how we think and write how we experience

62

‘reality’.11 The purpose of such an experimental approach is not to engage in
cultural criticism, but to become productive writers, and to tackle the “insecurity
over our status as a valid academic field [that] led us to entrench ourselves firmly
in professionalism” (Sirc, English 6) in such a way that ‘our profession’ has less
to do with institutions (and institutional demands) and more to do with how we
experience the world.
Still, some of the concepts that he introduces through the book are
problematic if read as the only application and approach that writers/artists
take toward the comics. Most notably, the initial definition he provides –
“juxtaposed pictorial and other images in deliberate sequence, intended to convey
information and/or to produce an aesthetic response in the viewer” (McCloud,
Understanding 7-9) – relies on a linearity that implies a grammatical structure,
like the one that Kress and Van Leeuwen propose in Readings Images: The
Grammar of Visual Design. This is where the Lyotardian superimposition
turns up – instead of arranging image/text, image/image, text/image, text/text
sequentially, conceptualizing this division as an already interrelated and interactive employment of technè presents a way of breaking up the division between
the textual, allowing how we think of the figural to become a hyperrhetorical
manner of invention. In addition to avoiding the concern of “amplification through
simplification” (McCloud, Understanding 30) present in the concept of caricature,
thinking of this combination as method of superimposition allows us to think
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about how comics create complex networks of meaning by looking at how various
media combine (more on the combination of media in chapter 3) to elicit a singular
aesthetic response rather than a general/ized response. If we take our cue from
Lyotard, the interaction of image and text would take shape as a Moebius strip
where there are no longer two separate sides, and the aesthetic response arising
out of these combinations “is not at all closed in the sense of a volume, it is infinite,
and contrary to the representative cube, intensities run in it without meeting a
would be the mark of a lack,” but “[i]t invests without condition,” without “rule and
knowledge” (Libidinal 4).
The problems with ‘understanding’ comics as a language, rather than as an
alternate form of thought, appears in Neil Cohn’s work on visual language in the
field of linguistics. In “Un-Defining ‘Comics,’” Cohn tries to develop a theoretical
model of comics that 						
of visual images comparable 				
view of aesthetics, which 			
		

he sees at the center of 		

		

rhetorical studies may

			
			

parallels the grammar
acquisition – what in
fall under the canon of

relies on a constructionist method of
reading that does not take into account the

			
		

to the Frankfurt School’s

style. Cohn’s visual language model, though,

				

		

focuses on a grammar

aleatory/associative
theoretical and 		

procedures found in
philosophical work

over the last century, 			
Marcel Duchamp. In 				

beginning as early as
his own words, Cohn

claims that comics 					
as sociological, literary, 						

“can only be understood
and cultural artifacts,
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terminus, without ever crashing into the wall of an absence, into a limit which

In the Shadow of Image/Text
independent from the internal structures comprising them,” and he proposes
that a more productive approach would study its “visual language” and “visual
linguistics” (with all of its grammatical and syntactical connotations), which would
be akin to taking “x-rays of it to understand how it works” (“Un-Defining” 246).
While he claims that language “places no restrictions on how it is utilized” and
could lead to “a boom of diverse content” (“Un-Defining” 247), he seems to suggest
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that ‘understanding’ the logic of a comics language can help us better grasp how
to handle the form in order to give voice to what other fields of study have already
been working on developing. If this is the case, the importance of comics would
become diminished as just another way of saying what has already been said in
another domain.
Aaron Meskin’s “Defining Comics?” suggests that Cohn’s project is misdirected when
he questions any (and all) attempts at defining comics: “we are typically most interested
in features whose absence tends to preclude a work from falling into a category, not ones
that are required for category membership” (“Defining” 376). Here, Meskin acknowledges
that any standardized features of comics are inherently limiting and unnecessary for any
art, and it would seem “improbable that a definition of comics – even if it were forthcoming
– would be of much help in giving us critical and interpretive guidance” (“Defining” 376).
In essence, Meskin finds that the definitional project is misguided since any definition
excludes more than it incorporates; an alternative would be to think of comics tropologically
– not as a medium (category) in itself, but as the superimposition of media that allows, even
invites, the proliferation of meaning beyond representation/reproduction (mimesis) in the
formulation of new, perhaps unexpected, linkages. As it happens,12 the relevance of comics
has to do with how they address the ordinary, the everyday where “random chronology
overcomes logic, and the idea of causality gives way to the contingency and arbitrariness of
everyday life” (Schneider, “Comics and Everyday Life” 41), where the Strange(r) writes and
thinks without regard for categorical memberships.
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A Hesitating In(ter)vention: The Cinematic (Arts) Project
“…it ought to be obvious that I accept completely the notion that
there is a prescriptive function to the idea of paganism. I believe
that one should move in the direction that it proposes. But I am
struck by the fact that prescriptives, taken seriously, are never
grounded: one can never reach the just by a conclusion.”

I

			
			

f we begin to

think of comics as an art on

				

its own merits, as Meskin suggests,

				

instead of systematically, as Cohn

				

and Groensteen seem to propose,

					

some headway can be made

							

in seeing comics as

							

a hyperrhetorical

							

form of writing

							

and thinking.

							

To consider

							
						
				

comics as a
form that links

art to the everyday,

				

some of the

				

concerns
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~ Lyotard, Just Gaming

In the Shadow of Image/Text
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that Groensteen
raises in “Why Are Comics Still

In Search Of Cultural Legitimization?”
need to be addressed. As a genre of art,
Groensteen claims

that comics endure a

s u b o r d i n a t e 			

position to other arts,

		

including cinema, 			

due to its hybridity

		

(combining image 			

and text), its (erroneous)

		

association with 			

an inferior art

								

(caricature), and

								

its position as a

								
							
							
						
						

medium lacking
any link to serious

work (9-11) – although
I’m not sure what could
be more serious than

					

how we think about

					

our everyday lives,

					

the “‘home of the

					

bizarre and mysterious’,

					

the place where the

						

exceptional

					

and marvelous reside”

					

(Schneider, “Comics and

					

Everyday Life” 43).

						

When
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Groensteen places comics and cinema in conversation in The System of Comics, he
asserts that for “its part, film has other assets, and comics have theirs also, a fact
that is demonstrated by its [comics] continuing popularity after a century and a
half of existence, despite the competition of cinema and of all the new things born
of what Regis Debreay calls the ‘videosphere’” (8). However, Groensteen relies on
scholarship within cinematic studies that does not reflect the differences in media,
but that equates cinema and comics – a problematic link for various reasons.
he by unquestioningly associates with comics even though Barthes identified the
obtuse as a cinema-specific meaning that produces an abstract examination of a
film.13 While Barthes mentions that comics may offer “a new signifier,” it would
be one “related to the obtuse meaning” since it contains a narrative that allows
for counter-narratives (“The Third Meaning” 66). By applying a term to comics
that Barthes assigns to film, even as he attempts to differentiate comics from
film, Groensteen stumbles upon some of the ambiguous differences between both
and how comics present an alternate form of thinking and writing: in fragments
(aphorisms – see my chapter 6) where we explore and invent with a rigor beyond a
unified system that closes upon itself.14
Toward the end of his assessment of the ‘system,’ he seems to have discovered
the difference: while film tends to work with logics of the cut (montage/collage),
traditional comics15 produce networks that stimulate logics of association un/cut from
how they appear in random, contingent and arbitrary chronologies. While Groensteen’s
project has been a welcome addition to comics scholarship, his study parallels that
of McCloud’s Understanding Comics16 and tends to position comics in opposition to
cinema, rather than exploring the ways in which comics present a form of technè that
can be thought of as a technology (in Haynes’ sense of the word). For example, he
“objects to” the term “editing (montage)” since this sort of “operation […] consists of
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The most prominent example he uses is Roland Barthes’ obtuse meaning, which
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an intervention on a material that has already been elaborated” (System 101) even
while he supports the juxtapositions that montage produces throughout his ‘spatiotopical’ system.17 But the intervention that comics provide needs to be elaborated as an
intervention in traditional understandings of comics that breaks apart discussions that
continue to persist speaking at cross-purposes.
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The underlying concern for Groensteen remains prominent for comics: that
comics are considered a secondhand version of cinema. Yet, discarding terms due
to their relationship with film can limit the development and potentialities of what
comics present: a manner of thinking and writing in an age of new media denoting
“the presence of an active and playful imagination trying to rewrite and redress its
own environment and process” (Ellis, Do Anything 15). Alan Moore, one of the most
prominent critics of film from within comics, acknowledges that cinematic techniques
“can advance the standards of comic art and writing,” but if they rely on cinematic
techniques for innovative practices, comics will restrict emselves from the possibilities
of artistic works not available to ‘other cinematic arts’ (Writing 3). David Carrier agrees
with Moore and expresses a common observation from a comics perspective: when
watching a film, the motion arises out of a projector, whereas the motion in comics
takes place when “the successive images are connected” by the reader (Aesthetics 56),
which correlates to McCloud’s discussion of the gutter between panels in a conventional
comic book. All of this to say that comics and cinema are already interrelated, but
that the ways in which the two have been discussed along side each other leaves a lot
to be desired. So while Groensteen dismisses montage as a technique for comics, his
perspective does not reflect that of how ‘artists’ working with comics write and think –
trans-disciplinarily; that is, with techniques and methods that extend beyond merely
joining images and text to say in another way what has already been said in a different
form, like Jacobson and Colón did with their graphic adaptation of the “National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.”
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if this remains the

Hans-Christian Christiansen investigates
the differences between comics and
cinema in his article “Comics and
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Let me state the obvious first: what such approaches ignore has to do with the
current cultural and media theories of remix that
		
			

these systematized narratives in order to
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work at breaking apart
say something else.
extreme, the

methods used to break apart cinematic narratives necessitate turning films into
what could, for all intents and purposes, be called traditional comics – a sequence
of still images that forms a narrative. And if we see remix as merely an alternative
mix of the mixes we have been presented, cinema and comics become modes of
thinking that suggest, as Ulmer writes of video, “an alternative means of gathering
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information into sets, for the purpose not of proving or testing an idea, but of a
having a thought, of inventing both in the rhetorical sense of finding something to
say and in the creative sense of innovation” (“One Video Theory” 268).
Hawk’s method of remotivating the figural into a new context (through
the rhetorical canons of memory and arrangement) presents such an alternative
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approach called hyperrhetoric, which comics scholars/hip has yet to adopt.
Hyperrhetoric, as Hawk explains while working out of Ulmer, runs antithetical to a
“method of controlling something in advance (or producing a generalization
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then control something in advance” that

		

“is a part of the ideology of science (induction and

		

deduction)” (“Hyperrhetoric” 77); in its place, hyperrhetoric
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inventive practices (to hyper/mediate here means to employ various media to
invent allusions to the imaginable that remains inaccessible to a single medium).
My use of cinematic theories of invention is not meant to suggest that comics are
subordinate to other cinematic arts; the main reason I rely on theories coming out
of cinema has to do with the dearth of work on how a comics form of thinking and
writing can acclimate us to imaginative approaches to writing (with) new media.

decades provides such approaches, how these approaches have been addressed
remains entrenched in ‘the literate text,’ even though the figural provokes
us to think abstractly. Victor Burgin’s The Remembered Film disrupts the
differentiations between comics and cinema that continues to be a source of
conflict. In particular, when Burgin writes that the “film we saw is never the film I
remember” (110), we find a corresponding example in Spiegelman’s In the Shadow
of No Towers when he presents one way of ‘making sense’ of his experiences during
the WTC attacks, and even the way he remembers those experiences are unfixed.
Spiegelman’s approach to this work puts into practice that inventive method that
relies on what Hawk practices with the film The Fifth Element: unbinding the
linear narrative to produce a conceptual starting place. As Spiegelman writes, what
he was looking for was a way “to sort out the fragments of what [he’d] experienced
from the media images that threatened to engulf what [he] actually saw, and the
collagelike nature of a newspaper page encourages [his] impulse to juxtapose [his]
fragmentary thoughts in different styles” (Shadow iv). The way Spiegelman frames
this project underscores how we can think of comics as a technology that provides
us with a way of thinking in fragments and creating collages through a process
of linking those fragments into new assemblages. Instead of relying on formal,
narrative analysis, this approach to thinking and writing would have us insert a
slash between comics and cinema – comics/cinema – to consider how practices of
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While the playful work that comics have engaged in over the past two
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creating and viewing change across media.20 Both are technologies of the slash,
and the importance of each is not the differences between them, but in how they
each define and employ techné.
Asbjørn Grønstad has already proposed a similar concept for film studies
that he calls theory film, which “provides us with a metadiscursive concept that
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condenses a host of inter-related ideas that all seem to converge in the perception
that aesthetic texts themselves may be constitutive of theoretical thought” (14).
From within comics, Neil Gaiman and Dave McKean visualize what such a
process might consist of in Signal to Noise. In the narrative, a (fictive) prominent
director has only months to live, but feels compelled to write his last project about
the end of the world, to be completed posthumously. He begins to imagine the
film, assembling the sets, actors, and shots, but not writing any of it. There is no
purpose, he tells himself. It will not be completed, the world is ending for him, but
eventually something pierces him about this project and he is compelled to write.
There is a world of potentialities building in his mind, “where the real films are”
(Signal 3), what Burgin might refer to as ‘internal memory,’ manifested as an
arrangement from “fragments [that] go adrift and enter into new combinations,
more or less transitory” (Burgin, Remembered 68), until he puts “them out of
their misery” (Gaiman, Signal 3) by writing. In his final moments, the director
finds what he sees as an appropriate title for this transitory work: apocatastases,
meaning a “return to a previous condition” (Gaiman, Signal 50), which could be
explained as a place where writers and artists work without (predetermined)
criteria for a playful inventiveness that works with collected fragments, and
produces a collagelike work in different styles (or media/tions).
But none of this is really new. McCloud notices this move in the sequel to
Understanding Comics – Reinventing Comics: How Imagination and Technology
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are Revolutionizing an Art Form. After all, what I’m suggesting is how comics work as
a form that can teach us how to work imaginatively with technology by inventing a way
of thinking about comics as a form of thought rather than as a unique medium. For this
re-invention, McCloud asks that we begin to think of comics as multimedia instead
of thinking about “comics and multimedia in collaboration,” which he explains
would be merely transfer the printed page into digital environments (Reinventing
208). At the heart of this manner of thinking is the ability to consider the “ideas
them into being, until the irreducible essence of each has emerged” so that “new
forms [can] grow in their new environments. Comics is such an idea, and most of
its checkered history has been the shell” (Reinventing 233). And it is this idea
that continues to be ignored in favor of rehashing the same old arguments about
the uniqueness of the medium rather than thinking about the idea of a (new)
comics form, a form that suggests a way of writing and thinking imaginatively
with the logics of digital media (e.g., linking, hypermedia/tion, montage/collage,
etc.), what Ulmer calls electracy – a method of learning closer to invention than
authentication. Part of the goal for the remainder of this project will be to find ways
in which we can think about how comics offer an imaginative way of thinking and
writing in digital environments.

Electracy, the early years: Nietzsche doing graphic design.
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that traditional media harbor” escaping “the shells of the technologies that brought
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Sifting Through the Madness:
Writing Imaginatively
“if it doesn’t come bursting out of you/in spite of everything,/
don’t do it. unless it comes unmasked out of your/heart and
your mind and your mouth/and your gut,/ don’t do it.”
74

~ Charles Bukowski, “so you want to be a writer?”

F

luidity and play guide this inventive process at the intersections of comics and
cinema as an additional way of thinking about the image/text relationship

and the relationship between print and digital writing. Hyperrhetoric, as Hawk
describes it, entails an element of playful inventiveness with a re-arrangement
of memory toward transformative production. Hawk tells us that a component of
hyperrhetoric is to give an example since this method attempts to blur the line
between theory and practice. For our purposes, an example presents itself in
Marcel Duchamp’s remix L.H.O.O.Q. An initial “reading” could suggest that this
re/viewing of Leonardo de Vinci’s21 Mona Lisa is a single artwork that stands on
its own. However, we know that Duchamp was questioning the meaning of Art by
drawing/painting in a mustache and goatee. In this instance, Duchamp’s piece also
comments on the work of art, which, if his writings are an indication, he would
say is never finished – similarly, a saying from composition courses puts this
point explicitly: “the essay is not finished, but it is due.” However, for institutional
writing, due, more often than not, means complete.
Duchamp’s L.H.O.O.Q. has become an accepted work of Art, and one
that rhetoric/composition scholars, when looking to art for guidance, see as an
inspiration or as a model of what the rhetorical turn to the figural might look like.
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L.H.O.O.Q. resonates with current popular art trends toward remix, in the sense
that it inserts a discrepancy and interrupts the expectations of spectators, at least
when it was first made public. However, this remix does not only use the montage/
collage techniques found in cinema and music, but superimposes one image over
another to create something new. Let me provide a manifestation of playful work
using a now-antiquated technology: the overhead projector. On this projector we
have a duplicate of de Vinci’s Mona Lisa shown on the screen behind us.
75

Leonardo da Vinci’s Mona Lisa and Duchamp’s L.H.O.O.Q.
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A traditional art-criticism course, like the one I took while an undergraduate,

It’s time to move

would begin by contextualizing the image and providing some description and/or
critique of art. Se

interpretation of the image – the slight, coy smile indicates a hidden secret. But“Doctor MD” (Essa
this is not a traditional course. In this course, we have two blank transparencies.
The first includes a mustache and a goatee that, when placed over our copy, mimics
Duchamp’s remix – Mona Lisa has a mustache and goatee. We let this sit; we
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discuss the painting and what we would add. On the second transparency, students
have decided that they would like to dye her hair pink and stretch her ear-piercings
to a double-zero gauge (about an inch in diameter). We lay this transparency over
Duchamp’s rendering of the Mona Lisa. What we have now resembles something
akin to a portrait of a “punk” created through a playful approach to art, to writing
and the figural while performing a critique from within the medium:22

Re/Mix of Duchamp’s L.H.O.O.Q.
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Still, the fear that this approach becomes “art for art’s sake” cannot be

e past Duchamp’s
ee Kaprow’signored
essay, since in most traditional writing courses “writing for writing’s sake”
ays 127-129).

seems to be a common perception among writing students. For the writing

classroom that continues to focus on traditional academic essays, a practice
still common in most writing instruction, rhetoric and composition has little
(obvious) personal and professional relevance and does not (always) address
the changing environments in which writing takes place. The research paper
recognized that writing takes many forms and is a cyclical process of theory/
practice. To write a research paper by trilogy (“thesis, antithesis, synthesis”)
serves as a way to continue the method of acceptable/accepted writing (topoi),
of argument, and modes of writing that do not account for alternate forms of
writing open by new media. Re-imagined, writing might look like Duchamp’s
L.H.O.O.Q. continued with a superimposition: invention accompanied by a sense
of play, like the playful revisions of both Mona Lisa’s portraits.
Allan Kaprow argues for such an approach
to “art” when he left the happenings behind,
calling it unart (see my chapter 3), which would
step toward laughter23 by avoiding “all esthetic
roles, give up all references to being artists of
any kind whatever24 [and existing] only fleetingly
as the nonartist, for when the profession of
art is discarded, the art category is meaningless,
or at least antique” (103-104). Discarding
art as a category has been a motivation for the
work that comics ‘artists’ have been developing
since becoming disillusioned with the formal

It’s time to move past
Duchamp’s critique of art.
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assignment is due and therefore complete. Conversely, many (theorists) have
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elements involved while learning to become artists – and so they’ve become
unartists unconcerned with aesthetic roles and categories. As it applies to rhetoric/
composition, James Kochalka offers us a clue to how comics (as a form) conduct
this work when he explains that “art is not a way of conveying information, it’s
a way of understanding information. That is, creating art is a means we have of
making sense of the world, focusing to make it clearer, not a way of communicating
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some understanding of the world that we already hold” (Cute 121), and it should
“be accompanied by a sense of play,” which “is a heightened state of imaginative
awareness that allows us to enter new realms of discovery […]. Play is our most
important way of processing the information of experience […]. Play and art are the
same thing!” (Cute 100-102; emphasis added). Here, Kochalka sees comics (form)
as a way to address the “constant blinking techno vibrations that we bombard our
senses” with in order to tune us in “with the cacophony of the instant” (Cute 40), by
“feeling the rhythm within the cacophony” (Cute 41) and writing within that state.
To re-begin, Spiegelman was able to make sense of his experiences on the day
the WTC was attacked as he wrote/drew In the Shadow of No Towers. However,
he may hesitate to say that that work accurately portrays how he felt and how
he has continued to make sense of the attacks. Writing and art became ways of
making sense of those events, but one that continues every time he remembers
and re-arranges that event. In the Shadow of No Towers might look much different
if Spiegelman were to attempt it a decade later instead of the three years he took
to complete the project following the attacks. Spiegelman’s approach to comics
presents a way of thinking and writing strangely by engaging (all) the available
means of production. Comics can re-orient us to the division between image/text
(and comics/cinema), all the while making differences apparent and inventive.
Such an approach proposes an inventive view of comics that takes into account
the superimposition of the figural and the textual toward postmodern writing
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practices similar to the one that Italo Calvino describes “as the tendency to make
ironic use of the stock images of the mass [new/digital] media, or to inject the taste
for the marvelous inherited from literary tradition into narrative mechanisms
that accentuate its alienation” (Six Memos 95); this (non)method corresponds “to
what in philosophy is nonsystematic thought, which proceeds by aphorisms, by
sudden, discontinuous flashes of light” (Six Memos 118). Calvino identifies this
position as one involving internal memory, a sort of ‘mental cinema’25 at work
midst of both image and text. Writing of his ‘reading’ as a small child, he refers
to the images in comics that spurred stories before he could read the text. Even
when he learned to read, “the advantage was minimal,” often “stabs in the dark [at
meaning] like my own” (Six Memos 93) – a claim that breaks away from traditional
views of comics as merely ‘visual novels.’ Instead, he adopted an “occupation of
daydreaming within the pictures” (Six Memos 93-94) that allowed for “a process of
abstraction, condensation, and interiorization of sense experience”26 (Six Memos
95) – an associational logic of assembling fragmentary thoughts in new formations.
Pedagogically, Calvino’s (non)method parallels Hawk’s hyperrhetorical method,
invented for the occasion with unpredictable outcomes, and returning us to a
sophistic ethos (Haynes) that would have us write as Plato’s sophist speaks: as
Sophist(ic)s, as Strangers.
Haynes appraises this pedagogical footpath as
“[t]eaching the value of exploring something in the abstract, without practical
purpose or intention, would return composition to its sophistic ethos (I
dare not say roots). In other words, finding new touchstones means leaving
touchstones behind. It mean plumbing the depths of abstraction. It means ob/
literating the ground” (“Writing Offshore” 715).
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in comics. He even works hyperrhetorically, inventing through difference in the
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Sophistic ethos in this sense would unhinge itself from institutional grounds (with
the various connotations, including the physical space and justification – “on these
grounds, I argue”). When pedagogy becomes postpedagogy, it returns itself to its
mobile (ped: foot – walking) origins by extracting itself from the fixed space/place
of institutions. The term itself comes to us from the Greek word paidagogeo, where
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agogos means ‘to lead,’ and comes to the Greeks from the Sanskrit word ajati,
meaning ‘drives, moving, active.’ In other words, postpedagogy walks the walk,
talks the talk, and writes writing. It would be sophist(ic) in the Socratic sense:
walking alongside each other as whatever singularities in order ‘to be such that it
always matters’.27

Chapter 3

Art Interrupted

Art Interrupted

Art Interrupted1
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“…Surrealism saw in it the means of obtaining, most often
under conditions of complete relaxation of the mind rather
than complete concentration, certain incandescent flashes
linking two elements of reality belonging to categories that
are so far removed from each other that reason would fail to
connect them and that require a momentary suspension of the
critical attitude in order for them to be brought together.”
~ Andre Breton, “On Surrealism in its Living Works”

T

here may be no better “art” to illustrate our Stranger’s (comic/s) writing than
Surrealism, a ‘movement’ whose participants took it upon themselves to

speak without an authoritative voice, bearing witness to the strange occurrence
of everyday life with the chance logic of dream-work.2 Beyond the denotative link
between the two terms, the Stranger and Surrealism share a common bond in
their desires to let the imagination run free, to manifest the un-manifested, as
exemplified by Andre Breton’s perpetual revisions of a “Manifesto of Surrealism”
(cf. Manifestos of Surrealism). The chance logics of this dream-work remain
uncommon practice with new media, a part of how technology has been affecting
the ways in which we think despite the moves we’ve been making toward
‘multimodal’ composition. A new way of thinking about how to compose with the
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available means new media provide presents itself in Blanchot’s view of surrealism,
and specifically with how it connects with Kaprow’s (non)method called unart and
its connection to Dick Higgins’ idiom of intermedia. To begin, Blanchot’s view of
surrealism:
The surrealist experience [expérience] is the experience of experience,
whether it seeks itself in a theoretical or practical form: an experience that
deranges and deranges itself, disarranges as it unfolds and, in unfolding,
interrupts itself. It is in this that surrealism – poetry itself – is the experience
of thought itself. (Infinite 412)
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The interruption Blanchot brings up here has to do with interrupting the totality
of thought similar to the interruption of myths, as detailed by Jean-Luc Nancy,
spoken and written as singularities exposing the limits of such totalities (The
Inoperative Community). Surrealism, like the means offered in new media,
attempts to affirm the experience of thought as life rather than as institutional.
For example, Breton’s manifestations of surrealism were in continual flux having
“nothing to do with any aesthetic criterion” (Manifestos 297), a move that Kaprow
terms unart to indicate a move away from institutional perspectives on art. As
Kaprow writes, the unartist “is the offspring of high art who has left home” (Essays
230), and as such is engaged in the interruption of Art and the categories therein.
I tend to sympathize with Kaprow’s unart due to its (indirect) link to rhetorical
theory concerning writing with new media, and its reliance on what can now be
called common art theories and practices – something I have also been guilty of
proposing when speaking of comics.
However, what comics suggests take a much different route, one much more
closely related to unart than to art. As I’ll explain, like surrealism, unart has no
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concern for art categories or ‘aesthetic criteria’ of any sort, and those individuals
we call ‘comics artists’ have (perhaps unknowingly) engaged in the unarting of art.
One example comes from Chris Ware, a ‘comics artist’ famed for his experimental
graphic novel Jimmy Corrigan: The Smartest Kid on Earth, among other works.
Speaking of his personal and professional relationship to art (in third person),
he taps into a common perspective among many of today’s well-known ‘comics
artists’: “Though admittedly trained as an ‘artist,’ he never felt entirely at home
in the generally approved setting, fashion, and didactic charter of that particular
industry” (Acme Novelty Library 17, copyright page). Like Kaprow, Ware feels
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much more ‘at home’ in the strangeness of everyday life, in the surreal experience
of thought itself, as it happens. However, in order to avoid a syllogistic fallacy – (1)
Ware was disillusioned with his training as an ‘artist’; (2) Ware is a ‘comics artist’;
(3) All ‘Comics artist’ are disillusioned with their training as ‘artists’ – this chapter
works toward the view of a ‘comics form’ whose idiom (‘school of art’) is unart rather
than Art – and therefore closer to the work rhetoric and composition engages with
in terms of new media and multimedia. Toward this goal, I begin with an example
coming out of Spiegelman’s alternative comics magazine RAW called The Narrative
Corpse (TNC), a project that attempted to enact a surrealist parlor game – les corps
exquisite – through comics.
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The Narrative Corpse: It’s Alive! It’s Alive!3
“The surreal may well seek to constitute for itself imaginary
objects, indicate itself in the margins, discover itself close
to the unwonted through what is stunning and fascinating.
These indications still have no more than a distancing value:
reminders of the unseemly whose law is not only to disorder
the order of the appropriate, but also to be unable to suit itself,
concern itself, or conform to itself by assuming a form.”
~ Blanchot, The Infinite Conversation
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O

ver the course of five years, 69 ‘comics artists’ collaborated on TNC in response
to a prompt by Spiegelman asking all involved to break out of their routine

methods of producing comics. This experimental practice asked that artists draw
three comics panels building on the previous three panels, but without seeing
any of the panels that came beforehand. The project, as Spiegelman4 conceived of
it, aimed to break “free from the constraints of rational thought” (2), a common
trait among ‘comics artists.’ By emulating,5 and transforming, this surrealist
parlor game,6 Spiegelman and friends extend Breton’s ‘surrealist manifestos’ into
a method of invention that relies on chance arrangements, but with one rule: the
main protagonist, a stick figure with a black head, will unify the narrative. But
if we understand this stick figure as a metaphor for comics, what we find is a
stranger’s work with a strange logic, the sort of logic that Derrida explains can be
seen “as if […] the stranger could save the master and liberate the power of his
host; it’s as if the master, qua master, were prisoner to his place and his power, of
his ipseity, of his subjectivity (his subjectivity is hostage)” (Of Hospitality 123). By
requiring each ‘comics artist’ to use the stick figure, he [the stick figure] works as
a way to implore each of his hosts – which Derrida also translates as ‘strangers’
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– to work beyond their normal context(s) – building a full narrative through an
uninterrupted progression (‘sequential art’).
What is particularly interesting about this practice, and how Spiegelman
conceives it, is that this method attempts to break apart tendencies to work toward
some aim that would limit what can be thought and written; in its place, the game
unfolds as an interruption of a totalizing narrative by singular ‘voices.’ Brian
Boyd, commenting on TNC, explains this method as a practice of “chance instead
of design, caprice instead of rationality, crazy disjunction instead of continuity”
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(“Art and Evolution” 35) in which Spiegelman “deliberately chooses to entangle
and interrogate intention when he denies the contributors […] access to any shared
aim” (“Art and Evolution” 53). Surrealism appeals to Spiegelman for its strange
way of writing, an attunement to the strange part of everyday life that allows
writers and artists to release themselves from what Ware sees as the paradox of
comics’ history of Art, including misdirected attempts to “insert comics into that
dominant narrative” (Roeder, “Chris Ware” 65). Comics in general, and TNC in
particular, are particularly interesting for their lack of concern for that dominant
narrative – this lack of concern does not mean that they directly confront Art
(history), but that they are much more like refugees from reason and Art. The
surrealist approach to comics presented in TNC illustrates how this strange form
of writing may be manifested under the conditions of a relaxed imagination (cf.
Breton, Manifestos).
When thought of as a game, the narrative corpse gestures7 toward a manner
of thinking and writing that attempts to strip itself of the rational and narrative
logic of sequence and linearity – we can see this in Spiegelman’s editing notes that
the editors of the work “ eventually cut the Savage Pencil strand after Jayr Pulga’s
panels (which do not end the story on page 19), and used the Mark Beyer panels,
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which followed those, to start our story” (2) – to point to other processes involved
in writing strangely. In the first manifestation of Surrealism, Breton explains the
purpose as an imaginative way of working that “offers me some intimation of what
can be, and this is enough to remove to some slight degree the terrible injunction;
enough, too, to allow me to devote myself to it without fear of making a mistake”
(Manifestos 5). This last claim (‘without fear of making a mistake’) resonates with
the guiding idea we find in the narrative corpse game, but that also appears in the
work of ‘comics artists’ in general – this lack of fear also being a lack of concern
for the demands of Art disciplines and their values.8 While it may seem odd that
comics become linked with a now-recognized art movement, at least when viewing
look to the underlying motivations of surrealist works to be surprised with the
unexpected, which is another way of saying to proceed with a ‘playful imagination.’

Dali Atomicus by Salvador Dali (1948)
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comics as a move away from art as such, this strangeness dissipates when we

Art Interrupted
Much like the surrealist concern for life over art, comics’ move away from
Art is much more attuned to Kaprow’s call for artists to unart themselves, “to
give up any references to being artists of any kind whatever” (103), a task that
has been underway within comics and surrealism since their inceptions, but
one that has been absent from many of the avant-garde theories in rhetoric and
composition concerning multimedia writing – a problematic term in itself. Unart
and its association with Dick Higgins’ concept of intermedia seems to be much more
attuned to the work of rhetoric and composition for reasons that should become
apparent throughout this chapter. Like ‘comics artists’ – those trained as artists,
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but who have left their ‘homes’ – the practice of unarting ourselves asks us to blur
the boundaries between art and life by working
in the “playground for experimental art [called]
ordinary life” in such a way that it does not
“possess a secret artistry in deep disguise,”
but is found in “not knowing what to call it at
any time” (Kaprow, Essays 248-249). The experience
of this surrealist work, as Blanchot describes it,
is the experience of thought itself as the productive
force of imagination,9 a method of chance. Comics
fit Kaprow’s unart remarkably well considering the lack of a fixed definition
of what constitutes a comic, but also because it offers up a form of proceeding
with the chance operations – most visible in TNC – always already present in
everyday life. And for rhetoric and composition, comics offer a way of thinking
about how to proceed in developing a strange and imaginative writing with/in new
media (digital) environments as avant-garde artists proceed to something else when a
form of Art becomes fixed, especially considering our lack of formal Art training.
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But this lack of training in Art has not stopped rhetorical theories and
practices from incorporating these alternate methods and processes of writing
into what is now being called postpedagogy – in essence, a pedagogy with avantgarde sensibilities. What we can learn from the methods of the avant-garde
methods taking hold in rhetoric and composition is a desire to attend to daily life
in the sense of Kaprow’s unart10 and in Lyotard’s desire for a writing stripped of
determining criteria. Unart would interrupt rhetoric and composition’s use of Art
to move closer to the sort of ‘art’ that Nietzsche petitions for in The Gay Science:
“if we convalescents still need art, it is another kind of art – a mocking, light,
fleeting, divinely untroubled, divinely artificial art that, like a pure flame, licks
not knowing, as artists” (37) so that we may become “the poets of our life – first
of all in the smallest, most everyday matters” (240). Stripped of the categorical
identifications with other ‘arts,’ the comics form presents us with this other kind
of art, this unart, precisely because the ‘artists’ who have taken up the form were
more concerned with ‘ordinary life’ than with the training they received in the
categories of Art. To put it briefly, when unartists leave their ‘homes,’ they leave
in order to walk through life as strangers, writing and producing imaginative
artifacts that may or may not be ‘art’ – there’s no way to know since the criteria
for making such judgments have not yet been formed. As it relates to comics, TNC
demonstrates the versatility of comics and ‘artists’ that have left their homes in
order to produce artifacts whose identity as art is uncertain due to its surreality
(its strangeness). In what remains of this chapter, I work to explicate the ways
in which the unart of comics performs this strange writing and how it relates to
writing (with) new media.
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into unclouded skies! […] Oh, how we now learn to forget well, and to be good at

Art Interrupted
Un/Arting Comics
“Reality, however, is not story-shaped, and the eruptions
of the odd into our lives are not story-shaped either. They
do not end in entirely satisfactory ways. Recounting the
strange is like telling one’s dreams: one can communicate
the events of a dream but not the emotional content, the
way that a dream can color one’s entire day.”
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~ Neil Gaiman, “The Flints of Memory Lane”

C

hris Ware once wrote: “Artists, it is well known, are strange people” (Acme Novelty
Library 18). And there is no stranger artist than those who work with the comics

form. I mean, what other sort of artist would take such a strange surreal parlor game
as the exquisite corpse and try to make it stranger? Only a ‘comics artist’ attempting
to break the form out of its complacency as a fixed medium could conceive of this a
project, the experience of performing such a project extending beyond traditional
conceptualizations of what it means to be a ‘comics artist.’ The link between a
surrealism contented to do whatever it is that they ‘do’ and a comics form that engages
in the experience of thought itself as it puts that thought to work in producing what
could only be called a ‘mocking, light, fleeting, divinely untroubled’ art gives rise to the
view that “‘their work is their reward,’ and that excessive capital pollutes its purity, or
something like that” (Ware, Acme Novelty Library 18). But this ‘purity’ is only ‘pure’ to
the extent that it is strange – the ‘something like that’ – and that this work, untroubled
by excessive politics, allows the productive force called imagination (cf. Derrida,
Archeology 76) to exceed a politics lacking in foresight.
Speaking of TNC, Brian Boyd acknowledges the strangeness of comics as a
playful form and that “Spiegelman plays with multiple patterns, dramatic, visual,
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verbal: with verbal allusion, and with repetition, anaphora, syntactic parallelism,
metaphor, cliché, antithesis and pun” (“Art and Evolution” 47).11 Of the elements
that Boyd notes in TNC, the most important one for addressing writing as
strangely imaginative is the ‘pun,’ the joke or witticism that breaks from the
patterns of sequentiality – beyond (conscious) reasoning12 – because it [the pun]
incorporates each of the other elements. Gregory Ulmer explains it thus:
The pun, which simulates in writing the effect of intuition (the convergence of
emotional sets), may be visual as well as verbal. As Ronald Schleiffer reminds
us, the pun is one of the most basic linguistic units for creating redundancies, the

For comics, the pun simulates the effect of intuition through the interrelatedness of the
visual and verbal, and in writing this simulated-intuition the pun moves us into the
practices of everyday life characterized as an imaginative ‘politics’ rather than as an
‘art.’13 In addition to simulating in writing the effect of intuition, the pun functions as
a device for interrupting the closure of linear (or sequentiality, if you prefer) reasoning
by fragmenting the cohesive narration of the work.14 Like Allan Kaprow’s unart, the
pun in comics works by a process where “we add, by imagination and interpretation, to
what we do” to render “meaning” variable, unfixed, and inventive (Essays 239).
For example, the internet meme LOLcats
has been popularized by its effective
use of the pun, including misspellings.
Applying such a method to Rhetoric and
Composition, and art could be shown
by playing on Steve Katz’s name and his
interest in the Rhetorics of Science. Like
Schrodinger’s cat, you never know what you’ll
see when you open up an article by Katz.
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condition that gives rise in experience to a feeling of eureka. (Heuretics 228)

Art Interrupted
But this aspect of punning presents itself in more than just the works that
‘comics artists’ produce; it also appears in the methods these strange writers take
on in their daily lives. Ware details this post-process in a roundabout way when he
writes of ‘comics artists’ in the third-person singular:
…his job complete at one locale, he would immediately move on to the next
outlet, asking only for a bit of bread, or a bowl of broth, or some such ‘nonpolluting’ recompense. Also, this artist could really have not charged much
of anything at all, otherwise his work would not have been so faultlessly
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universal…. (Acme Novelty Library 18)
Let me attempt clarity: the ‘faultless universality’ of the (art)work that the ‘comics
artist’ produces is performed as life. And the performance of life here does not exist
in a single medium, but with a variety of media – hence, ‘moving on to the next
outlet.’ The interruption of ‘Art’ that ‘comics’ artists’ put into practice implies a lack
of fixity in what constitutes writing, but also in the modes of imaginative production
employed in making those artifacts.
At this point, the link between ‘comics artists’ to unartists opens up explicitly
through the fleeting employ-ment of various media all at once. As Kaprow
defines it, an unartist is “one who is engaged in changing jobs, in modernizing”
(Essays 104), proceeding fluidly across – no! – between media (intermedia) with
a “simultaneity of roles” that thinks “all at once, or nonhierarchically” as “the
intermedialist does” naturally (Essays 105); the unartist’s approach to media – that
is, digital technology – is that of the pun, of the playful use of technology. Like the
comics artist, the intermedialist plays between established media, or art traditional
disciplines, in order to suggest other ways of writing that remain unconcerned
with formal categories of what constitutes ‘acceptable’ work. In doing away with
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categories, unart also leads to a re-thinking of current trends toward multimodal
composition, where “multi” indicates a combination of media (“mixed media”) rather
than how we may play between media forms.
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Art Interrupted
Writing for The Institute of the Future of the Book, Dan Visel presents the
(unimaginative) problem of ‘multimedia’ composition:
“Multimedia” is something that comes up all the time when we’re talking
about what computers do to reading. The concept is simple: you take a book
& you add pictures and sound clips and movies. To me it’s always suggested
an assemblage of different kinds of media with a rubber band – the computer
program or the webpage – around them, an assemblage that usually doesn’t
work as a whole because the elements comprising it are too disparate.
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(“multimedia vs intermedia”)
Let me rephrase Visel’s comments as it relates to this project: ‘mulitmedia’ does
nothing to interrupt the categories constituting established media or art disciplines
since it merely presents them in juxtaposition rather than integrating them in
a Lyotardian approach to writing by superimposition. Instead, Visel suggests
something more akin to the work that comics and unartists produce in the idiom of
intermedia:

Dick Higgins’s (incomplete) intermedia
chart. The “?”s imply that there is still a
lot to learn about the unartists approach
to working with new media to create
innovative forms of writing and ‘art.’

Un/Composing (Visual) Rhetorics
[Dick] Higgins’s intermedia is a more appealing idea: something that falls
in between forms is more likely to bear scrutiny as a unified object than a
collection of objects. The simple equation text + pictures (the simplest and
most common way we think about multimedia) is less interesting to me than
a unified whole that falls between text and pictures. When you have text +
pictures, it’s all too easy to criticize the text and pictures separately: this
picture compared to all other possible pictures invariably suffered, just as
this text compared to all other possible texts must suffer. Put in other terms,
it’s a design failure. (“multimedia vs intermedia”)

artists’ find in their ways of fusing media into a whole that, through these links,
interrupts understanding where a single medium seems to exist as an autonomous
paradigm of possibilities. The conceptual fusing of two or more media into an
intermedial work also implies the simultaneity of roles unartists engage when
writing in imaginative ways – a writer is no longer one who only produces essays,
but essays and images, (graphic) designs and (video) games, music and videos. Put
in Visel’s ‘other terms,’ intermedia works to undo the design failures of ‘multimodal’
work that relies on fixed categories. In part, this is why the image/text binary – or
better yet, reduction – of comics fails to emerge as anything more than another
iteration of previously written texts. The idea of comics, at least as conceived in this
project, can be better understood as the fusion of media into (strangely) imaginative
works, especially if we can understand the post-process of a ‘comics artists’ as an
oscillation between forms of media fused with a propensity for life rather than Art.
Craig Saper’s framing of intermedia may better elucidate the relevance for
rhetoric and composition, at least insofar as rhetoric has to do with ‘the available means,’
including the available means of interrupting persuasion. He writes: “[u]nlike all the
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To put it simply, the idiom of intermedia finds a correlation to the work that ‘comics

Art Interrupted
other arts, including film and literature, this new art, intensified by access to the
Internet, is not defined by any medium’s form. It is not a thing like a painting,
printed poem, or film. It is a situation: networked art” (Networked Art ix; emphasis
added). While Saper is not directly speaking of intermedia, the situation of the
work he presents as ‘networked art’ underlies an intermedial approach that echoes
one of the guiding theories in Breton’s surrealism: “linking two elements of reality
belonging to categories that are so far removed from each other that reason would
fail to connect them” (Manifestos 302). Where reason fails, imagination succeeds.
Like Lyotard’s phrases in dispute,15 intermedia acknowledges the need to link

96

media, but how to link is contingent. This “how” is the home of reason, but the
unartists usually referred to as ‘comics artists’ have left this home, preferring
instead to add new links by an imaginative interpretation – what Friedrich Kittler
calls post-hermeneutics.

The Philosoraptor, the philosophical genus
of the velociraptor (from such hits
at Jurraisic Park (parts 1-3)), ponders
questions concerning life, the universe, and
everything (according to unsubstantiated
rumors, Douglas Adams stole the title
from the Philosophator). With his
aggresive debate (argumentative) stlye, the
Philosophator offers us quick rhetorical
questions and answers.
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Post-Hermeneutics

“Artists regularly cross the supposed boundaries between media
and even the link of ‘appropriateness’ for art. Even museum art no
longer attempts to encourage catharsis or transcendence, nor does
it permit easy classification as painting, sculpture, or theater.”
~ Craig Saper, Networked Art

R

ather than thinking as usual, the Stranger’s surrealist writing has no direct
interest in producing a unified whole; thinking and writing strangely, the

may not be contradictory as thoughts ‘happen’ before he can think about them.16
Blanchot puts it well:
Surrealism – “it should come as no surprise” – thus encounters writing,
and through this encounter denies itself. But this is a writing of another
kind. That the first “purely surrealist” attestation was produced in a kind
of anonymous fashion through a double movement of writing that has no
other aim than a freeing of the space (the magnetic field) that was affirmed
by so-called automatic writing […]. Automatic writing, a writing freed from
the logic of logos, refusing everything that puts it to work and that makes it
available to a work, is the very proximity of thought […]. (Infinite 410)
Logos, in the way Blanchot uses the term, has to do with the logic of reason, of
interpretations that propose a unified whole, while this other kind of writing,
with its double movement, opens a space to affirm other, perhaps contradictory,
interpretations that happen before they are able to be reasoned – that is, deduced
or induced. This is an interpretation, a hermeneutics, of another kind. It is a
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Stranger affirms a proliferation of meanings and understandings that may or

Art Interrupted
loosening of the constraints imposed by a hermeneutics that looks to systematize
how interpretation proceeds,17 and in this loosening, a post-hermeneutics happens
intuitively (e.g., as a pun, as an interruption).
In the “Foreword” to Discourse Networks 1800/1900, David Wellbery
summarizes Kittler’s post-hermeneutic readings as an abandonment of “the
language game and form of life defined by the hermeneutic canons of justification
and enters into domains of inquiry inaccessible to acts of appropriative
understanding. Post-hermeneutic criticism, to put the matter briefly, stops making
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sense” (ix). Yet, in the interruption of making sense, post-hermeneutics opens the
potentialities and possibilities in the sense of nonsense, at least in the sense that
its logic knows no exclusion – it makes it own sense. That is, the sense of nonsense,
like intuitive and imaginative work, keeps its manner of making sense mysterious
– simultaneously unknown and strange.18 How this nonsense abandons the canons
of justification – argumentation – can be found in the associational logics of puns
that see methods of linking as always already contingent. In a nutshell, the posthermeneutic abandonment of the hermeneutic canons of justification emerges
not as an elimination of interpretation – even if it were possible to do so19 – but
as what, in Surrealism, Blanchot calls “a strange plurality” (Infinite 408), an
affirmation perpetually plural and multiple” (Infinite 409).
The Penrose Triangle would
offer more possibilities than the
Rhetorial Triangle. Sorry, Aristotle.

<
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To a certain extent, post-hermeneutics correlates to what John Caputo calls
“radical hermeneutics” in his book by the same name. The link I see between
Caputo’s “radical hermeneutics” and Wellbery’s post-hermeneutics can elucidate
the necessity of abandoning the justification-game in light of the “National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States” report addressing the
events of September 11, 2001. As Caputo writes, radical hermeneutics arises “at
the point of the breakdown and loss of meaning, the withdrawal and dissemination
of meaning” and it deals “with this loss of meaning by confronting the meaning of
the loss, of the withdrawal, of the lethe itself” – here, Caputo defines lethe as “the
concealed heart of a-letheia, the mystery which withdraws, which never hands
9/11 Commission Report” teaches us, it is that we are in need of confronting the
breakdowns and losses of meaning more than we are in need of confronting the
stabilization of meaning in forms we cannot trust. In militaristic terms, we need
to stop ‘sticking to our guns,’ to our firm convictions about meaning(s), and to the
canons of justification, since that will only serve to put us in “greater danger” and
threaten the play of imagination.
By moving away from desires to justify and build meaning, post-hermeneutics
encounter what Bill Readings, working out of Lyotard, calls a sublime politics that
attempts “to subject politics to the radical indeterminacy” (“Sublime Politics” 411),
that has us speak even though “we do not know exactly why or to whom” (“Sublime
Politics” 420). This sublime politics would be akin to the needs for an imaginative
politics, but one that would avoid its bureaucratization. The desire to bureaucratize
the imagination would be more akin to ‘a politics of the sublime’ that “could only be
terror” (Lyotard, Postmodern Explained 71). Politicizing the sublime, subjecting it
to a uniform law, remains suspect in a sublime politics because such laws attempt
to identify and define appropriat(iv)e understandings of totalizing thought, of a
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itself over in a form we can trust” (Radical 271). If there is anything that “The

Art Interrupted
representative determinacy. Put another way, a sublime politics proposes that
fixed rules and criteria (hermeneutics), and those who perpetuate them, are
always suspect since any attempt to fix these rules and criteria can only lead to
terror, “insofar as the political theorist, the state, or society claims to determine
what justice is, to derive political prescriptions in reference to a describable
state of affairs” (Readings, Introducing 113). In place of what Thomas Kent calls
hermeneutical terror,20 a sublime politics dispenses with the desire for consensus
(a ‘master narrative’) – a feature of argumentative writing – and espouses a posthermeneutics of dissensus, of strange pluralities and multiplicities of thought and

100

meaning.
To see how this works in relation to comics, as conceived in this project,
the idiom – the term McCloud uses to indicate a “school of art” – of intermedia
discussed earlier provides a clue. Higgins’ move toward intermedia and Kaprow’s
toward unart highlight the move beyond hermeneutics in a way that can address
the troubling ‘failure of imagination’ in today’s institutions and institutional
practices. Like Readings and Kent, Higgins and Kaprow are more concerned
with opening new media to realms of becoming (dissensus) rather than identity
(consensus).21 By way of explanation, Higgins argues:
Through developing our own hermeneutic concepts, we can find ourselves
in history and other areas of culture as well as art, can tune into the shifts
to which we can become more sensitive by balancing our focus on our own
horizons, those from the past and any others we can find in the middle.
(Modernism 21; emphasis added)
Hermeneutics, in this sense, communicates dubiously. It is a process, a becoming
of interpretation that communicates with the unknown by throwing a message out
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into the void.22 The indeterminacy of this sort of process offers opportunities for
imaginative inventions that open up in the production of its works. To be blunt,
imagination is both the process by which these imaginative works emerge and the
idiom of unart called intermedia.
This is perhaps one of the least underdeveloped aspects of postmodernist
writing – the role of imagination as sublime art, or unart. From Kant, Derrida lays
out this claim emphatically: “the imagination was already in itself an ‘art,’ was
art itself […]. It is art, certainly, but a ‘hidden art’ that cannot be ‘revealed to the
eyes’” and it “is the freedom that reveals itself only in its works” even though they
(Writing and Difference 7). The place of this unart, if there is such a place, then
reveals itself through associational logics that have always already abandoned
the language-games of justification in favor of intuitive linkages that then become
ways of writing and invention through assemblage – in some way associated with a
rhetorical canon of organization, but without any intentions to develop a consensus
concerning meaning. And with these assemblages, imagination reveals itself in the
assemblages that would otherwise remain hidden by setting out to find meanings
not found in the image itself.23

I found this fragment on a bathroom wall,
a place where a variety of different images
and writings are assembled without regard
for justification. A “form of art” that has no
concern for justification, but is thrown out
into the void.
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“do not exist within nature, but neither do they inhabit a world other than ours”

Art Interrupted
How any of this relates to comics can be found in the work of another ‘comics artist’
involved in TNC: Robert Crumb. In an interview with Ted Widner for The Paris Review,
Crumb illustrates how such a post-hermeneutic manner of writing may begin with “…an
idea for a story based on one drawing in a sketchbook—sometimes a story, or a character,
or an idea starts as a mood, an atmosphere, a feeling” that works itself out “intuitively”
(“The Art of Comics” 55). And for those familiar with the documentary Crumb, we know
that these moods, atmospheres, feelings happen while he wanders around Paris (and
elsewhere) – à la Walter Benjamin24 – and attends to those elements of (daily) life that
often go unnoticed. The stories he spins, the moods worked out intuitively, attempt to sort
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out the breakdowns of meaning through a strange and mysterious process that can only be
figured out – revealed – through its works. In addition, since these works unfold intuitively
by way of a mood, an atmosphere, a feeling, they are not subjected to any hermeneutic
paradigm; as such, they are also not determined to any specific medium, but allow the
possibilities of working between media and hermeneutic paradigms since no need exists to
“have a deep, profound meaning” (Crumb, “The Art of Comics” 55). As such, comics can be
thought of as bricolage (cf. Derrida; Lévi-Strauss) – work produced with whatever happens
to be at-hand and with indeterminate associational
logics. In other words, a comic(s) form of writing,
like that of post-hermeneutics, unart, and
intermedia, emerges as a fragmentary writing
that proceeds in a manner similar to the (strange)
surrealist (non)method of automatic writing free
from the logos of reason – an intuitive writing of
the pun, of the interruption. An automatic
writing that presents itself as a figmentation – a
portmanteau of “figment” and “imagination”
indicating a mere product-tion of imagination
– as fragments of thought.

It’s like an amusement park.
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Fragmentary Writing: Writing of the Figment(s)
“The imagination creates another nature, which has to do not with
thinking by concept but with the derivatives connected with the
concepts […] the constituent elements of which are not attributed
to it logically, but are nevertheless ‘(aesthetic) attributes.’”
~ Lyotard, Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime

F

ragmentary writing, as Blanchot characterizes it, is a game of chance. The

Higgins, Kaprow, Spiegelman, and Ware – are found in interruptions that
open themselves to pluralities of thought. The future of surrealism, as found in
comics, approaches what Blanchot explains as an “exigency of plurality escaping
unification and extending beyond the whole (while at the same time presupposing
it, demanding its realization), untiringly maintaining, in the face of the Unique,
contradiction and rupture” (Infinite 409). Dissensus rather than consensus:
contradicting and rupturing the unification that, as Blanchot’s estimation of the
disaster, ruins meaning while leaving it intact. The fragmentary, as seen here,
plays a game without rules. The game: the interruption of the incessant, where
affirming the interruption offers an opening that breaks from unity. So, when
Blanchot writes that fragmentary writing is “risk itself” (Writing 21; 59), it’s a
risk of a thought without unity or rules, thought estranged25 from the unity of
appropriat(iv)e understanding(s) that it interrupts. Fragmentary writing, like
surrealism, would then also “seek to constitute for itself imaginary objects, indicate
itself in the margins” (Infinite 418-419). In other words, the risk of fragmentary
writing is the opening of potentiality itself, the inherent possibility for its coming
into being as presented through an intuitive post-process of figmentation.
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parlor games that the surreal (un)artists referenced earlier – Breton, Crumb,

Art Interrupted
Yet, it would be a mistake to think of fragmentary writing as a categorical
genre of writing – Blanchot has no concern for categories of genres. Part of the
risk involved in the fragmentary has to do with venturing into the unknown, the
unimaginable that needs to be imagined, with ‘unworking’ the work of unification.
Fragmentary writing, then, as Blanchot explains, can be thought of as “the insane
game, the indeterminacy that lies between reason and unreason” (Infinite 424).
Much like Kaprow’s unart, the unworking of the Work – the “absolute of voice and
of writing” – encounters a “double game: necessity, chance” (Blanchot, Infinite
428). To write this unworking would not be to fragment the Work – to critique the
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Work – but rather to address those aspects of the work that remain set aside in the
demand for unity. The idea here has to do with thinking in terms of context rather
than in terms of category, specifically where context escapes reproducibility, and
instead offers “fragments for the future to puzzle over” (Beitchman, “Fragmentary
Word” 59). It is this puzzlement that we need to foster through a writing of chance.
We can see the fragmentary at work in TNC in each 3-panel set and through
the stick figure – endearingly named “Sticky” – who appears in each set as a ‘spark’ for
imaginative production. And it is this spark that correlates to what Breton saw as
…the means of obtaining, most often under the conditions of a complete
relaxation of the mind rather than complete concentration, certain
incandescent flashes of linking two elements of reality belonging to categories
that are so far removed from each other that reason would fail to connect
them and that require a momentary suspension of the critical attitude in
order for them to be brought together. (Manifestos 302; emphasis added)
These flash moments26 of linking ‘often’ take place within imaginative realms of thought
that have no need for categories to explore the possibilities of linking. For TNC, Sticky
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works as the means for these flashes, a fragment that sparks each ‘comics artist’s’
imagination to produce another fragment in the margins of the whole. For comics in
general, the means that spark these flashes open up in moods, atmospheres and feelings of
the unexpected and offered as exigencies27 for productions of the imagination.
Like Sticky, and TNC as a (non)whole, this fragmentary writing produces novelties –
something new that excites imagination only for a short time – which Ware also recognizes
as the roles of comics (novelties), as we see in his mock business: The Acme Novelty
Library. As the play of novelties, fragmentary writing (as seen in comics) moves us toward
unart and a process of un-arting ourselves as a play of limits that has no limitation (e.g.,
art as Blanchot, Kaprow, and Lyotard, art historian/critic Jerzy Ludwinski explains that
“novelty in art is the measure of the artist’s imagination” (Notes 110). But this measure is
not in inches, feet, yards, or miles (or seconds, minutes, hours, days or years); rather, the
measure is the one that Cynthia Haynes has told me about: it’s the length of string that
depends upon the size of the package that needs to be wrapped. The form and style of this
package has no bearing on the length of string since “it [the package] is a whole complex of
artistic phenomenon seen in their variety” (Ludwinski, Notes 117).

The webcomic XKCD offers a summary
of a possible ‘string theory.’
URL: http://xkcd.com/171/
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the limitation of argumentative writing). Speaking along similar lines of thought about

Art Interrupted
Given as a gift, we open this package and discover its contents: comics. Opened,
comics remain open: unart. For Ludwinski, “the art of the future [is] unexpectedly
simple: art of the future [is] every art imaginable, both traditional and the most
current art” (Notes 115). And Strangely enough, he discusses this ‘future’ in the “form
of a comic strip” (Notes 115). Comics, as a gift, are given as a fragmentary forms
hospitable to all of the varieties of artistic experience as they are presented through the
imagination. While comics work with ‘every art imaginable,’ they have no commitment
to any singe form, but are configured in a plurality of ‘fragmentations’ that play at the
limits of art without limitation. This is, after all, how Spiegelman was able to make
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sense of the events of September 11, 2001 through comics. As he writes:
Each of the strips was a condensed journal entry of my month in the shadow of
no towers and I allowed the shape to be whatever it was going to take. But I did
acknowledge that the work had urgency without thinking of the work as making any
bid for posterity. The strips were made in the spirit of the work that takes place in
the second part of the book, the early comics. They weren’t made for some ostensible
future. They were made for a specific moment. (“A Novel Graphic” 110)
The specific moment, the exigency, presents itself as an unknown future that
fragmentary writing allows us to discover, and the shape of the work cannot be
known as a whole. For Spiegelman, the fragmentary appears when nothing is
left to say, but that maintains an urgency for thinking in relation to the moment
of thinking, allowing it to take form as needed – ‘without thinking in terms of
posterity.’ The early comics he refers to, appearing in daily newspapers, were
ephemeral artifacts offered as fragments, addressing the uncertainty of the future.
In each moment, the fragmentary adapts itself as necessary to the available
means, but without the intention of persuasion; rather, it interrupts persuasive
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intentions. Blanchot put it best when he wrote that the “fragmentary expresses
itself best […] in a language that does not recognize it. Fragmentary: meaning
neither the fragment, part of the whole, nor the fragmentary in itself” (Step Not
Beyond 43). After the whole (of art) has been written, the fragmentary takes place
in the beyond (of art) – the (unexpectedly) simple form that integrates ‘any art
imaginable.’ Comics, as such a form, present the fragmentary since the “terrible
explosion took place” and “the model of art ceased to exist” (Ludwinski, Notes 90).
But the explosion of the ‘model of art’ reveals something else: that there exists a
plurality in art (sans art (unart)). In Blanchot’s words, the fragmentary “would
never be ‘pure,’ but, on the contrary, profoundly altered, with an alteration that
then, is not conferred a position of authority, but risks its own legitimacy in
relation to the whole since it does not recognize the law (of art) – definition – as
its guiding principle.28 Without a definition in regard to a norm, the fragmentary
breaks from the whole of art by giving up those references in their entireties, and
it “will need,” as Kaprow writes, “an updated language to refer to what is going
on” (Essays 107) since the current language does not recognize the work of the
fragmentary.29 Much like the readymade, the fragmentary abandons itself to the
impossibility of conforming to the law and language of art.30

Banksy illustrates Sticky’s move away
from “Art” authorities.
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could not be defined (arrested) in regard to a norm” (Step Not Beyond 42). Writing,

Art Interrupted
This impossibility opens a space where the interruption of the unartist
begins, imprinted with another way of thinking, writing, and producing art-ifacts.
The unartist puts the fragmentary to work
…as the seeking of a new form of writing that would render the finished work
problematic. Problematic not because it refuses accomplishment, but because
it explores with an inexorable rigor – beyond the conception of the work as
something unified and closed upon itself, as organizing and dominating the
values transmitted by a traditional already established and attained – the
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infinite space of the work, though with a new postulate: namely, that the
relations of this space will not necessarily satisfy the concepts of unity, totality,
or continuity. The problem the work of the fragment poses is a problem of
extreme maturity: first of the artist, and also of society.” (Blanchot, Infinite 348)
A new form of writing sought in the unworking 31 posed by the fragmentary:
intermedia. And it is this unworking that we see at work in TNC – particularly,
the unworking of (comics) art as unified, total, and continuous, which indicates a
move not only beyond Art, but also beyond the conception of the work of (comics)
art as something closed upon itself. The rigorous exploration that characterizes
the fragmentary, with an “I prefer not to” refusal of accomplishment, writing
would no longer concern itself with argument, unity, or totality, approaches that
close upon themselves. This writing would not be that of composing a work, but
of the interruption of unworking composition (un/composing) that would render
impossibilities possible.32
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Un/Composing (Visual) Rhetorics
“To write is to produce the absence of the work (worklessness,
unworking [désoeuvrement]). Or again: writing is the absence
of the work as it produces itself through the work, traversing
it throughout. Writing as unworking (in the active sense of
the word) is the insane game, the indeterminacy that lies
between reason and unreason.”
~ Maurice Blanchot, The Infinite Conversation
117
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etween reason and unreason is where we now find our Stranger, and his
strange approach to writing that incorporates any and all of the available

media, regardless of the traditional divisions separating those media. He begins
by un/working writing through the performance of composing, begetting the
infancy of writing as if it were only coming into being at the very moment of
writing. In composing this work by a singular process of unworking, he can
begin to make sense of all the nonsense surrounding him and his environment.
His logos is not made in his own image since he does not yet know that image;
it is through composing that image that he comes to discover his own fleeting
place. It is in this image that we can begin to see the un/working of composition’s
perspective of a given rhetorical situation.1 To un/compose would be to write
without intention in order to subvert the bureaucratization of the imagination that
writes by way of argument/ation. Carrying out one possibility at the expense of
exploring others, as Kenneth Burke informs us, is to be positioned in the “realities
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of a social texture, in all the complexity of language and habits, in the property
relationships, the methods of government, production and distribution, and in the
development of rituals that re-enforce the same emphasis” (Attitudes 225); as an
alternate “formula,” Burke suggests that we use a conceptual methodology he calls
“perspective by incongruity” (Attitudes 228).2 Through this methodology, we can
begin to un/compose our approaches to doing the work of rhetoric and composition,
or what Blanchot refers to as the unwork that takes place between reason and
unreason.
Building on the discussion of puns in the previous chapter, Burke describes
his “perspective by incongruity” methodology as carrying “the same kind of
enterprise in linking hitherto unlinked words by rational criteria instead of
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tonal criteria” (Attitudes 309). However, unlike Burke, the focus of this chapter
addresses how this methodology can be extended to the figural and to composition’s
turn toward intermedial composition. A key concept in Burke’s methodology is
that of the casuistic stretch, of un/composing words (and now images) from their
“‘constitutional’ setting” (Attitudes 309). Both of these concepts (when re-framed
from Burke’s Chapter title “Dictionary of Pivotal Terms”) translate to ways of
seeing strangely, and specifically to how the digital age has moved us into a theory
of civic discourse that departs from common readings of Aristotle’s On Rhetoric. In
essence, linking tones and words not normally linked presents us with something
of a quandary—an uncertainty of how these strange links are produced and what
they mean in whatever contexts they arise. It is this uncertainty of our Stranger(s)—
and their strange ways of seeing—that remains unknown, and that must remain in
unknown if it is to confront the bureaucratization of the imagination, opening our
archive(s) to the infinite possibilities of linking. Without such an archive, we
subject ourselves to the sort of bureaucracy that will keep us from realizing our
potential and the potentialities of knowing, doing, and making artifacts apart
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from the “business as usual” model that remains central to contemporary civic
discourse.3
How un/artists are connected to civic discourse can be found in some of the
opening remarks that Aristotle makes in On Rhetoric: “…rhetoric is a certain
kind of offshoot [paraphues] of dialectic and of ethical studies (which is just to call
politics)” (39). For the purposes of this chapter, offshoot is the key word, implying
that a rhetorician has been trained in dialectical methods, and in theories and
practices of ethics/politics, but has departed from those discourses. However, to
draw a direct connection between rhetoric and persuasion may not be the best
approach to thinking (and writing) in the polis. As an offshoot, rhetoric exceeds
traditional argument (persuasion) and ethics/politics while engaging with each
in other arenas and by other (available) means. The most significant element
civics in favor of taking an active part in creating a strange(r) citizenship that
points out the incongruities they’ve observed in assembling their art/ifacts. These
observations occur through one’s own devices regardless of conventional use, and
suggest that there are other, imaginative ways of composing the polis. Aristotle
echoes this point in Book 3 of On Rhetoric when he writes that to “deviate [from
prevailing usage] makes language seem more elevated; for people feel the same in
regard to word usage as they do in regard to strangers compared to citizens. As a
result, one should make the language unfamiliar; for people are admirers of what
is far off, and what is marvelous is sweet” (198). Where Aristotle’s citizen thinks
that it “is strange if we think we do not have to obey laws whenever they are not
rightly framed and those who made them erred” (Rhetoric 107), our Stranger has
no qualms about disobeying these laws and working outside the law.4 Still, the
Stranger need not always be strange; sometimes “truth” is stranger than fiction.5
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that makes un/artists offshoots is that they abandon the discourse (science) of
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Strange Figurations
“The eye is ready for the pictorial gesture, prepared for
what cannot be anticipated: the event. This is not because
the gesture would erupt unexpectedly. On the contrary, it
would have been expected and ardently wished for. But it is
an event in that the subject giving birth to it does not know,
cannot analyse and does not control.”
~Jean-Francois Lyotard, “Anamnesis of the Visible”

I

t is not my wish to con-figure or re-con-figure the un-working of composition and/
or rhetoric; rather, I prefer to un/configure this work, exploring the meanings
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of the immediate without concern for reality.6 Lyotard tells us how avant-garde
artists accomplish this goal in “The Sublime and the Avant-Garde”: “[t]he arts,
whatever their materials, pressed forward by the aesthetics of the sublime in
search of intense effects, can and must give up the imitation of models that are
merely beautiful, and try out surprising, strange, shocking combinations” because
this is what presents “evidence of (something) happening, rather than nothing”
(Inhuman 100). Unlike other ‘figurative arts,’ this strange figuration implodes
representative forms.7 Diane Davis echoes this point in Inessential Solidarity: “…
figuration gives world by giving meaning; it is the very condition for knowing, and
without it, there would be no-thing, nothing to know and nothing to understand—
not even a ‘you’ or an ‘I’” (38). The meanings given by figuration, however, cannot
always be analyzed or controlled; sometimes, these meanings are (too) strange to be
known or understood through representative compositions. At these times, citizens
become displaced by the strange, and become strangers who unwork familiar
configurations lest they be left with no-thing, no options for composing those
events that escape reason. The ability of unartists8 to present us with evidence
that something is happening enacts the strange figuration necessary for an un/
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composing rhetoric that deviates from “politics as usual” (civic discourses).
Trying to figure out how to address a given (political) event occasionally
requires a dis/figuration of common understandings so that others may become
available. This is part of what Davis means when she writes that dis/figuration

		

(Inessential Solidarity 50)

As described here, dis/figuration sheds light on the strange figuration of un/
there are two prominent responses to this shock: to speak or to kill.9 To kill would
be the refusal to listen and to retain the complacency of the norm-al. On the other
hand, to speak (that is, to write) un/composes the homogeneity embodied in the
kill switch response.10 In its place, strange figurations produce “heterogeneous,
disruptive, open, pleasurable, and political” works that “make meaning possible
and our pleasure in it unpurloined” (Kelly, Imaging Desire 113).
How these works come into being comprises the work of un/composing
(visual) rhetorics performed by un/artists. The act of writing produces meaning,
imaginative possibilities, and pleasure of working without the stress of some
external appropriative understanding. The gift of writing, “by its detours, its
decisions, and its interruptions, knows itself always responsible for a latent
knowledge, as it knows itself responding to another possibility; a possibility that
is the other of all knowledge and whose attraction carries the act of writing”
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composing rhetorics with its disruptive change of direction that shocks. For Davis,
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that introduces the un/artist to “the play of the absence of (the) work” (Blanchot,
Infinite 421). This play: the absence of the game of argumentative writing where
the unknown presents itself in the act of writing. The meaning that would then
develop from these artifacts would not be one in which a reader/viewer critiques
or analyzes, but would arise from the writing that those artifacts motivate—
to appropriate Burke’s phrasing, the importance of visual rhetorics is the un/
composing of motives and our quests for “perfection.”
Like Nietzsche, the un/artist and un/composing writer “deny that anything
can be done perfectly as long as it is still done consciously” (Nietzsche, Portable
581). By allowing the work to play out unconsciously in the act of writing, the idea
that perfection is possible begins dismantling. The criterion for the un/composing
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work has no place in the Stranger’s process; rather, it enters the work within
the play of composing the event. Strange figurations offer us the opportunity to
escape “the nature of language as motive,” the “desire to name something by its
‘proper’ name, or to speak a language in its distinctive ways” that “is intrinsically
‘perfectionist’” and that has made us “‘rotten’ with perfection” (Burke, Language
16, 18). The idea of perfection is one in which we find the danger of violence (i.e.,
terrorism) and the (unimaginative) acts of compulsion carried out by conclusivereason. In the unconscious we are given a respite from the implications of
perfection,11 and the corresponding motives of carrying them out. Without the
demands for a conclusion found in the implications of perfection, an un/artist
resists the temptation to (re)con-figure events with the criteria of perfection—
Burke calls this “the completely done” (Language 26) and associates it with Death.
When all is said and done, our Stranger steps in and re-introduces us to (the
unperfected) life. Nietzsche’s view of representation summarizes the importance
of strange figurations for an un/composing (visual) rhetoric: “One is not finished
with one’s passion because one represents it: rather, one is finished with it when
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one represents it” (Portable 458). To delay perfection, to instill the importance of
delaying perfection: this is the play12 accomplished by speaking otherwise.

Un/Composing (in) the Digital Event
“The future promise of digital aesthetics is its enhanced
zone of ‘interactivity’ through which the users’ entry
into the circuit of artistic presentation simulates
or projects their own virtualizations, fantasies, and
memories in consort with the artwork.”
~ Timothy Murray, Digital Baroque

W

orking out of Nietzsche’s “Morality as a Problem,” Avital Ronell writes that

For composition and rhetoric, the meanings that have been left in the cold, trickling
down13 from our focus on Platonic and Aristotelian rhetorics (of persuasion) keeps
us from engaging with the changing ways and means of production in the digital
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(“Nietzsche Loves You” 163)
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age. To disrupt these rhetorics of perfecting an argument in an age when morality
has become even more dangerous (e.g., fundamentalism, in all its forms, including
terrorism) demands14 an experimental imagination rather than a bureaucratized
imagination. Without the risk of disrupting this bureaucratization, we accept the
sedimented concepts that atrophy the possibilities of social changes (e.g., civics),
like the death found in perfecting an argument. What the digital opens for us is a
way to diverge from these concepts by discovering—not necessarily synonymous
with inventing—new ways of playing with meaning that do not require persuasive
motivations. The ‘digital event’ indicates a way of linking “experimentation with
the development of improv techniques,” where discovery is not simply “‘invention,’
but, under certain conditions, as a way of discovering what was already there,”
inhabited in “an event, an experiment, a unique stage for representing discovery
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without invention” (Ronell, “Nietzsche Loves You” 174). In the digital event, we are
called into the act of composing improvisationally.
The improvisational event that takes place in digital spaces takes an
alternate route from what continues to be taught in the composition classroom,
first-year composition or otherwise. Blanchot describes the process of the latter as
one where one writes “according to the rules of strict composition; then of a more
complex demand: to write in a rigorously premeditated way in harmony with the
control of the mind and to assure its full development” that attempts to “suppress
chance” (Book to Come 225). The experimental imagination that Ronell sees as a
key element of composing the former would constitute the un/composing of these
strict rules (laws) of composition. Our Stranger, positioned between reason and
unreason, has realized that controlling any composition subverts the vibrancy of
chance and subdues it by claiming jurisdiction over the discovery of meaning(s).
The digital offers us opportunities to compose by chance if we were only willing to
be open to the logics already in play in those spaces15 instead of adhering to what
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Blanchot might call ‘the book of the past.’
In the book to come, we would see writers who, as Blanchot claims, become
“involved in politics, with an energy that displeases the experts” and “he is not
yet involved with politics but only with this new, difficult-to-see relationship
that literature and language awaken in contact with public presence” (Book to
Come 248). Those Strangers who compose would play with the (improvisational)
logics awakening in digital spaces and engage in a performative civics instead of
discourses concerning civics—that is, they actively play in this composing space
without feeling the need to analyze or critique the artifacts they (and others)
produce. While this may seem dis/connected to politics, it is precisely this lack of
concern for political policy that opens the imagination to creative play and the
unwork that can lead to discovery, postponing the kill switch response in the Work.
[that] reaches us like a surprise that is not always a repose: a perceptible silence,
sometimes masterly, sometimes proudly indifferent, sometimes agitated, animated
and joyful”16 (Blanchot, Book to Come 220). And in this silence, we are given the
opportunity to explore the potentialities of a silence that is not silent,17 but speaks
beyond the capacity of words, of arguments, to (clearly) articulate.
This silence presents us with an absence of sense (as in, sensation) that
…opens another set of possibilities whereby imagination can be thought of
as reordering the objects of sense, or taking them apart and imagining them
in new combinations (such as centaurs) that do not themselves derive from
sensory experience. It can thus become “creative,” and even visionary things
forever closed to sense, as with the language of the mystic, who would express
his intuitions in images meant to transcend imagery. (Burke, Rhetoric of
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You see, the digital event presents us with “the evidence of a particular silence
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Motives 79)
In Burke’s ‘sense’ of the word, the ‘imagination’ would be a silent refusal to resolve
arguments, and un/artists are thrown into the void of the digital.18 In this void
we are abandoned by the rules19 of composition and the orderly arrangement of
arguments meant to establish sensible meaning(s). The digital does not subscribe
to the demands of the rhetorical tradition or composition; rather, those who espouse
each are maintaining the criteria of earlier media because it’s all they know. In the
digital void, “there is no longer law or duty” and “a good or bad conscience brings
neither consolation nor remorse. In every age there has been implicitly recognized
by those who have something to do with the strangeness of literary language an
ambiguous status, a certain playfulness with regard to common laws” (Blanchot,
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Book to Come 28). Un/composing within the digital event is the recognition of such
a strange playfulness (comical) for our age. However, like Blanchot’s writers of
the book to come,20 un/artists are aware that they are not free of consequences,
consequences that shut down imagination in favor of (irresponsible) patriotic acts.
Un/composing the digital event: an invitation to imagine possibilities that oscillate
between reason and unreason, and to accept the consequences for the resulting
artifacts.
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Comic(al) Interventions into the Digital
“At electric speed, all forms are pushed
to the limits of their potential.”
~ Marshall McLuhan, Laws of Media

I

nstead of adapting to the digital, the un/artists comics forms are “an active
logos or utterance of the human mind or body that transforms the user and his

ground” (McLuhan, Laws of Media 99).21 This active logos constitutes the puttinginto-action of civics rather than the more passive discourse approach that contents
itself with writing policy and law. Additionally, as the human mind (imagination)
transforms un/artists and their ground(s), evidence turns into an unreasonable

Since electronic man lives in a world of simultaneous information, he finds
himself increasingly excluded from this traditional (visual) world, in which
space and reason seem to be uniform, connected and stable. Instead, Western
(visual and left-hemisphere) man now finds himself habitually relating to
information structures that are simultaneous, discontinuous, and dynamic.
(102)
In the void of the digital, the un/artist22 thrives in the simultaneity of forms and
the ambiguity of the disconnected. The un/artist’s intervention into the digital is
to discover some meaning in this ambiguity by relating to the information through
imaginative approaches of linking forms and content rather than merely adapting
tradition. But this intervention and discovery do not constitute a goal; un/artists
have ambivalent relationships to digital work.23
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request. McLuhan tells as much in Laws of Media:
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Ambivalence returns us to our Stranger’s position between reason and
unreason, composing the uncertainty of the situation or event that has thrown him
or her into the (digital) void. Blanchot helps us understand the political relevance
of this work: “…the strangest demand: that through it speak that which is without
power, that starting from that point speech show itself as the absence of power,
this nakedness, powerlessness, but also impossibility, which is the first impulse
of communication” (Book to Come 32). This form of communicative ambivalence
disrupts the assertive power of arguments to propose uniform and stable solutions
that inform the bureaucratization of the imagination. This sort of ambivalent
intervention into the digital subverts the need for identification at the heart of
argumentative theory; rather, an ambivalent composition—un/composition—is a
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complex search for alternate perspectives that “attempts to address the complexity
of our current cultural situations” (Hawk, “Toward a Rhetoric” 149). Ambivalence,
as it is used here, correlates to the Greek dissoi logoi approach of arguing both
sides of a question; the difference is that an ambivalent approach to composition
is not situated in terms of argument (and it has no question to answer), but as an
approach to dis-covery. In other words, ambivalence has no opponent or opposing
perspective; rather, it allows us to “grasp again in the literary work the place where
language is still a relationship without power, a language of naked relation, foreign
to all mastery and all servitude, a language that speaks only to whoever does not
speak in order to possess and have power, to know and have, to become master
and to master oneself” (Blanchot, Book to Come 33). At this point, comics enter to
address the Stranger’s ambivalence: his mixed feelings (intuitions) take form in
mixed media tangled up into an unfinished whole. The strange thoughts that arise
in these comics un/compositions tap into the unknowable, but speak-able, moments.
Michael Bernard-Donals and Richard Glejzer explain how the comics form
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slips into the space between reason and
unreason in Between Witness and Testimony
through an analysis of Art Spiegelman’s
Maus. As they write, Spiegelman’s ‘text’ marks
“a locus of meaning” as something that is not
“resolvable or knowable. But it is
transmissible; we can recognize—bear
witness to—the horrors within
representation itself” (73). Beyond
Maus, comics artists are adept at signaling
the moments that escape representation
across various media seamlessly. It is this ability that allows them to speak the
unrepresentable meanings of an event; they are witnesses capable of intervening
virtual space, a sort of single-panel that integrates a variety of media, the comics
un/artist can teach us how to compose visually complex and seamless artifacts.25
Hillary Chute recognizes the affordances of thinking about comics as “informed
by postmodern politics” that “adopts a rhetoric of space—of location, multiplicity,
borderlands, and […] boundary crossings” (342). Intervening in the digital by
learning to be(come) a (comics) un/artist throws us into this space: the (rhetorical)
void. Composing in this space demands that we bear witness to these media by
attempting to transmit that which remains in the unresolvable locus of meaning
called the digital. Without resolve, (comics) un/artists are the hospitable traitors
of visual rhetoric(s) seeking only to gesture toward those unknowable parts within
themselves, those parts that allow their imagination(s) to wander aimlessly, like
a strange traveler interested only in discovering a refuge from the kill switch of
argument.
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in the ways we compose within a given space.24 And if we recognize the digital as a

Chapter 5
Traitorous Hospitality: An Aphoristic (composition) Pedagogy
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Traitorous Hospitality: An Aphoristic (Composition) Pedagogy
“The witness of the wrongs and the suffering engendered by
thinking’s differend with what it does not manage to think,
the witness, the writer, the megalopolis is quite happy to
have him or her, his or her witnessing may come in useful.
Attested, suffering and the untameable are as if already
destroyed. I mean that in witnessing, one also exterminates.
The witness is a traitor.”
~ Jean-Francois Lyotard, “Domus and the Megalopolis”

M

ore than a witness, our Stranger is also a traitor who acts out of an
undetermined love—of understanding, of just/ice, of individuals, of life!

He needs no rule-of-law for the illusion of a stable domus1 since his sublime
provide […] a written record of the hesitations involved when bridging the gap
between witness and testimony that in oral testimonies register as silence, the
shrug, and the retreat into the litany of numbers” (Bernard-Donals 62), the traitor,
which is similar to what Michael Bernard-Donals and Richard Glejzer find in
Art Spiegelman, “presents us with a means of defining witnessing in terms of
a movement of meaning that resists knowing—a recognition of the swallowing
up of the knowable, a recognition that is itself recognizable” (69). This is the
strange traitor’s approach to writing in the age of new media: to move in the
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works arises outside of the law. Where the witness writes testimonies that “must
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abyss of meaning, not to resist knowing, but to explore the possibilities within
the imagination.2 Paradoxically, this traitor appears in the work of the un/artist
before the witness has been able to form (through his testimony); that is, before
witnessing becomes possible, the traitor must produce a finished artifact. As an
antecedent to the witnessing patriot,3 our traitor—like the comics un/artist—only
witnesses what comes into being through his playful approach to imaginative
productions. It is this attitude (of ambivalence) that opens the traitor’s domus to a
hospitality for the most monstrous of thoughts that witnesses and patriots (in the
bureaucratic sense) exclude from their compositions.
Friedrich Nietzsche makes the distinction thus:
All thought, poetry, painting, compositions, even buildings and sculptures,
belong either to monological art or to art before witnesses. […] I do not know
of any more profound difference in the whole orientation of an artist than
this, whether he looks at his work in progress (at “himself”) from the point
of view of the witness, or whether he “has forgotten the world,” which is the
essential feature of all monological art: it is based on forgetting, it is the
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music of forgetting. (Gay Science 324)
It is this monological art that we find in the work of comics un/artists; they have no
concern for their audience because they have forgotten the whole enterprise of art and
the need to make a direct commentary on a given issue. I realize how odd a suggestion
this may be, but when what we do must have a function in relation to others, we lose
something of ourselves. Cultivating this forgetting in our pedagogical practices sows
the seeds of creativity in students who “might perhaps eventually produce works that
far excel [their] own judgment, so that [they] utter stupidities about [their works] and
[themselves]” (Gay Science 327). These stupidities, exceeding judgments, open up
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possibilities for the realization of the sublime works of the imagination.4 To produce
something that exceeds judgment—and witnessing—is at the heart of monological art,
and the creative work of the imagination. The traitorous hospitality of the Stranger,
then, comes from the ability to forget the world and his relations to others—without
such a perspective, un/artists remain constrained, and constrain their imaginations.
After producing their artifacts, they let others—those who refuse to forget the world—
bear witness, exercising judgments or developing other criteria for judging the artifacts
they produce.
Maurice Blanchot might refer to this sort of traitor as a “man without horizon”
who does not affirm “himself on the basis of a horizon—in a sense a being without
being, a presence without a present, thus foreign to everything visible and to
everything invisible—he is what comes to me as speech when to speak is not to see”
(Infinite 69). What he (indirectly) confronts is the “frightened, ignorant, and servile”
that “are unable to fulfill their civic duties, having lost all sense of liberty” (Blanchot,
Infinite 217-18). The concept of a being without being, however, seems rather confusing
until we recognize that Blanchot uses this phrasing to indicate a being that remains
separate from the existence of a given position,5 and retains the sense(s) of liberty—
in the sense of going beyond the boundaries of propriety—that allow this being to
embodies the origin(s) of thought before a witness provides a testimony; in other
words, the traitor explores that which does not yet have a being with ungrounded
resiliency. And this is precisely what is needed when addressing the ways in which new
media, or what is currently being called digital humanities, are engaging in political,
cultural, and social issues of public policy and education.6 The concept of traitorous
hospitality, as with un/art/ists, opens a space for an art that “cannot be, must not be,
purely artistic” since “as soon as art becomes culture, is the means, the instrument of
a culture, it can no longer belong to itself; it falls prey to travesties and servitudes: the
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engage in an imaginative civics. In this sense, the traitor, like the (comics) un/artist,
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wheel of values and knowledge” (Blanchot, Friendship 28) that restricts imagination;
for the digital humanities, this concept involves re/thinking, re/doing, and re/making
the our ways of composing with new media.

A Traitorous (Writing Imagination)
“…imaginary is the reference to a man without myth, as is
imaginary the reference to the man dispossessed of himself,
free of all determination, deprived of all ‘value,’ and alienated
to the point where he is nothing but the acting consciousness
of this nothing, the essential man of point zero…”
~ Maurice Blanchot, Friendship

W

here the witness composes “by testifying, by attempting to be faithful to
what happened,” the traitor let’s himself “be led by the unknown that
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happened then, by what is unpredictable and invisible in the event” (Lyotard,
“Anamnesis of the Visible 2” 22). In the unknown, there’s nothing to know, but we
can discover this nothing through an imaginary stripped of the myth of the law, of
the ‘law(s)’ of composition as determined by governing bodies.7 This would be akin
to performing what Aristotle calls deliberative rhetoric that looks to (convalesce8)
the future rather than epideictic rhetoric, which looks to the past and is at the
heart of argumentative writing. The stakes of each are not the same; the witness’s
argumentative writing takes place when one feels the work as indispensable,
whereas traitor’s imaginary composition has no delusions of having satisfied
the (unknown) demand of the lingering event. The traitor, as a digital un/artist,
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resonates with Lyotard’s painter: “The painter is not someone who sees better than
others, but one who no longer sees anything at all, and wants to see and make
seen this nothing” (“Anamnesis of the Visible 2” 29). It is this ability to see nothing
(and make seen this nothing) that we are called to by the imaginary—to dispense
with our customary ways of witnessing and composing since these testimonies may
betray the purposes with which they began.
Within digital environments, it is the un/artist’s fragmentary intervention that
can help us to see this nothing. Marshall and Eric McLuhan explain as much in Laws
of Media: “Without the artist’s intervention man merely adapts to his technologies
and become their servo-mechanism” since “the role of art is to liberate man from
the robot status imposed by ‘adjusting’ to technologies” (98). In other words, the
traitorous un/artist is released from the value(s) of argumentative writing in order
to begin again. This intervention opens an empty space where we may imagine what
writing might be,9 what will have been writing in the digital age.10 There is a sort of
ease in this type of composition, one that Bradley Dilger describes as a preference
for “a simple, pragmatic approach which doesn’t involve the complication of complete
understanding,” but involves “learning new technologies and questioning one’s
relationship with technology” (“Ease and Electracy” 109-10). A relationship of ease
to flourish by releasing oneself from the complications of critique and/or procedure.11
This, however, doesn’t mean that the compositions that arise out of this approach
to technology are reductive, simplistic, or uncomplicated; rather, it means to write
within a state of ease that can point un/artists (or have un/artists point us) toward
those aspects of digital thought that remain hidden during our ‘adjustment period.’
For rhetoric and composition, one of the traitor’s approaches to writing in digital
environments spawns an event: a writing process for the digital based on our ways of
processing writing—the ease of writing spurred by an event that belongs only to itself.
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with technology offers a sort of comfort and effortlessness necessary for the imaginative
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An (everyday) event that belongs only to itself becomes suspect since it sits
outside of the law of the whole. For Blanchot, it is this everyday ‘speech’ that is
most difficult to find and, as such, “the everyday must be thought as the suspect
(and oblique) that always escapes the clear decision of the law, even when the
law seeks by way of suspicion to track down every indeterminate manner of
being: everyday indifference. (The suspect: anyone and everyone, guilty of not
being able to be guilty)” (Infinite 239). If, as the 9/11 Commission reports, what
we need is a way to create opportunities for the imagination to flourish, it is
through these indeterminate manners that remain suspect that we may find our
way to composing as imaginative traitors, not through the law or an adherence to
the law as such. As the antithesis of a patriot, the traitor places no value (in the
Nietzschean sense) in the law or its justifications; rather, the traitor is guilty of
nothing (thought of as the (immaterial) imaginary) and becomes dis/possessed of
the law. But this law is not only imposed by the political and judicial (law); it also
comes from oneself. To open students to the everyday, we need to also break down
their defenses (make them uncomfortable, as Nietzsche says12), to be traitor-friends.
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As traitor-friends, our pedagogical goals would have less to do with teaching
some set material; we would be teaching students to be thinkers—and writers—that
are self-observant. The major hindrance to the imagination has nothing to do with the
law, but with the defenses that stop the thinking process. Nietzsche observes:
Man is very well defended against himself, against being reconnoitered and
besieged by himself, he is usually able to perceive of himself only his outer walls.
The actual fortress is inaccessible, even invisible to him, unless his friends and
enemies play the traitor and conduct him in by a secret path” (Human 179-80)
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The role of this strange (comic) approach to writing has to do with finding these secret
paths and breaking down the fortress-walls that impede the ability for the imagination
write on those walls,13 and testing how well these walls (values/defenses) hold up
against the hospitality of the (defenseless) traitor. In order to get to a place that
allows us—students—to engage the imaginary with/in the digital, “we have to become
traitors, be unfaithful, again and again abandon our ideals” (Nietzsche, Human 199) of
composing criterion, especially when we are faced with the incongruous manners of un/
artists in these spaces.

Digital Hospitality
“One recognizes those hearts which are capable of noble
hospitality by the many draped windows and closed
shutters: they keep their best rooms empty. Why? Because
they expect guests with whom one does not ‘put up.’”
~ Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols

ourselves, and it invites us to reside in these rooms as guests, wanderers,

nomads. What we find in the digital is the hospitality of an un/formed space
that asks us to create our own forms of knowing, doing, and making imaginative
artifacts. To think of the digital as this kind of hospitable friend would allow us
to enter into “this relation without dependence [where] all of the simplicity of life
enters, passes by way of recognition of the common strangeness that does not allow
us to speak of our friends, but only to speak to them” (Blanchot, Friendship 291).
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he digital presents us with an open space, a space that we may design for
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Speaking of the digital only distances us from the invitation it offers—by way of
analysis, critique, and argument14—but in speaking to the digital, by accepting its
invitation, what separates us from the it puts us in relation to the digital. In this
relation to the digital, the traitor wanders through the digital void, connecting
disparate elements without committing to a single relation; rather, the traitor
develops a whatever15 relation to the digital, a relation that does not seek control to
control thought, but unfolds through imaginative link(age)s.
Entering into the empty room(s) the digital offers us, we are given a chance
to (eternally) return the favor by allowing the hospitality to remain a silent subject;
to return the favor, we speak to the digital in our own ways without trying to reconstruct these rooms in the image of an/other, which is what we should aspire to
in our class/rooms—not to put up with guests, but to offer them a place to write
their own writing. Alexander Reid explains this as some of the affordances that
new media provides: “Writing and new media offer means of pursuing the coming
community and the university without conditions. […] One writes into a space of
writing that is produced through writing, just as one thinks into a space of thought
that is produced through thought” (Two Virtuals 194). Writing into these digital

138

spaces without condition becomes an event that offers new possibilities for thinking
and ways of writing, and this composes the digital’s hospitality, a hospitality that
opens the digital to ways of thinking and forms of composing that helps us pursue
the coming community.16 This sort of hospitality has the ability to put us at ease
with one another and to open up the empty space where we can compose our
hospitality.
To accept this hospitality, we also have to be hospitable to the ways in which
the digital changes how we think. We cannot merely tolerate the digital, but we
have to learn to love the digital as a friend who helps us to learn (to love) the
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strange. In return, as Nietzsche writes of hospitality, “we are always rewarded for
our good will, our patience, fair-mindedness, and gentleness with what is strange;
gradually, it sheds its veil and turns out to be a new and indescribable beauty. That
is its thanks for our hospitality. Even those who love themselves have learned it in
this way” (Gay Science 262). In other words, the mutual hospitality of composing in
the digital unveils itself in the play of learning to love the strangeness of the digital
void (empty space) that puts us back into a relation that transforms each. Through
these transformations we are given over to the strangeness of the imagination that
de-familiarizes itself with the distance of human relations encapsulated in the
witness’s testimony. Nietzsche makes a similar distinction regarding works of art:
“All thought, poetry, painting, compositions, even buildings and sculptures, belong
either to monological art or to art before witnesses” (Gay Science 324). The witness,
then, would be an untimely figure in the digital age whose testimonies come
only after the traitor’s playful compositions in (and of) the empty space of digital
hospitality.
This hospitality is the condition for composing in a digital age: to think along
a secret path that we can only discover by composing the events of our imagination.
The traitor—as nomad, wanderer, stranger—creates a path to the unknown
Inevitably, in treading a new path, we traitors will fall in(to) the digital void, and
the imagination then “comes to help us fill the void in which we fall, by establishing
a certain beginning, a certain starting point, that lead[s] us to hope for a certain
point of arrival” (Blanchot, Friendship 207). Arriving at the digital, accepting its
hospitality, the imagination takes us on a detour toward a relation of thinking
(and writing) without dependence that characterizes the traitor not as an enemy,
but as a friend that delivers17 us the gift of the empty space of the digital. This
gift, however, remains obscure, “where rules abandon us, where morality is silent,
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(compositions) since even the ‘less travelled’ paths have already been worn down.
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where there is no longer law or duty” (Blanchot, Book to Come 27-28). In thinking
of the digital as a gift of an empty space that holds us in no obligation to write, or in
how to write, we are afforded the possibility of (perpetually) re-beginning the call to
compose: the thought of composition that does not close upon itself.18

Aphoristic Composition
“Whatever its sophistication, style has always something
crude about it: it is a form with no clear destination, the
product of a thrust, not an intention, and, as it were, a
vertical and lonely dimension of thought. […] Indifferent
to society and transparent to it, a closed personal process,
it is in no way the product of a choice or of a reflection on
Literature. […] style resides outside art, that is, outside
the pact which binds the writer to society.”
~ Roland Barthes, Writing Degree Zero

T
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he time has come to re-think about the digital’s influence on composition
and the ways we think. Friedrich Kittler provides us with one instance of

how technology influences an individual’s compositions when he notices that
Nietzsche’s writing changed “from arguments to aphorisms, from thoughts to puns,
from rhetoric to telegram style” after purchasing (and writing with) a typewriter
(Gramophone 203). This short, pithy, and un/artistic style of Nietzsche’s later
writings offers us a way to think about and perform a pedagogy appropriate for
new media, and that would allow us to overcome Literature as un/artists overcome
art.19 The implication of Kittler’s statement is a common one: the technologies
we interact with work-over the ways we think and write. In response to Kittler’s
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observation, Nietzsche anachronistically answers: “it is my ambition to say in
ten sentences what everyone else says in a book—what everyone else does not
say in a book” (Portable 556). But our ambitions must go beyond Nietzsche if
we are to address composition in digital environments; after all, in the digital
age, we are moving far more quickly than Nietzsche did with a typewriter. If the
goal is to inject imagination into the ways we compose within the digital void,
we must recognize the ways our thoughts are being worked over, particularly
the immediacy and surprise of our thinking. I propose the following ambition for
digital composition: to “say” in 140 characters20 what Nietzsche wants to “say” in
10 sentences. To compose in such a manner would be to develop our own joyful
wisdom, our own gay science, where we become “the poets of our [lives]—first of
all in the smallest, most everyday matters” (Nietzsche, Gay Science 240). To use a
cheap analogy, this manner would have us write the gutters21 of our lives instead of
moments consciously selected.
Aphorisms are a part of everyday life. If we need evidence to justify this
claim, we need only look to Walter Benjamin’s Arcades Project, which Geoff Sirc
refers to as “notational jottings” that are “a desperately important compositional
skill” and which can be found in “interesting little bits of the everyday” (“Box Logic”
thinking that typifies the digital humanities and their interdisciplinary approaches
to the pedagogical event. To turn toward experimental approaches to the
pedagogical event—based on un/art practices rather than process-oriented ones22—
enables a condition of tremulous excitement (a twitter) exposed in the surprise of an
observation that sparks the deep thought of an aphorism’s pithiness—a terse form
of writing achieved in a only a few words (or characters/images). The aphorism is
an (experimental) art of exegesis that links thought to composition im-mediately
and that refuses to be elaborated, but that invites traitorous thoughts to take up

141

122-23). Moreover, such a method of composing is open to experimental ways of
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residence in the yet unbuilt rooms of the digital.
Gilles Deleuze explains as much when he speaks of Nietzsche writing: “an
aphorism is present as a fragment; it is the form of pluralist thought; in its content
it claims to articulate and formulate a sense. The sense of a being, an action, a
thing—these are the object of the aphorism. […] only the aphorism is capable of
articulating sense, the aphorism is interpretation and the art of interpreting”
(Nietzsche 31). Yet, this interpretation remains open to other interpretations; it
is not the interpretation of rhetorical argument, but of ruminating within the
space of pluralist thought presented in the digital, like the play of the un/artist,
since it stands apart from any grand narrative; the aphorism presents us with
the little narratives that Lyotard sees as the ambition of avant-garde art, and
which Kaprow and Ludwinski extend in the move to un/art. As the thought of
composition, aphorisms make sense and change senses in relation to the thought(s)
they compose apart from the narratives in which they were built. For Nietzsche,
the aphorism becomes a composition of the post-modern, interested in ruminating
thought rather than the fully-formed and explicated forms of knowledge that
restrict imagination.23 Composing aphoristically would then allow the thought
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of composition to become a form in and of itself, the composition of an ‘art’ of
pluralistic interpretations (potentialities).
The potentialities of writing aphoristically return us (eternally?) to the
possibility of writing strangely. Agamben explains the writing of this potentiality
as a place where
[t]he trace is nothing other than the most rigorous attempt to reconsider—
against the primacy of actuality and form—the Aristotlian paradox of
potentiality, the gesture of the scribe who dips his pen in thought and writes
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solely with his potentiality (not to write). The trace,24 writing ‘without
presence or absence, without history, without cause, without arkhë, without
telos,’ is not a form, nor is it the passage from potentiality to actuality; rather,
it is a potentiality that is capable and that experiences itself, a writing tablet
that suffers not the impression of a form but the imprint of its own passivity,
its own formlessness. (Potentialities 216)
Thinking in terms ‘characters’ rather than merely image and/or text offers a
capability of experiencing the formlessness of such a writing, and it is one that
is opened in the relation to the (traitorous) hospitality of the digital. In terms of
digital composition, a character is a mark that marks the capability of composing
aphoristically by imprinting a form that remains formless in its potentiality not
to write (purely). In Derridean terms, a character corresponds to the written
grapheme, not as its equivalent, but as an analogue whose reference opens a
(third) relation that has no central argument—it has no center at all. The political
significance of writing this third relation is how it is capable of addressing the
points-of-contention in the ‘bureaucratization of the imagination’ by refusing to
become bureaucratized (centered).

refusal; where the witness’s testimony (c)enters what can be said, the traitor’s
aphoristic composition presents us with intuitions, movements of ‘writing’ where
thought escapes bureaucratization (law). At certain moments, we must refuse to
(c)enter testimonies and enter into “an infinite task that risks condemning the
writer to a didactic, pedagogic role, and, in so doing, of excluding the demand [the
(committed) writer)25] carries within him and that constrains him to lack a place, a
name, a role, and an identity, that is, never yet to be a writer” (Political 118). The
formlessness of aphorisms presents us with such a risk, a risk supplemented by the

143

Extending Nietzsche’s ambition of writing aphoristically presents such a
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hospitality of the digital, an invitation to compose ourselves into a space that lacks
place—the ones we carry within ourselves and that open us into the potentialities
of pluralist thought. Accepting the digital’s hospitality in our pedagogy would
have us affirm the part(s) it takes in forming thought from the formlessness of the
refusal to write purely.

A (Comic) Pedagogy of (Twittering) Aphorisms
“Philosophical writing is ahead of where it is supposed to be.
Like a child, it is premature and insubstantial. We recommence,
but we cannot rely on it getting to the thought itself, there, at
the end. For the thought is here, muddled up in the unthought,
trying to make sense of the impertinent chatter of childhood.”
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~ Jean-Francois Lyotard, “The Subject of the Course of Philosophy”
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Introduction Endnotes

1. A reference to Herman Melville’s “Bartleby the Scrivener: A Story of Wall-Street” and
Maurice Blanchot’s reading of ‘Bartleby’ in The Writing of the Disaster (145), which
appears in the form of aphorisms.

2. Also see Cynthia Selfe’s article “The Movement of Air, the Breath of Meaning:
Aurality and Multimodal Composing.” She writes: The stakes for students are no less
significant—they involve fundamental issues of rhetorical sovereignty3: the rights
and responsibilities that students have to identify their own communicative needs
and to represent their own identities, to select the right tools for the communicative
contexts within which they operate, and to think critically and carefully about the
meaning that they and others compose. When we insist on print as the primary, and
most formally acceptable, modality for composing knowledge, we usurp these rights
and responsibilities on several important intellectual and social dimensions, and,
unwittingly, limit students’ sense of rhetorical agency to the bandwidth of our own
interests and imaginations” (618).

3. As Blanchot writes, “The disaster does not put me into question, but annuls the
questions, makes it disappear – as if along with the question, “I” too disappeared in
the disaster which never appears” (Writing 28). Questions, in this sense, assume and
demand answers, reasons, justifications that take “place after having taken place”
(Blanchot, Writing 28).
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4. See Bill Readings’ The University in Ruins and Stanley Aronowitz’s The Knowledge
Factory for more detailed accounts of the problem facing universities focused on
‘training’ students “in knowledges that constitute an occupation or a particular set of
skills” (Aronowitz, Knowledge Factory 1). Instead, Readings conceives of the University
as a space “where thought takes place beside thought, where thinking is a shared
process without identity or unity. Thought beside itself perhaps. The University’s
ruins offer us an institution in which the incomplete and interminable nature of the
pedagogic relation can remind us that “thinking together” is a dissensual process”
(University 192).

5. In Networked Art, Craig Saper begins with Barthes’ notion of “receivable texts,” claiming
that this term alludes to “a network of relationships linked by sending and receiving texts
in the mail or as a part of a network of participants” and which “suspends traditional
norms of judgment” (4).

6. “I will not say that the disaster is absolute; on the contrary, it disorients the absolute”
(Blanchot, Writing 4).

7. Here, I take my cue from Geoffrey Sirc: ““[o]ur texts are conventional in every sense of
the word; they write themselves. They are wholly determined by the texts that have
gone before; a radical break with the conventions of a form or genre […] would perplex.”
(English 10). Also, see Victor Vitanza’s article entitled “Abandoned to Writing: Notes
Toward Several Provocations” for a radically passive performance. Vitanza writes:

“What writing or composition wants is a writer! To invite someone to become a
writer! What rhetoric wants is a body that comes to expressing itselphs. A writer.
A body filled with tics that cannot but (not) write! Twitchings.
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“Writing, however, is not ||||||||||||||||| (barcodes) nor is it ////////////
(slashing of value). Only writers spawned by institutions write in this manner!”

8. Here, transvaluation refers to what that which has no pre-determined criteria and
would be, in the Nietzschean sense, a valuation of love, which Nietzsche finds to go
beyond good (acceptable) and evil (unacceptable) (cf. Beyond Good and Evil; The Will to
Power: A Transvaluation of All Values).

9. See Byron Hawk’s A Counter-History of Composition (100-104).

10. In Internet Invention, Ulmer defines conductive logic thus: “Conductive logic subsumes
the inductive, deductive, and abductive inferences of the interrogation. In conduction
the inference path moves from material thing to another thing, from signifier to
signifier, without recourse to the abstractions of rules” (156). To clarify Ulmer’s
thinking, conductive logic can be figured as a pun, a logic similar to the one Derrida
builds with his concepts of deconstruction and differance, a logic of wordplay that
can also extend into image realms – an image spurs another image, perhaps directly
related, perhaps indirectly related. Heuretics, according to Ulmer, “contributes to what
Barthes referred to as ‘the return of the politician’—one who is concerned with how a
work is made” (Heuretics 4), and it indicates a process of using “the method that I am
inventing while I am inventing it” (Heuretics 17). Such a process does not determine
‘the paths of inquiry,’ but ‘continually sets the inquiry in motion.’

11. This phrasing is a reference to Giorgio Agamben’s The Coming Community. He writes
in a ‘chapter’ titled Bartleby: “The perfect act of writing comes not from a power to
write, but from an impotence that turns back on itself and in this way comes to itself
as a pure act […]. Bartleby, a scribe who does not simply cease writing, but ‘prefers
not to,’ is the extreme image of this angel that writes nothing but its potentiality to
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not-write” (37). Earlier, he explains ‘impotence’: “It is neither apathy nor promiscuity
nor resignation. These pure singularities communicate only in the empty space of
the example, without being tied by any common property, by any identity, they are
expropriated of all identity, so as to appropriate belonging itself, the sign ε. Tricksters
or fakes, assistants or ‘toons, they are the exemplars of the coming community”
(Coming 11). Quentin was a trickster for Bartholomae, one that performed his writing,
turning back on himself (“I lose again”), and coming to himself through the Act of
writing. It was his “Fuck You” essay (cf. Bartholomae, “The Tidy House” and Sirc’s
English Composition) that brought Bartholomae to question the field of Basic Writing
almost 20 years later. The essay comes too late for Bartholomae even as the realization
of that essay came too soon (cf. Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition 81).

12. Later, I will refer to Warren Ellis’ Do Anything, where he quotes Harvey Pekar saying:
“Comics are words and pictures. You can do anything with words and pictures” (5).
On Stan Lee, apparently a postmodern writer/artist: “The artist would go away – with
or without a supporting document, it seems – and draw out the story in pencil. Stan
would then generate all the dialogue” (12).

13. See Kant’s Critique of Aesthetic Judgement (226) and Lyotard’s Lessons on the Analytic of the
Sublime (6).

14. Nicholas Lemann explains why reason comprises so much risk in “Terrorism Studies:
Social scientists do counterinsurgency”:

In the world of terrorism studies, the rhetoric of righteousness gives way to
equilibrium equations. Nobody is good and nobody is evil. Terrorists, even suicide
bombers, are not psychotics or fanatics; they’re rational actors—that is, what they
do is explicable in terms of their beliefs and desires—who respond to the set of
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incentives that they find before them. The tools of analysis are realism, rational
choice, game theory, decision theory: clinical and bloodless modes of thinking. (73).

In essence, Lemann argues that the tools of argumentation, Logic, Reason, and
rationality are the same tools that allowed the justification of disastrous actions on
September 11, 2001. Also, Lester Faigley’s writes in Fragments of Rationality:

…a major source of contradictions in writing pedagogy results from the dogmatic
teaching of a truncated conception of coherence, which supports bureaucratic
rationality where reason is restricted to narrow channels of expertise and
questions of ethics are suppressed. Even the champion of Enlightenment
rationality, Jûrgen Habermas, critiques ‘instrumental rationality’ that supports
bureaucracies by providing their justification and controlling mechanisms, and
he argues instead for a ‘communicative rationality’ that would integrate the
discourses of the arts, science, and morality. (133)

Given the subtitle of Faigley’s book (Postmodernity and the Subject of Composition),
it appears that Rickert’s book (subtitle: Rhetoric, Zizek, and the Return of the
Subject) works in a similar vein. Postpedagogy, perhaps, is a manifestation of the
problematics Faigley detects in (composition) pedagogy – work that Rickert, among
others, continuously attempt to flesh out, and the work that this project attempts to
supplement.

15. See Gregory Ulmer’s “The Object of Post-Criticism.”

16. As Byron Hawk explains, “Potentiality is there first and then when it encounters the
right circumstances, the right constellation of bodies and forces, it is put in motion and
becomes possibility. In short, potentiality is the ‘condition for possibility” (282-83, n15).
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17. Gilles Deleuze explains as much when he writes of Nietzsche’s ‘concept of genealogy’:
“Evaluations, in essence, are not values but ways of being, modes of existence of those
who judge and evaluate, serving as principles for the values on the basis of which they
judge” (1).

18. As explained in the Glossary of Libidinal Economy:
The Great Ephemeral Skin: this is in many ways the more provocative figure
in Libidinal Economy. It highlights the disruptive potential of the figure, a
concern which occupied Lyotard […] Freud’s elaboration of the ‘dream-work’
(cf. The Interpretation of Dreams) provides Lyotard with an articulation of the
connivance of the figural and the libidinal: the dream-work (condensation,
displacement, secondary revision and considerations of representability) distorts
figural materials (words, signs and ideas). In Discours, figure, Lyotard draws out
the implications of the figural unconscious’ plastic invasion into the realm of the
conceptual conscious, the result of which invasion is not merely to demonstrated
the inevitable confusion of the two realms, but to highlight difference in their
respective organizations. Whereas the conceptual relies on rigid opposition, the
figural works differences: concepts, in other words, utilize negation (the ‘this’
and the ‘not-this’ in the language of Libidinal Economy), isolating unit(ie)s as
opposed entities, whereas figural difference, like the unconscious whose work it is,
knows no negation. […] The great ephemeral skin is the libidinal materialist (dis)
solution of figural difference and conceptual opposition as polymorphous (hence
‘ephemeral’), material (hence ‘skin’) intensity. (Libidinal xiv)

19. Vitanza writes in “Abandoned to Writing: Notes Toward Several Provocations”: “’We’
may never write ‘writing,’ but ‘we’ must start letting writing write. Such a writing
cannot, should not, take place, and will not, unless under the most radical, still
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unthinkable, conditions…take place…in the university (or the schools). It is simply not
safe for students to write ‘in’ or ‘at’ the university. Any university. What is taught at
the university is not-writing.”

20. Also, see Sharon Crowley’s Composition in the University: Historical and Polemical
Essays, specifically Chapter 10 entitled “The Politics of Composition” where she writes:
“No matter how nurturant the teacher, the so-called community classroom is rife with
the ideological differences that students and teachers bring with them to class. These
differences will inevitably be put on the table, as they might not be in a history or
biology class, because liberal composition pedagogy insists that students’ identities
are the subject of composition. Within the context of the universal requirement, which
forces people to take and teach the class, this seems to me to be a recipe for pain” (227).
In general, Crowley’s perspective reminds us that we are a highly political field, but
that we rarely acknowledge the ideological differences in the classroom in hopes of
‘keeping the peace.’ The problem here is that once students leave the classroom, they
continue to maintain their identities, which is enforced when we require them to learn
how to argue well instead of learning that arguments, and therefore identities, are
contingent singularities, forcing a rethinking both of politics, self, and the act or event
of writing.

21. See Joshua C. Hilst’s forthcoming article in JAC, “Gutter Talk: An Other Idiom of
Rhetoric.”

22. Here, I use the word “abysmal” as an indication of the additional Catholic (church)
meaning of ‘limbo,’ which refers to a border-space between Heaven and Hell (cf.
Harper, “Online”). Could it be, perhaps, that this is the space that exists beyond good
and evil? It certainly appears so considering the theoretical suggestions. Could that
mean that, in part, Nietzsche would have liked to read some comics? And Lyotard?
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What we do know, however, is that Roland Barthes thought comics has some
theoretically interesting potentialities (see Chapter 1).

23. Again, Lyotard finds this necessity in the work of Kant, whose discussion of the
“sublime” in the “Appendix” of Kant’s Critique of Aesthetic Judgement is akin to what is
now being termed postpedagogy.

24. Kant links his idea of ‘free art’ with the field of rhetoric, claiming, “Rhetoric is the
art of transacting a serious business of the understanding as if it were a free play
of the imagination” (284) and that the rhetorician gives “an entertaining play of
the imagination” (Kant’s Critique of Aesthetic Judgement 185). In addition, U.S.
Army Commander, Lieutenant General David H. Petraeus suggests that large-scale
conventional tactics “may be of limited utility or even counterproductive in COIN
[counterinsurgency] operations” (ix) and that “successful counterinsurgency campaigns
require a flexible, adaptive force led by agile, well-informed, culturally astute leaders”
(n.p.). If the work of rhetoric/composition is indeed to prepare students for academic
and professional work, it stands to reason that successful students will be “flexible,”
“adaptive,” and “astute” – that is, to be able to work beyond “conventional” practices
in order to formulate the rules of the “unconventional” (cf. Petraeus; Lyotard,
Postmodern).

25. A reference to the concluding lines of Melville’s “Bartleby the Scrivener: A Story of WallStreet” (74).

26. In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche writes, “What is done out of love always occurs
beyond good and evil” (Portable 444; aphorism 153). Quentin’s refusal to write purely
could also be an Act of love in this sense…
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Chapter One Endnotes

1. Ulmer has proposed “terms” for writing (with) new media, calling this a move ‘from literacy
to electracy’ in Internet Invention. Electracy, according to Ulmer, “is to digital media what
literacy is to print” (xi), and it “adds to orality and literacy the possibility of writing the
unconscious (and hence of writing with what we do not know—with our stupidity and with
our trust” (163).

2. See Jean Baudrillard various works, but specifically Simulations.

3. In part, this series of divisions mimics Plato’s own series of dialogues in this sequence:
The Sophist, The Statesman, and The Philosopher, where each of the dialogues
correlates to each of the forms of imitation. In our own time, this estimation seems
appropriate, if we consider current brands of sophistry as attempts to accurately
represent knowledge in the service of professionalism and institutions, statesmen
are commonly framed as deceptive in order to maintain their own will to power, and
philosophers are excluded for attempting to think the unthought to cut through both,
at least in Lyotard’s view of the philosopher. Plato’s The Philosopher was not written
(or uncovered, whichever your preference), and there seems to be little corroborating
evidence to assume a definition of the philosopher by Plato.

4. This would be analogous to Diane Davis’ feminism in the sense that it “anticipates
laughing itself out of a job” (Breaking 208).
171

Chapter 1 Endnotes

5. Cf. Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and Paul Feyerabend’s
Against Method for further explanation.

6. Lyotard vaguely observes that “it is reasonable to suppose that the proliferation
of information-process machines is having, and will continue to have, as much of
an effect on the circulation of learning as did advancements in human circulation
(transportation systems) and alter, in the circulation of sounds and visual images
(the media)” (4) at the outset of The Postmodern Condition. The vagueness in this
statement suggests that Lyotard does not see technology negatively, but as a potential
to provides ways of thinking systematically and non-systematically. That is, playing
with these technologies can lead us to new ways of knowing (theoretical knowledge),
doing (practical knowledge) and making (productive knowledge).

7. As we learn from Kenneth Burke in Permanence and Change, and Victor Vitanza in
“Seeing in Third Sophistic Ways,” among others, a way of seeing is also a way of not
seeing.

8. See Ulmer’s “The Object of Post-Criticism” for more on these techniques and how they
relate to the current trends of art practices in composing otherwise.

9. See Ulmer’s Teletheory, pp. 64-104.

10. Galloway concludes by saying: “People often ask me if I think protocol is good or bad.
But I’m not sure this is the best question to ask. It is important to remember first
that the technical is always political, that network architecture is politics. So protocol
necessarily involves a complex interrelation of political questions, some progressive,
some reactionary. In many ways protocol is a dramatic move forward, but in other
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ways it reinstates systems of social and technical control that are deserving of critical
analysis” (Protocol 245-46).

11. Bill Readings’ The University in Ruins effectively discusses and dismantles the criteria of
excellence.

12. See Gilles Deleuze’s The Fold, pp. 22, 66, 158, and 181. He writes: “Unfolding sometimes
means that I am developing – that I am undoing – infinite tiny folds that are forever
agitating the background, with the goal of drawing a great fold on the side whence forms
appear […] I am forever unfolding between two folds, and if to perceive means to unfold,
then I am forever perceiving within the folds” (93).

13. The use of this term comes from Chris Ware’s The Acme Novelty Date Book, Volume One: “To
create a fine line-up of brilliantly pro-duced and rendered moving comic pictures ~ all by the
original creators” (41).

14. Gregory Ulmer has worked to develop such a manner since as early as 1983 when his
article “The Object of Post-Criticism” was released in Hal Foster’s Anti-Aesthetics. Ulmer
then develops this method more fully in Teletheory and Heuretics, calling this additional
logic “conduction.” However, the conductive reasoning that he describes is meant to deal
directly with electronic (digital) media. Also, at the base of this term, as Ulmer writes,
are “the features of the electronic terms (conduction and transduction)” (Teletheory 86).
In trans-disciplinary and trans-medial fashion, I am using the term pro-duction as a way
to address the gap that these ‘electronic terms’ exclude, specifically what Ulmer calls “a
movement directly between things (unconscious thought), instead of “the established
movements of inference between things and ideas (abduction, deduction, induction)”
(Heuretics 127).
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15. See Aristotle’s On Rhetoric, pp. 229-230.

16. See Ulmer’s Applied Grammatology, pp. 78-79.

17. See also, Ulmer’s “The Object of Post-Criticism,” p. 86.

18. Jeff Rice explains that this sort of work is already under way in popular culture when
he writes that such work has “occurred without ‘further study’” (Rhetoric of Cool 144).

19. As Ulmer notes in Applied Grammatology and in “The Object of Post-Criticism,” postpedagogy supports the popularization of education already present in the digital
technologies students use every day. The turn to the figural in composition studies is
not an outright rejection of traditional forms of writing; instead, post-pedagogy aims to
challenge the desire to fix meaning in order to explore what has been excluded.

20. Similarly, in the introduction to Kittler’s Discourse Networks 1800/1900, David
Wellerby refers to a practice called “post-hermeneutics” in which the interpretive
methods called hermeneutics are supplemented with additional readings that push
interpretation to its limits until it becomes generative. As it applies in Ulmer’s work,
post-hermeneutics petitions us to see readymade objects as conceptual starting places
that spur abstract, theoretical thinking and approaches to research.

21. Also, these nomadic drifts share a kinship with Vitanza’s paganism in “Three
Countertheses” – a process of continually finding new ways of understanding and
making sense of the world around us.

22. Warren Ellis, speaking of jazz musician Anthony Braxton, writes that Braxton “makes
up a name for every new ‘style’ he creates – even though his honking free-jazz almost174
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musical experiments are so dissonant, random and alien as to be almost indivisible
from each other” (Do Anything 15).

23. See Cynthia Haynes’ “Writing Offshore,” p. 715. Such a “condensation” leads Haynes’
to write: “Writing in the abstract also suggests learning the rhetorical device of brevity
and the rhetorical power of the aphorism” (715).

24. Calvino speaks of this as a time of inspiration that sparked his desire for literature, but
also has deep relevance to rhetoric and composition. Perhaps such a method could bridge
the gap between the between the cultures of literature and composition that Peter Elbow
so effectively traces out in his opinion piece “The Cultures of Literature and Composition:
What Could Each Learn from the Other.”

25. For more on Lyotard on Duchamp, see Lyotard’s Duchamp’s TRANS/formers. He
(Lyotard) writes: “In what you say about Duchamp, the aim would be not to try to
understand and to show what you’ve understood, but rather the opposite, to try not
to understand and to show that you haven’t understood. No, not what you think, not
a commentary on incomprehensibility in general or in particular, the seven hundred
and twenty-eighth modern text on modernity as the experience of Nothing. No, to be
good and conscientious and phrasey, to stick to the motif, to be technical if necessary,
and at the same time to let the inconsistency of the commentary and its object be felt,
by Yours Truly and Monsieur Marcel, and by the one with the other, but a conquered
inconsistency, you see, not received in disappointment, not exhibited as a cardinal
virtue of martyrdom, on the contrary, nonsense as the most precious treasure” (12).

26. Christopher Bracken also discusses similar concepts in Magical Criticism: The
Recourse of Savage Philosophy as the convocation of “forbidden possibilities of
discourse” (1).
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Chapter Two Endnotes

1. See Maus I and Maus II.

2. Hawk builds on Gregory Ulmer’s work in Heuretics, a term that he uses to describe an/
other logic of invention that “appropriates the history of the avant-garde as a liberal
mode of research and experimentation” (xii) and addresses what has been excluded
from “a review of the history of the arts [indicating] that the criticism that has been
written and the art works that have been created are only a fraction of the kinds of
things that could have been developed” (3). A postmodern writer/artist, in writing what
will have been, address the fragments left excluded.

3. In inventing a method while inventing it, the criteria for developing such a method
would be formulated after the fact.

4. This, of course, presents a paradox – in addressing its illegitimate position as a benefit,
I could also be seen as attempting to legitimate comics in the service of institutions.
However, as I will attempt to demonstrate, comics do not merely represent one form
that needs be legitimated; rather, comics are in a position to explore a perpetual
combination of media (both print and digital).

5. See David Wellerby’s introduction to Friedrich Kittler’s Discourse Networks 1800/1900.
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6. C ynthia Haynes currently has an article entitled “Post-Conflict Pedagogy,” slated to
be published as a book chapter in Beyond Post-Process (eds. Sidney Dobrin, Jeff Rice,
and Michael Vastola), that takes its task as destabilizing “the stabilizing momentum
of any pedagogy that re-iterates conflict in the name of writing” (from the unpublished
book proposal/abstract). What I see in a comics form is a way of enacting Haynes’ postconflict pedagogy within rhetoric’s and composition’s move toward new media and the
figural.

7. Kenneth Burke explores the “paradox of substance” in Chapter 2 of A Grammar of Motives,
titled “Antinomies of Definition,” explaining, “etymologically ‘substance’ is a scenic work.
Literally, a person’s or a thing’s sub-stance would be something that stands beneath or
supports the person or thing” (22).

8. “Context” also comes from Burke’s discussion of sub-stance whose origins
etymologically “refer to an attribute of a thing’s context, since that which supposrts
or underlies a thing would be a part of thing’s context. And a thing’s context, being
outside or beyond the thing, would be something that the thing is not” (Grammar 23).

9. See also Gregory Ulmer’s “The Object of Post-Criticism and Applied Grammatology.

10. Trahair builds on Mary Lydon’s article “Veduta on Discours, figure” in Yale French
Studies 99:

…discourse and figure are given together. Not sequentially, not in juxtaposition,
but together at once, one on top of the other like two superimposed photographic
images, or like the representations of the unconscious. This is a spatial
relationship that language in its linearity does not permit, hence the imperative to
write “Discours, figure,” where the comma […] represents graphically, but mutely,
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as a pause, a blank, a hesitation, one might say, that which cannot be verbalized.
(24)

Earlier she (Trahair) also writes of Discours, figure, when Lyotard distinguished
between vision and seeing, that it “is not possible to establish a relationship of simple
epistemological exteriority between the text and the image” (20). Comics present a
way of thinking about this relationship, and a way of thinking about how other hybrid
media – I use cinema as a synecdoche for digital media in this dissertation – may be
thought of in a similar manner.

11. See Gregory Ulmer’s “The Object of Post-Criticism,” p. 86.

12. Pun intended. :)

13. Barthes writes in “The Third Meaning” (where “meaning” is translated from the
French sens, which means “meaning,” “sense,” “direction,” “tenor,” “wits,” among
others) that the obtuse meaning indicates “a theory of the supplementary meaning”
(55) and “what the obtuse meaning disturbs, sterilizes, is metalanguage (criticism)”
(61); in doing so, it also disturbs attempts at mounting meta-narratives in favor of
alternate directions spurring from sensation. Here we may find a link to Lyotard’s The
Postmodern Condition.

14. This phrasing of “fragmentary work” comes from Blanchot’s The Infinite Conversation.
He writes that fragments are

problematic not because [they] refuse accomplishment, but because it explores
with an inexorable rigor – beyond the conception of the work as something unified
and closed upon itself, as organizing and dominating the values transmitted by
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a traditional already established and attained – the infinite space of the work,
though with a new postulate: namely, that the relations of this space will not
necessarily satisfy the concepts of unity, totality, or continuity. The problem the
work of the fragment poses is a problem of extreme maturity: first of the artist, and
also of society. (348)

If thought of in this way, the fragmentary writing that comics suggest would subvert
Barthes’ claim that comics are “derisory, vulgar, foolish, dialogical forms of consumer
subculture” (66n1), but rather, present a way of thinking and writing in their prime
manifestations

15. See McCloud’s Understanding Comics and Eisner’s Comics and Sequential Art.

16. Groensteen only acknowledges McCloud’s work twice in The System of Comics, even
while his (Groensteen) project has a great deal in common with McCloud’s earlier
analysis. Yet, McCloud appears to be a bit more flexible with his view of comics than
Groensteen’s system allows for.

17. In part, this conceptualization of montage appears a bit narrow. A more productive
view of montage comes to use from Walter Benjamin in “The Author as Producer: “I am
speaking of the process of montage: the element which is superimposed breaks into the
situation on which it is imposed” (Reflections 234). Gregory Ulmer also discusses such a
process in “The Object of Post-Criticism” that moves beyond critique into a productive
process of in(ter)vention.

18. In the second endnote, Hawk explains that he uses “’hir’ to denote a conflation between her
and his. Aside from the practical reasons, it is also emblematic of the gender problematic I
see in The Fifth Element” (89).
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19. Umberto Eco echoes a similar manner in “A Reading of Steve Canyon,” offering an
active means of reading/visualizing comics as a collaborative moment of creation with
and apart from the writer/artist. Eco describes an experiment at the end of this article
that finds readings had inserted images that were not present in the original sequence
– creating an alternate narrative.

20. In Vitanza’s terms, this would be “a Rhetoric that not only is without the philosophical
pretensions of adjudicating ‘philosophical knowledge claims’ but also (and more
importantly) is without the philosophical-Rhetorical pretensions of adjudicating
‘hermeneutical understandings.’ It is, in other words, not concerned either with
attempting to resolve rhetorical, interpretive differences or with even accounting for
them. Instead, it identifies, detonates, and exploits the differences” (“Critical Sub/
Versions” 42).

21. Italo Calvino on da Vinci: “And not just in science but also in philosophy, he was
confident he could communicate better by means of painting and drawing. Still he
also felt an incessant need to write, to use writing to investigate the world in all its
polymorphous manifestations and secrets, and also to give shape to his fantasies,
emotions, and rancors – as when he inveighs against men of letters, who were able
only to repeat what they had read in the books of others, unlike those who were among
‘inventors and interpreters between nature and men’” (Six Memos 79).

22. See Ulmer’s “The Object of Post-Criticism” in which he looks to move beyond critique
toward production. Post-criticism, then, would be “to think the consequences for critical
representation of the new mechanical means of reproduction (film and magnetic tape –
technologies which require collage/montage)” (91).
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23. See Diane Davis’ Breaking Up [at] Totality: A Rhetoric of Laughter.

24. In The Coming Community, Giorgio Agamben writes of the term whatever: “Whatever is
the figure of pure singularity. Whatever has no identity, it is not determinate with respect
to a concept, but neither is it simply indeterminate; rather it is determined only through
its relation to an idea, that is, to the totality of its possibilities” (67), and that “Whatever is
singularity insofar as it relates not (only) to the concept, but (also) to the idea” (76). Here,
“whatever singularity” is that which has an “inessential commonality, a solidarity that
in no way concerns an essence” (17-18). It should also be noted that his understanding
of “whatever” does not indicate indifference, but is etymologically based on the Latin
translation of “being such that it always matters” (1) – which is precisely what Kaprow
looks for in unart.

25. Calvino: “In the cinema the image we see on the screen has also passed through the
stage of a written text, has then been ‘visualized’ in the mind of the director, then
physically reconstructed on the set, and finally fixed in the frames of the film itself. A
film is therefore the outcome of a succession of phases, both material and otherwise,
in the course of which the images acquire form. During this process, the ‘mental cinema’
of the imagination has a function no less important than that of the actual creation of the
sequences as they will be recorded by the camera and then put together on the moviola.
This mental cinema is always at work in each one of us, and it always has been, even
before the invention of the cinema. Nor does it ever stop projecting images before our
mind’s eye” (Six Memos 83).

26. This concept correlates to Cynthia Haynes’ desire for writing instruction to move away
from ‘argument’ and toward more nomadic and inventive approaches in “Writing Offshore.”

27. See Agamben’s The Coming Community, p. 1.
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Chapter Three Endnotes

1. The title is a reference to Jean-Luc Nancy’s “Myth Interrupted” in The Inoperative
Community.

2. The phrase “dream-work” comes from Lyotard’s article “The Dream-Work Does Not
Think” where he writes that the dream-work “does not think, calculate, or judge in any
way at all; it restricts itself to giving things a new form” (Reader 20). Surrealism works
with such logics and ‘restrictions.’

3. As a Frankenstein reference, this subtitle is very appropriate considering that the
project is a mish-mash of parts from a variety of ‘comics artists.’

4. I work with Spiegelman’s work again, primarily because he has been (consistently
recognized as) one of the leading avant-gardists working within comics.

5. See Gregory Ulmer’s Heuretics, p. 5.

6. Compare with Kenneth Burke’s “Unending Conversation” in The Philosophy of Literary
Form 110-111.

7. Here, I use the word “gesture” as Giorgio Agamben does in Means Without Ends:
“The gesture is the exhibition of a mediality: it is the process of making a means
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visible as such” (58). Spiegelman even addresses this in the introductory remarks
when he acknowledges that the surrealist exercise was not very effective as a work in
itself, but it worked well as an exercise in thinking about the process of making and
experimenting with comics.

8. See James Elkins’ Why Art Cannot be Taught and What Happened to Art Criticism.

9. See Derrida’s The Archeology of the Frivolous, p. 76.

10. This is also a key trajectory of Ulmer’s “Electracy” project. Jeff Rice and Marcel
O’Gorman concisely explain the use of avant-garde art methods in new media practices
in the “Introduction” to New Media/New Methods: The Academic Turn from Literacy
to Electracy as “…about making methods and not art (as Greg Ulmer reminds his
students on a regular basis)” since “avant-garde artists serve as ideal exemplars in the
invention of new modes of discourse” (9).

11. Boyd’s article is the only article that explores the importance of TNC for comics, at
least that I could find. Also, to clarify his use of the word “pattern,” he writes: “If all art
plays with pattern, the best art plays best with pattern” (“Art and Evolution” 47).

12. See Ulmer, Heuretics, p. 228: “Chorography continues the speculative circulation
of meaning through equivocal words but introduces a different style of linkage
(hence a different ‘method’)—one that is ‘punceptual’ rather than conceptual—in
which conduction (passing from thing to thing in the real, ‘external’ to my conscious
reasoning) reorganizes abduction, deduction, and induction.”

13. In Ulmer’s “method” CATTt, he defines the “t” (target) as “the immediate domain of
application” in which “Breton also intended to change the status of art itself, constituting it as
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a practice of daily life better characterized as ‘politics’ than ‘art’ (Heuretics 11). While Ulmer
seems to be interested in ‘methods’ of how we may think of media processes, the methods I
work with here have already been put into practice.

14. For more on Puns, see Jonathan Culler’s edited collection On Puns: The Foundation of
Letters. For a specific reference to my thinking on the pun as an interruption, see R. A.
Shoaf’s article “The Play of Puns in Late Middle English Poetry: Concerning Juxtology”
in Culler’s collection.

15. This phrasing comes from Lyotard’s The Differend: Phrases in Dispute, but it is also a
common phrase throughout his writings. Rather than quote a specific instance, I felt
it more appropriate to paraphrase with references to his work on language games –
hence, phrases.

16. See Readings’ The University in Ruins, p. 161.

17. See John Caputo’s More Radical Hermeneutics, p. 55.

18. For a most extensive discussion of sense and nonsense, see Gilles Deleuze’s The Logic
of Sense.

19. See Diane Davis’ “Addressing Alterity” for a fuller discussion on this ‘impossibility.’

20. Thomas Kent’s phrase, hermeneutical terror, appears in his 1992 article entitled
“Hermeneutical Terror and the Myth of Interpretive Consensus” in Philosophy and
Rhetoric 25.2. Kent defines the phrase as “the silencing of voices with discourse
communities through an appeal to interpretive consensus” (135). While argumentation
does not necessarily require that ‘silencing of voices,’ many attempts to argue for a specific
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point of view is done with creating a consensus – and we have seen the dangers of such
interpretive consensuses with World War II and the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks
on the United States.

21. See Lyotard’s Libidinal Economy, p. 19.

22. This sentence is a patchwork consisting of Blanchot and Lyotard. Blanchot writes:
“Communication—to employ this dubious word—is communication with the unknown.
But communicating with the unknown requires plurality” (Infinite 409). And Lyotard
writes in “Tomb of the Intellectual” about “the responsibility of artists, writers, or
philosophers”: “Their addressee is not the public and, I would say, is not even the
‘community’ of artists, writers, and so forth. To tell the truth, they do not know who
their addressee is, and this is what it is to be an artist, writer, and so forth: to throw a
‘message’ out into the void” (Political 4).

23. In relation to ‘cartoons and comic strips,’ Barthes explains that the relay advances “the
action by setting out, in the sequence of message, meanings that are not to be found in the
image itself” (Image 41).

24. See The Arcades Projects where Benjamin collects fragments of writings and
observations while wandering about Paris.

25. Estrangement, as an interruption, Blanchot explains as a commitment “to unfolding in
various modes of experience” (Blanchot, Infinite 128).

26. In Ulmer’s forthcoming book Avatar Emergency, he writes of “flash reason,” a concept
intimately connected to Breton’s “incandescent flashes.” As Ulmer writes, flash reason
is “a practice for deliberative reason, for public policy formation, making democratically
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informed decisions in a moment, at light speed” (3). The role of comics, as a stranger sort of
surrealism, takes on the role of such a practice.

27. For more on this aspect of Surrealism, see David Cunningham’s “The Futures of
Surrealism: Hegelianism, Romanticism, and the Avant-Garde,” where he writes of
Blanchot’s view of Surrealism: “As such, surrealism, in its most radical manifestation as
a temporal modality of experience, calls forth neither an immanent end nor a utopianist
projection, but an ‘exigency’ that comes from the ‘unexpected’ itself. The future as
‘unknown,’ ‘ever exterior to the horizon against which it seems to stand out’” (58).

28. This sentence parallels a paragraph in Jean-Luc Nancy’s discussion of interrupted myths. He
writes: “The gift or the right to speak (and to speak of gifts and rights) is no longer the same
gift or the same right, and it is perhaps no longer either a gift or a right. No more is the mythic
legitimacy that myth conferred upon its own narrator. Writing is seen rather as illegitimate,
never authorized, risked, exposed to the limit. But this is not a complacent anarchy. For it is in
this way that writing obeys the law—the law of community” (Inoperative 70).

29. De Duve offers an indication for why this is the case in Kant After Duchamp: “…art is
not the order of seeing and knowing but rather of that of judging, not the order of the
descriptive but of the prescriptive. Misinterpreted conditionally and immanently, the
modern imperative prescribed: do whatever in art, but do it in art only” (347).

30. For more on this claim, see de Duve’s Kant After Duchamp, where he writes that
creativity “also abandons the thing to its absolute impossibility of being determined as
underdetermined, that is, to its impossibility of conforming to the law of the necessity
of a universal whatever. And it’s precisely thanks to this abandonment that the
readymade—and not the readymades—conforms to the universal of this impossibility”
(358-59).
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31. Later in The Infinite Conversation, Blanchot writes that ‘the work of unworking’
is “a practice of life and of writing in which we thought we recognized one of the
characteristic traits of the surrealist project” (417).

32. In Blanchot’s discussion of “interruption,” he summarizes his thinking similarly:
Let us go no further and summarize. We have, first of all, two important
distinctions: one corresponding to a dialectical, the other to a non-dialectical
exigency of speech: the pause permits exchange, the wait that measures infinite
distance. But in waiting it is not simply the delicate rupture preparing the poetic
act that declares itself, but also, and at the same time, other forms of arrest that
are very profound, very perverse, more and more perverse, and always such that
if one distinguishes them, the distinction does not avert but rather postulates
ambiguity. We have “distinguished” in this way three of them: one wherein
emptiness becomes work; another where in emptiness is fatigue, affliction; and
the other, the ultimate, the hyperbolic, wherein worklessness (perhaps thought)
indicates itself. To interrupt oneself for the sake of understanding. To understand
in order to speak. Speaking, finally, only to interrupt oneself and to render possible
the impossible interruption. (Infinite 79)
This impossible interruption would also be the interruption of art by unartists (or ‘comics
artist’).
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1. Unlike Lloyd Bitzer’s article title “The Rhetorical Situation,” the focus of this
Stranger’s does not deal with a question (cf. Bitzer, “Rhetorical Situation” 5-6), nor
does he suggest that an answer is possible. Rather, he merely wants to discover
the available means of being in the world, of living, and therefore, of writing with
significance.

2. Later in his discussion of “perspective by incongruity,” Burke also refers to this method
as a “planned incongruity” (Attitudes 309).

3. Here, I use the term civic discourse to mean an engagement in what Aristotle called
deliberative rhetoric: “The important subjects on which people deliberate and on
which deliberative orators give advice in public are mostly five in number, and
these are finances, war and peace, national defense, imports and exports, and the
framing of laws” (Rhetoric 53). The role of the un/artist in civic discourse is to present
artifacts that inform these deliberations, often indirectly. Additionally, it would also
be necessary for these deliberators to engage in Burke’s “perspective by incongruity”
methodology to link these artifacts to the topics being deliberated.

4. Here we could also continue with a discussion of pirates and the ways in which
they work outside of the law to enact some change in social, cultural, and political
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proceedings that ignore their interests and input. Perhaps we could learn to un/
compose ourselves via Captain Jack Sparrow of the Black Pearl (cf. the Pirates of the
Caribbean movies). Also, in Permanence and Change, Burke discusses the Nietzschean
theories of decadence and eternal recurrence as devices for working outside the law,
which he claims offers opportunities for “uniting under one head movements which
were generally considered in complete isolation from one another” (89).

5. This phrasing, in part, comes from Bad Religion’s song, “Stranger than Fiction,” from
the album Stranger Than Fiction.

6. Parts of this phrasing are reminiscent of Lyotard’s “Anamnesis of the Visible” (108).

7. Lyotard makes a similar comment when discussing ‘landscape arts’ in “Scapeland”:
“…the estrangement that landscape procures does not result from the transfer of a
sensorial organization into another sensorium, such as the transfer of the fragrance of
scents into the flagrance of colours or into the light of timbres. This estrangement is
absolute; it is the implosion of forms themselves, and forms are mind” (Inhuman 189).

8. If it is not clear yet, I am using Allan Kaprow’s term un-artist from here on out as a
reference to ‘comics artist’ since both share the common trait of leaving Art in favor
of doing something more interesting (without the constraints of art-istic forms or
conventions).

9. In the second chapter (“Figuration”) of Inessential Solidarity, Davis includes a subsection called “To Speak or to Kill” where she explicates this in more detail.

10. A kill switch, in current technological cultures, refers to a system put in place to
shut down an unwanted response (communication—usually between software and
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hardware) that cannot be stopped in the normal manner. Kill switches usually shut
down communication at all costs.

11. For more on this, see Burke’s Language as Symbolic Action, pp. 16-20.

12. I use play rather than work purposefully here.

13. This phrasing comes from the Ronald Reagan Presidential Administration’s (19801988) economic policy of “trickle-down economics,” a concept that proposed a standard
tax for all US citizens. Like this economic policy, persuasion provides those with the
resources more opportunities for success than those without the resources.

14. Here, I use demand as a verb meaning to require some action in order to function
effectively.

15. Gregory Ulmer discusses these logics in terms of linking and play throughout his
work, particularly in Heuretics, Teletheory, and Internet Invention.

16. Blanchot makes this claim in reference to the plastic arts, but my claim is that it is
also applicable to the un/artist imaginative play and the digital event.

17. For more on silence, and an explication of rhetorics of silence, see Cheryl Glenn’s
Unspoken: A Rhetoric of Silence.

18. This sentence refers to the Bill Readings quote in the introduction (chapter 4
description): Thought as an in(ter)vention that does “not resolve arguments; it does
not provide a metalanguage that can translate all other idioms into its own so that
their dispute can be settled, their claims arranged and evaluated on a homogenous
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scale”; rather, comics would throw “those who participate in pedagogy back into a
reflection upon the ungroundedness of their situation: their obligation to each other
and to a name that hails them as addressees, before they can think about it” (Readings,
University 161).

19. In part, this phrasing comes from Nietzsche’s famous aphorism: “If you stare into the
abyss long enough, the abyss stares back at you” (Beyond Good 89).

20. Blanchot writes that writers who play the strange game of literary language do not

…have the right to escape the consequences. Whoever has killed out of passion
cannot alter the passion by invoking it as an excuse. Whoever comes up against,
when writing, a truth that writing could not address is perhaps irresponsible, but
must answer all the more for this irresponsibility; he must answer for it without
calling it into question, without betraying it—that is the very secret about himself:
the innocence that saves him is not his own; it is that of the place he occupies, and
occupies by mistake, and with which he does not coincide” (Book to Come 28).

The digital is one of the places that un/artists occupy, and they do not coincide with it,
which is why they write with all the means and media available to them: to discover
this new game of literary language.

21. McLuhan makes this claim in reference to a tetrad form of the laws of media as he sees
them. However, the artifacts we have seen composed in the early 21st century do not
always adhere to these laws.

22. Recall my discussion of the un/artists in chapter 3—the connection to McLuhan’s
electronic man should be clear.
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23. Blanchot makes a similar claim about the work of the writer in relation to the book to
come: “The work demands much more: that one not worry about it, that one not seek it
out as a goal, that one have with it the most profound relationship of carelessness and
neglect” (Book to Come 30). Also, the term ambivalence here is being used in the sense
of ‘uncertainty’ and a mixture of ‘perspectives’ that have not yet been untangled.

24. Franny Howes sees this potential in comics when she explores a “multiplicity of visual
rhetorical traditions,” claiming that such a theory offers ways of composing “across
genre and form” that explores relationships “in a similar location, or within a similar
culture or discourse community” (“Imagining a Multiplicity…”).

25. This addresse the problem that Jeff Rice sees for digital writing: “…the problem of
digital writing is how to write visually in a complex but seamless fashion” (138).
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Chapter Five Endnotes
1. Lyotard has a major influence on this chapter, and the framework for this chapter
comes from his article “Domus and the Megalopolis” where he writes: “It is impossible
to think or write without some façade of a house at least rising up, a phantom, to
receive and to make a work of our peregrinations. Lost behind our thoughts, the domus
is also a mirage in front, the impossible dwelling” (198). The one who writes in this
illusion of a domus still rising is a (traitorous) stranger aware of the impossibility of
completing this dwelling (references to Heidegger should not be lost here).

2.

In “Book 5” of The Gay Science, Nietzsche has a similar view of the importance
of ‘picking the stick up from the other end’ (to use a Vitanzian phrase) of what is
generally accepted as “good”: “Even genius does not compensate for such a deficiency,
however much it may deceive people about it. This becomes clear to anyone who
has ever watched our most gifted painters and musicians from nearby. All of them,
with scarcely any exception, know how to use cunning inventions of manners, of
makeshift devices, and even of principles to give themselves after the event an artificial
semblance of such probity, of such solidity of training and culture—without, of course,
managing to deceive themselves, without silencing their own bad conscious. For you
surely know that all great modern artists suffer from a guilty conscience” (323-24).

3.

This is a reference to the USA PATRIOT Act—which stands for “Uniting and
Strengthening American by Providing the Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
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and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001”—passed in the immediate aftermath of the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. One of the most important parts of this act, if
you’ve read through it, is that it introduced “electronic communication” into the United
States’ surveillance laws. We’ve all heard the criticisms—which are, at times, driven
by paranoia—but it’s an important part of the ‘legality’ of composing within digital
environments.
Blanchot defines patriotism as “the most prodigious power of integration, being
that which, in the intimacy of thought, in everyday practice, in political movement, is
at work to reconcile everything—works, men, classes—to prevent all class struggle, to
found unity in the name of values that particularize (national particularism promoted
as universal), and to set aside the necessary division of an infinite destruction”
(Political 92)—World War II offers us one example of such a power that desired to
reconcile everything.

4.

This sublime work of the imagination seems akin to Sigmund Freud’s dream-work,
and Lyotard’s further development of this concept throughout his works, particularly in
The Libidinal Economy and “The Dream-Work Does Not Think” (which can be found in
The Lyotard Reader, edited by Andrew E. Benjamin).

5.

For a further explanation of this concept, see Gerald L. Bruns’ book, Maurice
Blanchot: The Refusal of Philosophy, pp. 138-39.

6.

Matthew Kirshenbaum situates digital humanities similarly in the context of
scholarship: “Whatever else it might be then, the digital humanities today is about a
scholarship (and a pedagogy) that is publicly visible in ways to which we are generally
unaccustomed, a scholarship and pedagogy that are bound up with infrastructure
in ways that are deeper and more explicit than we are generally accustomed to, a
scholarship and pedagogy that are collaborative and depend on networks of people and
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that live an active 24/7 life online” (“What is Digital Humanities…” 6).

7.

This is a double reference to the Council of Writing Program Administrators and
the political bodies that set policy for education, knowledge, and domestic and
international relations.

8.

This is a reference to Nietzsche’s call for “another kind of art” that relies on the ability
to forget, to forget the past, to forget the world.

9.

This is a reference to Roland Barthes’ Writing Degree Zero, which he offers us as “no
more than an Introduction to what a History of Writing might be” (6).

10. This is an extension of Lyotard’s description of the postmodern in The Postmodern
Condition cited/referenced earlier.

11. Dilger explains these concepts: “With comfort, the first widespread concept of ease
relied on two other qualities: effortlessness, the reduction or elimination of physical
labor and intensive activity; and perhaps the most important, transparency, or freedom
from concern with complications or unnecessary attention to details and procedures”
(“Ease and Electracy” 110).

12. Nietzsche notes in 1875: “To make the individual uncomfortable, that is my task”
(Portable 50).

13. While not a direct reference, Cynthia Haynes speaks of a similar approach to Writing
Center pedagogy in “’Hanging Your Alias on Their Scene’: Writing Centers, Graffiti,
and Style.” As she writes: “graffiti serves as a sign for expressing anger without
violence in assigned writing” (120). This, I think, is what composition/rhetoric should
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aspire to in the digital age, writing on the networked walls.

14. Bruno Latour echoes a similar point in the first plank in his composition manifesto:
“In a first meaning, compositionism could stand as an alternative to critique […]. With
critique, you may debunk, reveal, unveil, but only as long as you establish, through this
process of creative destruction, a privileged access to the world of reality beyond the
veils of appearances. Critique, in other words, has all the limits of utopia: it relies on
the certainty of the world beyond this world. By contrast, for compositionism, there is
no world of beyond. It is all about immanence” (“An Attempt…” 475).

15. The concept of whatever, as stated earlier, comes from Giorgio Agamben’s The Coming
Community.

16. As stated in chapter 1, this way of composing, in Agamben’s view, is one that
communicates “online the empty space of the example, without being tied to any
common property, by any identity” (Coming 11).

17. Etymologically, traitor stems from the Latin traditorem, literally meaning “one who
delivers.”

18. Jean Baudrillard uses this phrasing when explicating the etymology of the term
aphorism (as an aphorism): “‘Aphorizein’ (from which we get the word ‘aphorism’)
means to retreat to such a distance that a horizon of thought is formed which never
again closes on itself” (Cool Memories V 31).

19. This is not to say the end of literature, but of another kind of literature resonating
with Katherine Hayles’ Electronic Literature, and beyond. Barthes also comments on
what may occur beyond Literature: “It is at this moment that the modes of writing
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begin to multiply. Each one, henceforth, be it the highly wrought, populist, neutral
or colloquial, sets itself up as the initial act whereby the writer acknowledges or
repudiates his bourgeois condition. Each one is an attempt to find a solution to this
Orphean problematics of modern Form: writers without Literature” (Writing Degree
Zero 61).

20. This is a direct reference to Twitter, a social networking platform that works with the
Short Message System (SMS) for mobile technologies. While SMS limits messages to
160 characters, Twitter shortened this limit to 140 so that “usernames” would be able
to be included before the message. Also, a “character” in a digital environment would
be the smallest “read-able” mark, not necessarily an alphabetic letter.

21. This term comes from McCloud’s Understanding Comics, but Hillary Chute’s
description of gutters is more helpful in this context: “…gutters, the rich empty spaces
between the selected moments that direct our interpretation” (“History and Graphic…”
342).

22. In The Two Virtuals, Alexander Reid explains how this is possible with the advent of
new media pedagogy: “New media pedagogy, because it still remains largely uncharted
and undisciplined, offers a number of such experimental opportunities. […] though
the means for teaching new media, and the particular contents of such courses,
remain fairly open, such courses quickly become a site for re-enacting some of the
oldest concerns in rhetorical instruction, particularly this concern that courses in new
media sacrifice humanistic content in the name of career preparation. This concern is
essentially a reincarnation of a debate between rhetoric as a set of skills and rhetoric/
philosophy as a mode of intellectual investigation that goes back to Plato’s arguments
against rhetoric in Gorgias and Phaedrus” (170-71).
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23. At the end of the preface to On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche writes that the
aphorism “is necessary above all to practice reading as an art in this way, something
that has been unlearned most thoroughly nowadays—and therefore it will be some
time before my writings are ‘readable’—something for which one has almost to be a cow
and in any case not a ‘modern man’: rumination” (23).

24. The ‘trace’ that Agamben refers to here is a reference to Jacques Derrida’s Of
Grammatology: “The trace is not only the disappearance of origin—within the discourse
that we sustain and according to the path that we follow it means that the origin did
not disappear, that it was never constituted except reciprocally by a nonorigin, the
trace, which thus becomes the origin of the trace. From then on, to wrench the concept
of the trace from the classical scheme, which would derive it from a presence or from
an originary nontrace and which would make of it an empirical mark, one must indeed
speak of an originary trace. […] The (pure) trace is differance. It does not depend on
any sensible plentitude, audible or visible, phonic or graphic. It is, on the contrary, the
condition of such a plentitude.” (61-62). A character, in this sense, would be such an
originary empirical mark for the condition of potentialities.

25. “The (committed) writer,” for Blanchot, saves “the place of the one who will come, to
preserve absence from all usurpation” (Political 118).

26. Courtesy of @l_I__I_l (renamed).

27. Courtesy of @tw1tt3rart (renamed). Unless otherwise noted, these designs can be
found on the individual artists’ pages on www.twitter.com.

28. Courtesy of @MargaR1da (renamed).
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29. Courtesy of @mightymegadon.

30. Courtesy of @TwitComicStrip.

31. Courtesy of @KatCutler. Very e.e. cummings, don’t you think?

32. Courtesy of @VisuellePoesie (renamed).

33. Courtesy of @hg47 (renamed).

34. Courtesy of @aggregart.

35. Courtesy of @followingfuture (renamed).

36. Courtesy of @aggregart (renamed, with a reference to Nietzsche’s Twilight of the
Idols, or, How to Philosophize with a Hammer).

37. Courtesy of @paintedtweets (renamed).

38. Courtesy of @140artist (renamed).

39. Courtesy of @hg47.

40. Courtesy of @MargaR1da.

41. Courtesy of @riv7art (renamed).
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